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Abstract 
This thesis examines the relationship between education, experience, and earnings 
in the context of human capital theory in the manufacturing sector of Iran. Using a 
sample of 15755 full-time male workers clustered within 35 firms, both single-level and 
multilevel statistical techniques were employed to evaluate the contribution of 
education and experience to earnings. The research also examines the advantages of 
applying a multilevel method of analysis to investigate the above relationship. 
This study has shown that, in the manufacturing sector of Iranian industry, the 
amount of education and experience is significantly and systematically associated with 
the earnings of employees. This helps to corroborate the notion that human capital 
acquired through education and experience provides individual economic benefits 
through improving the earning capacity of individuals. These findings are consistent 
with many other analyses of earnings based on human capital theory. 
The multilevel analysis showed that data used are affected by a hierarchical or 
clustered structure and the relationship between human capital variables and earnings 
varies across firms. As a result, as argued by multilevel methodologists and confirmed 
by our findings, the application of the OLS models in a hierarchical structure leads to 
incorrect inferences. This study has also shown that the relatively new statistical 
technique of multilevel modelling provides a powerful tool for examining earnings 
differentials and some of the effects of labour market structures on earnings. In general 
the use of a multilevel model provides evidence for the pecuniary externality effects of 
human capital. By treating individual firms as second level units of analysis, it has been 
shown that part of the differences in earnings can be attributed to the firms in which 
individuals are working. In particular clusters of highly educated people seem to have a 
positive effect on the amount of human capital created through experience. It would be 
interesting to see whether this finding has wider application. The multilevel technique 
also strengthens the explanatory power of human capital variables. 
Using qualitative methods, this research also examines the question "why does 
investment in human capital increase earnings?" The main findings tend to support the 
human capital interpretation of education rather than pure screening. 
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Molavi, 	 one 	 of the 	 greatest 	 Persian 	 poets 	 in 	 the 
thirteenth 	 century, 	 describes 	 the 	 understanding 	 and 
observation of a person of the reality through describing 
an elephant in a dark room. 	 For that purpose, he was 
exhibiting an elephant in a dark room that people were 
gathered to see the elephant. But as the place was so 
dark to permit them to see the elephant, they all felt it 
with their hands, to gain an idea of what it was like. He 
worded the observations of different people as follows: 
One felt its trunk, 	 and declared that the 
beast resembled a water pipe; another felt its 
ear, and said it must be a large fan; another 
its leg, 	 and thought it must be a pillar; 
another felt its back, and declared the beast 
must be like a great throne. 
According to the part which each felt, the 
person gave a different description of the 
animal: one, as it were, called it "Dal" and 
another "Ali'''. 
He finally concludes: 
If anyone had a light (candle) in his hand, 
the difference between the description of the 
animal would disappear. 
* Persian alphabet letter. 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
This chapter begins by describing the general background to the research. A 
discussion of the aims of the study and the research questions follows. The structure of 
the thesis is also outlined. 
1.1 Background and Points of Interest 
Individuals develop their productive capacities in large part through attending 
courses at school and university or college as their formal education, and on-the-job 
training and learning by doing as their non-formal education. An individual (above 
compulsory school age) has a choice of attending, for example, a college or entering the 
labour market. If s/he attends a school course, s/he may have to pay tuition fees and 
other direct costs of education, and living expenses, and to forgo earnings. This 
behaviour of the individual has long been of interest to economists and other social 
scientists. In fact, they have tried to explain what induces people to undergo and pay for 
educational activities. A range of explanations and hypotheses has been provided by 
social scientists. Economists have tried to explain individual behaviour through the 
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concept of human capital. According to this concept, an individual undergoes and pays 
for educational activities for the sake of future economic gain, particularly earnings. 
Following this interpretation of individual behaviour, the notion of investment in 
human capital emerged. It stems, in fact, from work in the eighteenth century. For 
example, in the 1770s Adam Smith in his masterpiece, The Wealth of Nations, identified 
the improvement of workers' skills (e.g., through education) as a source of personal 
incomes which partly explains earnings differentials. However, the notion has been 
considered as a separate topic in economics only in the twentieth century. In the 1930s 
Walsh (1935), for example, tried to investigate whether expenditures incurred by 
persons for the sake of their professional careers were a capital investment made in a 
profit-seeking and equalising market, and in response to the same motives that lead to 
investments in conventional capital. In the early 1960s the "human capital" concept 
entered the main stream of economic literature when Schultz (1961) in his inaugural 
lecture to the American Economic Association analysed educational expenditure as a 
form of investment; and by Becker's book with the title of Human Capital (1964; 
Reprinted in 1993). In this Becker developed a theory of human capital formation and 
analysed returns to investments in human capital. 
The concept of human capital, therefore, is the idea that individuals spend on 
themselves by means of education, training, on-the-job learning, job search, and the like 
for the sake of future economic benefits. Individuals may acquire additional education, 
choose jobs with low pay but with a high training and learning potential, and spend time 
searching for a job with the highest possible rate/level of pay. All these activities are 
costly, as they involve direct expenses such as tuition and fees paid for school/college 
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attendance, the cost of books and supplies, or the cost of enrolling in a (private) school, 
and indirect cost consisting of the earnings or consumption foregone while the human 
capital investments are being made. Costs are incurred not for the sake of present 
enjoyment, but in the expectation of future pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits. Since 
benefits derived from these investments accrue mainly in the future, the costly 
acquisition of productive capacities is viewed as an investment. It follows that the 
standard tools of economic analysis can be applied to the determinants and 
consequences of investments in human capital. In other words, in such a situation it is 
possible to measure the profitability of investment in human capital using the same 
techniques of benefit-cost analysis and investment appraisal that have been traditionally 
applied to physical capital. That is, through using cost-benefit techniques, a comparison 
between the economic profitability of, for example, different levels of education can be 
made.' 
Since the birth of human capital theory very many attempts have been made to 
test its basic ideas. In particular, there have been efforts to analyse the association 
between higher education and higher earnings. The association provides evidence that 
students undergoing educational activities may be motivated by economic benefits and 
that education and (on-the-job) training are good investments, which are rewarded in the 
labour market with higher earnings. 
Two approaches have been employed in this field; one is concerned with 
collecting data about the intention of students to continue their education in order to 
Besides direct economic benefits, education may have direct consumption and other non-economic 
benefits, which are elaborated in chapter 2. 
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study "whether or not they take a systematic forward-looking view of earnings 
prospects" (i.e., an ex ante approach). This approach is used in the works of Freeman 
(1976), Williams and Gordon (1981) and Menon (1997). The other is to collect data 
about employees' educational qualifications and their earnings (i.e., an ex post 
approach) which is the focus of this study. This has been chosen because through this 
approach (rather than the ex ante one) it is possible to collect data from the real world to 
investigate the effects of both human capital variables (such as education and 
experience) and non-human capital factors (e.g., the characteristics of enterprises) on 
earnings. 
Many efforts have been made to establish a relationship between education and 
training and earnings and, in turn, to evaluate returns to education and training. Some of 
the most well known are the studies by Mincer (1958, 1974), Psacharopoulos (1973, 
1981, 1985), Psacharopoulos and Williams (1973), Psacharopoulos and Layard (1979), 
Becker (1962, 1993), Schultz (1961, 1962), Carnoy (1995), Griffin and Ganderton 
(1996), Kingdon (1997), and Cooper and Cohn (1997). Generally speaking, the results 
of all studies tend to support the existence of an association between higher education 
and higher earnings. However, the conventional evaluation of returns to education and 
the contribution of education and training to increasing earnings, derived from the well-
known Mincerian earnings function, has been questioned because it ignores factors such 
as the quality of education (Griliches, 1977; Betts, 1995), ability (Griliches, 1977; 
Fagerlind, 1987), firm size (Siebert and Addison, 1991, cited in Polachek and Siebert, 
1993; Idson, 1995; Velenchik, 1997), team work (Idson, 1995), and geographical 
aggregation and location (Bisdsall and Behrman, 1984; Griffin and Edwards, 1993; 
Velenchik, 1997). It is argued that ignoring these factors leads to bias in estimating 
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returns to education and training. Nevertheless, little attention has been devoted to 
assessing the efficiency of the conventional OLS estimates, which rely on data 
dominated by a hierarchical structure. In other words, the empirical analysis of the 
relationship between education and training (experience) and earnings in the context of 
human capital has mainly been based on a single-level methodology assuming that the 
groups in which the individuals are clustered have a constant effect, if any, on earnings 
of the individuals. In reality, however, this may not be the case. That is, individuals in 
different groups may receive different levels of wage/salary, holding human capital 
variables constant. During their working life, they may experience different growth 
rates of earnings. Such phenomena are in part due to the fact that the group and its 
members both influence and are influenced by the group membership. To ignore this 
relationship, as Goldstein (1995:2) makes clear, risks overlooking the importance of 
group effects, and may render invalid many of the traditional statistical analysis 
techniques used for studying data relationships. For instance, it may lead to a situation 
where earnings of individuals in the same group are correlated to each other. Such 
correlation undermines one or two of basic assumptions on which the single-level 
method of analysis (OLS) is based. This causes the OLS estimates to be inefficient and, 
in turn, unreliable for the purpose of testing of hypotheses. For the purpose of policy 
implications, therefore, it is very important to examine empirically the existence of such 
statistical problems. 
To deal with such issues, a set of firms from the manufacturing sector in Iran was 
selected. Data from such firms enabled us to examine the effects of clustering on the 
issue of hypothesis testing. Such a data set provides a practical and actual example of 
data dominated by a clustered and hierarchical structure in the real world. Besides, 
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studying human capital analysis of earnings in the manufacturing sector can provide 
information for the sake of policy implications and also serve an academic purpose. In 
particular, concerning the latter purpose, it was of interest to assess the explanatory 
power of human capital theory in the context of the manufacturing sector. No study, to 
date, has been conducted to analyse earnings differentials in the context of human 
capital theory in this sector in Iran. 
The new technique of multilevel analysis deals with such clustering effects. 
Through employing this technique one is able to obtain statistically more efficient 
estimates of regression coefficients. By using the clustering information, the multilevel 
technique provides correct standard errors and significance tests, and these generally 
will be more "conservative" than the traditional methods. (Goldstein, 1995:3) By 
allowing the use of covariates measured at any of the levels of a hierarchy, it enables us 
to explore the extent to which differences in average earnings between firms may be 
accounted for by factors such as the characteristics of firm or other factors. It also 
makes it possible to study the extent to which firms differ for different kinds of 
employees. For example, it can be examined whether the variation between firms is 
greater for firms with higher or lower stocks of human capital. 
In empirical human capital analysis of earnings it is conventional to employ 
potential years of experience to account for earnings variation attributed to on-the-job 
training. That is, it is assumed that graduates start their working lives immediately after 
graduation. (Mincer 1974:84) We consider such an assumption implausible for the case 
of countries experiencing a relatively high rate of unemployment. We examine the 
relaxation of this assumption and its empirical effect on the coefficient of years of 
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experience, through employing actual versus estimated years of experience. The 
variation of the contribution of years of schooling at different stages of education and 
the cross-effect of education and experience are two other important issues which have 
not been illuminated and investigated properly. 
Although there is general agreement on the fact that there exists a strong 
association between higher education and higher earnings from an individual 
standpoint, the reason for which (higher) education leads to higher earnings has long 
been debated between human capital theorists and supporters of the screening 
hypotheses. The human capital view holds that education provides the cognitive, 
behavioural and manual capacities that increase productivity on the job and therefore 
earnings. In contrast, in the screening and signalling theories of Arrow (1973), Spence 
(1974), and Stiglitz (1975) education is an indicator of pre-existing ability. More able 
individuals invest in education to signal their higher abilities. Employers, therefore, use 
educational qualifications to select more able individuals in the absence of any better 
information, but education itself does not contribute to productivity. 
Several attempts have been made to study empirically the debate between human 
capital theory and its rival hypotheses through employing various research methods 
such as investigating the relationship between education and productivity in agriculture 
(e.g., Welch, 1970; Lockheed, 1987) and industry (e.g., Fuller, 1970; Min, 1987, cited 
in Carnoy 1994); comparing earnings of the self-employed or employees in the private 
sector, as a non-screened group, with those of the employed as a screened group (e.g., 
Wolpin, 1977; Riley, 1979; Katz and Ziderman, 1980; Grubb, 1993; Arabsheibani and 
Rees, 1998); and analysing supervisors' ratings of their subordinates, which were 
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regarded as a productivity criterion (Medoff and Abraham, 1981). However, little 
attention has been devoted to illuminating the core of the debate, that is, why employers 
are willing to pay more to more highly educated workers and whether they consider 
education as well as training as productivity-enhancing elements. Besides, the above 
mentioned methods are able only to establish a correlation between human capital 
variables and earnings. Such a correlation may provide evidence to imply that more 
educated employees are paid more because they are more productive. It does not 
indicate whether the greater productivity of the employees is due to additional education 
or to higher innate ability. Moreover, when data are derived from a relatively 
homogeneous set of observations in the sense that employees selected from an (non-
screened) economic sector, such methods are not appropriate to examine the 
productivity-augmenting role of education. Some evidence on such issues can be 
derived from interviews. 
Screening hypotheses fail to provide any explanation for individuals' and firms' 
investment spending on human capital through training and on-the-job learning. In our 
qualitative analysis, we extend the debate by including these forms of investment. That 
is, we intend to examine the question whether investments in human capital through 
education, experience, and training are thought by employers to improve the 
productivity of their employees. 
1.2 Research Questions 
In the preceding section, a general background to the research and the points of 
interest have been described. The main research questions, which are the focus of this 
17 
study, are as follows: 
1. Do education and experience contribute to increasing earnings in the manufacturing 
sector in Iran? If so, to what extent? 
2. Is a multilevel statistical analysis a more appropriate approach than the conventional 
OLS for evaluating the effects of education and experience on earnings? 
3. Is the contribution of education (as well as experience and training) to higher 
earnings due to the productivity-augmenting role of education or does education 
serve only as a filter to identify abler workers? 
For the purpose of studying the first two research questions, statistical analyses 
(i.e., earnings functions) using data from the manufacturing sector were employed 
which enabled us to evaluate the contributions of, among other factors, education and 
experience to increasing earnings. In particular, these analyses have contributed to the 
understanding of patterns of employee earnings differentials and, therefore, helped us to 
evaluate the explanatory power of human capital theory in the context of the 
manufacturing sector. Since data have been derived from a labour market, which is 
dominated by a hierarchical structure (i.e., employees are grouped or clustered within a 
firm and that the group and its members both influence and are influenced by the group 
membership), it is argued that applying the conventional OLS methodology cannot 
provide reliable results for testing of hypotheses.' The research, therefore, attempted to 
examine the advantages of employing multilevel models in the context of human capital 
2 More elaboration is given in chapter 3. 
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investigation of earnings differentials through comparing the results of an OLS 
approach with those of a multilevel one. To do this it was essential to have data in as 
much detail as possible. Having detailed data from the manufacturing sector of Iran, we 
were able to investigate the effects of a hierarchical structure on statistical analysis of 
earnings in the context of human capital theory. 
To collect data for the examination of the third research question, we interviewed 
the representatives of 10 firms. Qualitative methods of analysis were employed to 
analyse data; a number of main themes were identified, and data were analysed in detail 
and reported using indicative quotations to examine the views of employers in 
connection with investment in human capital and productivity. 
1.3 Organisation of the Thesis 
This thesis consists of eight chapters. Chapter 1 outlines the aims and objectives 
of the study. Chapter 2 deals with the theoretical and empirical background to the 
issues, showing the development from an ad hoc explanation of the education and 
earnings relationship to a systematic one (i.e., human capital theory). It also reviews the 
developments and criticisms of human capital theory during the last three decades, to 
highlight the points that need further investigation. In particular, it was found that 
empirical estimates of the impact of human capital variables on earnings (derived from 
the human capital analysis of earnings applying Mincerian types of earnings function) 
have been criticised, though in an ad hoc manner, mostly for ignoring some relevant 
variables. Applying multilevel modelling, we argue that such variables can 
systematically be classified into different levels making it possible to provide a better 
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and a more systematic explanation of the determinants of earnings. Moreover, as 
mentioned above, little attention has been paid to the issue of the efficiency of the 
traditional OLS estimates,3 which have extensively been used in the literature. In 
particular, it was found that there has been no study investigating earnings determinants 
in the manufacturing sector in Iran. 
The third chapter discusses the methods of investigating the research questions. 
Research questions are elaborated, and the concepts, units of analysis, and variables 
employed are defined and discussed. Methods of collecting and analysing data are 
examined and justified. In particular, a multilevel statistical experiment was proposed 
through which the effects of clustering on the estimates of the coefficients of human 
capital variables could be examined. 
Since the manufacturing sector of Iran's economy has been selected as a case 
study, chapter 4 gives the reader some general information concerning the current 
political and economic structure of Iran, and describes the manufacturing sector as well 
as the education system of the country. Information presented in this chapter makes it 
possible to compare the characteristics of the sample of firms used in this study with 
those of the manufacturing sector, which were derived from the general population and 
housing censuses. In particular, it helps us to examine dramatic changes in the number 
of students at and graduates from higher education institutions, which is helpful for the 
interpretation of the results of the earnings functions. 
3 Few studies examine the issue of heteroscedasticity, which are reviewed in chapter 2. 
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With regard to the first research question, chapter 5 presents a brief descriptive 
review of the characteristics of the observations and reports the results of the traditional 
OLS analysis of earnings. It was found that the conventional human capital variables 
explain a relatively large part of the earnings variation among the employees, and the 
results are consistent with human capital theory and most of the empirical studies. It 
was also found that employees who have had managerial responsibility earn more than 
their counterparts who have not had any managerial responsibility. In connection with 
the examination of effects of other determinants of earnings on the coefficients of 
human capital variables, we attempted to include firm variables, such as size, 
geographical location, and industry, in earnings functions. All these variables were 
found to be important determinants of earnings and therefore consistent with other 
empirical investigations. 
Chapter 6 investigates the appropriateness of multilevel techniques in human 
capital analysis of earnings and presents the results of the multilevel analyses. At first, 
the question whether data used were dominated by a hierarchical structure was 
examined. Statistical tests showed that this is the case; therefore to have efficient 
estimates, application of multilevel analysis is essential. Then, the issue of the reliability 
of hypothesis testing was investigated and it was found that in a hierarchical structure, 
the conventional OLS estimators may mislead us in testing of hypotheses. As a result of 
our analyses, we found that the conventional variables at firm level (i.e., size of firm, 
geographical location and industry) become insignificant when the cluster effects are 
incorporated through employing the multilevel technique. This technique also enabled 
us to study the effects of contextual variables at firm level such as the average stock of 
human capital in each firm, which shed light on the issue of the external pecuniary 
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benefits of human capital density. Overall, the results of multilevel analysis highlight 
the importance of human capital variables and weaken the role of non-human capital 
variables in the determination of earnings. The last part of the chapter examines the 
relevancy of estimated instead of actual years of experience in the context of the 
manufacturing sector. It was found that the inclusion of estimated years of experience 
would overstate the effect of experience on earnings. 
Chapter 7 focuses on the debate between human capital theory and screening 
hypotheses concerning the productivity-enhancing role of education. For that purpose, 
qualitative methods of analysis were used. In the first section of the chapter, data 
concerning the employers' views of the role of education in recruitment and increasing 
productivity is presented and analysed. Experience and training, as two other important 
elements of human capital, were examined from the viewpoint of the representatives of 
selected companies in the next two sections. The results of the analyses in this chapter 
tend to support the human capital theory proposition asserting that investments in 
human capital, in general, and education, in particular, improve the productive capacity 
of individuals. Moreover, employers do consider educational qualifications as a 
screening device to help them in the initial selection of their prospective employees. 
The last chapter presents a summary of the results and proposes methodological 
and policy implications. 
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Chapter 2 Theoretical and Empirical Background 
2.1 Introduction 
This study investigates the relationship between education, experience and 
earnings in the context of human capital theory. In this chapter, the theoretical and 
empirical considerations are reviewed. The first part of the chapter looks at the 
theoretical developments from Adam Smith's explanation of education and 
wages/earnings differentials in the 1770s to the birth and subsequent developments of 
human capital theory and its rival hypotheses. The second part critically examines the 
empirical studies of human capital theory based on (Mincerian) earnings functions 
accompanied by a review of the literature on the screening and signalling hypotheses. 
Finally, a summary and some conclusions follow highlighting some of the shortcomings 
of previous empirical research, which merit further investigation. 
2.2 Theoretical Status of Investment in Human Capital 
In this section, we review human capital interpretation of spending on human 
beings. Then, the Shaffer's critique of human capital concept, that is the application of 
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the concept of capital to man, is illuminated. In 1970s, some alternative hypotheses 
emerged challenging the notions of human capital theory. Last part of the theoretical 
section deals with the debate between human capital theory and its rival hypotheses. 
2.2.1 Human Capital Theory 
Treating human beings within the framework of capital analysis is by no means 
new. The analogy between human beings and their skills and physical capital have been 
recognised for a long time. 
William Petty, the early actuary and national income accountant, is generally 
credited with the first serious application of the concept of human capital, when in 1676 
he compared the loss of armaments, machinery and other instruments of warfare with 
the loss of human life (Rosen, 1987: 682). Labour to him was the father of wealth 
(Kiker, 1966:3). However, it was Adam Smith who set the subject on its main course. In 
his masterpiece the Wealth of Nations, he identified the improvement of worker's skills 
as a fundamental source of economic progress and increasing economic welfare. He 
also demonstrated how investments in human capital and labour market skills affect 
personal incomes and the structure of wages (Rosen, 1987:682). Nevertheless, in 1930s 
empirical investigation in connection with cost imputation of human capital value was 
launched. For example, in 1935 Walsh was the first economist who attempted to apply a 
cost-benefit technique of analysis to education as an investment and particularly 
interested in whether expenditures incurred by persons for professional careers were a 
capital investment made in a profit-seeking, equalising market, and in response to the 
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same motives that lead to investments in conventional capital. In his analysis, Walsh 
concludes that: 
The outcome tends to corroborate the doctrine that useful abilities acquired 
through professional education are subject to the same influences as other 
forms of capital. Investment in training these capacities tends to be made as 
long as the returns promise to cover the cost of that training with an 
ordinary commercial profit. (Walsh, 1935: 284) 
However, the substantial and systematic impetus for rapid progress in this area 
was launched in the late 1950s and early 1960s. The first impetus stems from 
economists' interests in understanding the nature and sources of economic growth (the 
works of, e.g., Schultz, 1961; Denison, 1962; and Becker, 1962, 1964, reprinted in: 
Becker 1993), the earnings differentials (studies by Mincer, 1958; Miller, 1960; and 
Becker, 1964, reprinted in: Becker 1993), and, in turn, incentives for investing in 
human beings (e.g. Schultz, 1959; and Becker, 1964). 
In terms of the application of a theoretical framework for the analysis of earnings 
differentials, it was Mincer who in his pioneering work in 1958, Investment in Human 
Capital and Personal Income Distribution, tried to explain earnings differentials in the 
context of human capital theory. Mincer in this study finds that: 
The implications for income distributions of individual differences in 
investment in human capital have been derived in a theoretical model in 
which the process of investment is subject to free choice. The choice refers 
to training differing primarily in the length of time it requires. Since the 
time spent in training constitutes a postponement of earnings to a later age, 
the assumption of rational choice means an equalization of present values of 
life-earnings at the time the choice is made. As Adam Smith observed, this 
equalization implies higher annual pay in occupations that require more 
training. (Mincer, 1958: 301) 
25 
So it indicates that, from the viewpoint of individual behaviour, individuals choose to 
invest in themselves so as to maximise (the present value of) their life time earnings. In 
fact, this and subsequent works by Mincer have provided the basis for a vast body of 
empirical research on the level and distribution of life cycle earnings and the returns to 
education in the context of human capital theory. (Willis, 1986: 549) 
However, it was not until Schultz's inaugural address to the American 
Economics Association in 1960 that the concept was fully developed and entered into 
the mainstream of economic literature.' Irrespective of the macroeconomic aspect of 
human capital theory, Schultz emphasised the micro and individual aspect in which he 
highlights the motives for spending money on education and other kinds of human 
capital formation such as health, migration, job searching, etc. In that respect he argues: 
Although it is obvious that people acquire useful skills and knowledge, it is 
not obvious that these skills and knowledge are a form of capital ... 
Much of what we call consumption constitutes investment in human capital. 
Direct expenditures on education, health, and internal migration to take 
advantage of better job opportunities are clear examples. Earnings foregone 
by mature students attending school and by workers acquiring on-the-job 
training are equally clear examples. ... In these and similar ways the quality 
of human effort can be greatly improved and its productivity enhanced. I 
shall contend that such investment in human capital accounts for most of the 
impressive rise in the real earnings per worker. (Schultz, 1961: 97) 
The fundamental framework of analysis for virtually all subsequent work in this 
area was provided by Becker who not only organised the emerging empirical 
observations but also provided a systematic method for seeking new results and 
' More discussion is provided, for example, by: Rosen (1987) and Mace (1992). 
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implications of the theory.2 In accordance with Schultz's analysis, Becker organised his 
theoretical development around the concept of the rate of return on investment, as 
calculated by comparing the earnings streams in discounted present value on alternative 
courses of actions. In Becker's view, rational agents pursue investments in their 
education and training up to the point where the marginal rate of return equals the 
opportunity cost of funds. After criticising the reluctance of economists to interpret 
improvements in the effectiveness and amount of human resources in the same way as 
expanding physical capital, he highlights the explanatory power of investment approach 
to human resources for a wide range of phenomena to justify the application of 
investment theory in the context of human beings. In that respect he states that: 
... an investment approach to human resources is a powerful and simple tool 
capable of explaining a wide range of phenomena, including much that has 
been either ignored or given ad hoc interpretations. (Becker, 1964 reprinted 
in: 1993: 85-86) 
An example in that connection is that a relatively large fraction of younger 
persons are in school or on-the-job training, change jobs and locations, and add to their 
knowledge of economic, political, and social opportunities. Such behaviour may be 
explained in the way that the young are relatively more interested in learning, able to 
absorb new ideas, less tied down by family responsibilities, more easily supported by 
parents, or more flexible about changing their routine and place of living. However, in 
Becker's view, the main explanation is that younger people have a greater incentive to 
invest in themselves because they can collect the return over more years. In Becker's 
words: 
2 More details concerning the initial developments of human capital theory are given in Bowman (1966). 
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One need not rely only on life-cycle effects on capabilities, responsibilities, 
or attitude as soon as one recognises that schooling, training, mobility, and 
the like are ways to invest in human capital and that younger people have a 
greater incentive to invest because they can collect the return over more 
years. (Ibid.) 
Although formal schooling is one way in which human capital can be 
accumulated, it is not the only route. Many individuals and workers' skills are acquired 
through (on-the-job) training, ranging from formal training sessions to the much more 
informal on-the-job training. These issues have been considered initially by both Mincer 
(1962 and 1974) and Becker (1962 and 1964, reprinted in 1993), but it was Becker who 
developed a set of comprehensive theoretical underpinnings in the context of human 
capital theory. He distinguished general from specific training. General training in 
Becker's view refers to activities that generate extremely transferable skills equally 
usable or saleable in any firm or industry. For that reason general training increases the 
productivity of a worker at many jobs. 
General training is useful in many firms besides those providing it ... Most 
on-the-job training presumably increases the future marginal productivity of 
workers in the firms providing it; general training, however, also increases 
their marginal productivity in many other firms as well. (Becker, 1964 
reprinted in: 1993: 34) 
Other kinds of training increase productivity in the firms providing the training 
more than in other firms. These kinds of training Becker calls specific training. 
Completely specific training can be defined as training that has no effect on the 
productivity of trainees that would be useful in other firms. 
A key question that emerges here is who should bear the cost of training and who 
recoups the gain from the investments. 
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If all training were completely specific, the wage that an employee could get 
elsewhere, as Becker claims, would be independent of the amount of training he had 
received. In that case, firms provided that they could appropriate all the return would 
have to pay training costs, for no rational employee would pay for training that did not 
benefit him. (Ibid.: 41) 
However, firms will be unwilling to bear any of general training costs if labour 
markets are competitive. The reason is that since general training is transferable, any 
worker who receives general training paid for by the firm could quit upon completion of 
training, and the firm would be unable to recoup any of its general training investments 
in the worker. Therefore, the worker should bear the cost of training. In Becker's words: 
... firms would provide general training only if they did not have to pay any 
of the costs. Persons receiving general training would be willing to pay 
these costs since training raises their future wages. Hence it is the trainees, 
not the firms, who would bear the cost of general training and profit from 
the return. (Ibid.: 34) 
In reality, however, completely general and specific training are polar extremes, 
and in many cases, investments in human resources represent a mix of these two types 
of training. That is, much on-the-job training, as Becker explains, is neither completely 
specific nor completely general but increases productivity more in the firms providing it 
and falls within the definition of specific training. The rest increases productivity by at 
least as much as in other firms and falls within a definition of general training. 
However, once we move away from the perfect competition market, freely 
functioning markets of theory to real world situations, as Ziderman (1978: 23) remarks, 
the careful distinction drawn between general and specific training (i.e. Becker's 
classification) loses much of its significance. Training provided under monopsony 
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conditions, even if general in essence, becomes firm-specific in reality. Conversely, 
training that may have been de facto specific will be rendered general by competitive 
entry. It is the potential mobility of trainees, therefore, not the generality of skills, as 
such, that is critical to the training investment decision of a firm. Firms are unlikely to 
invest in trainees with a high probability of moving, which is seen to be related partially 
to the generality of training provided. Thus, firms would finance investment in general 
training if there were a low mobility potential and if the general training being 
converted to a specific investment by labour market imperfections, geographical 
location, the institutional setting, internal labour market, etc. (The same critique of 
Becker's training theory was presented by Stevens, 1996.) 
Regardless of the issue of financing training investment, in the context of human 
capital theory it is also assumed that additional human capital can be accumulated by 
incremental job experience. Such accumulation of human capital varies across jobs, 
firms, time spans, etc. As far as I am aware, little effort beyond the theoretical 
developments has been devoted to clarify and elaborate these kinds of human capital 
formation. 
The idea of investment in human capital through a variety of ways and the 
expectation of future returns have been addressed more explicitly in 1970's literature 
onwards. Blaug (1976a) in his paper (The Empirical Status of Human Capital Theory: A 
Slightly Jaundiced Survey), for example, highlights future returns (in both pecuniary 
and non-pecuniary terms) as an explanation of why people invest in themselves. He 
explains that the hard core of the human capital research programme is the idea that 
people spend on themselves in diverse ways (e.g. through education, in-service training, 
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health, job search, information retrieval, and migration) not for the sake of present 
enjoyments, but for the sake of future pecuniary and non pecuniary returns. All these 
phenomena, therefore, may be viewed as investment rather than consumption. What 
knits these phenomena together, in Blaug's view, is not the question of who undertakes 
what, but rather the fact that the decision-maker, whoever he is, looks forward to the 
future for the justification of his present actions. (Blaug, 1976a: 5) 
Woodhall also remarks that "the concept of human capital refers to the fact that 
human beings invest in themselves, by means of education, training, or other activities, 
which raises their future income by increasing their lifetime earnings." (Woodhall, 
1995: 24) 
2.2.2 Shaffer's Critique of Human Capital Concept 
The above consideration provides a theoretical framework to shed light on 
analysing individuals' investment in self-improvement. However, this notion (i.e., the 
hard core, in Blaug's terms) of human capital and the attempt to apply the concept of 
capital to man were not without its critics. After the birth of human capital theory, 
Shaffer (1961) attacked the notion. He argued that investment in man is essentially 
different from investment in non-human capital. Because a part of any one direct 
expenditure for the improvement of man, in Shaffer's view, is undertaken for reasons 
other than the expectation of a monetary return, it has no traceable effects on future 
output and satisfies wants directly. To the extent to which, as he claims, any part of such 
an expenditure is investment it is inseparable from other parts which are not being 
classified as investment. 
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Where it is possible to separate consumption expenditure from investment in 
man, it would still remain, in Shaffer's view, a virtual impossibility to allocate a specific 
return to a specific investment in man. 
In the case of overcoming the above difficulties and impossibilities Shaffer 
believed that it would in most instances still be ill-advised, from the viewpoint of social 
and economic welfare, to utilise the information thus obtained as the exclusive or even 
the primary basis for policy formation. (Shaffer, 1961: 46) 
These kinds of criticism can be classified, at least, into two categories; 
theoretical and methodological aspects. In terms of theory, Shaffer's argument 
weakened and even denied any economic motivations of students and parents to invest 
in education. In his view, as Schultz (1961 revised in: 1971: 52) states, the students and 
parents are motivated as current consumers of education but only weakly or not 
motivated at all as investors in education. Undoubtedly, it is true that some education is 
wholly for current consumption, and obviously in that case, as Schultz explains, there 
would be no investment opportunity, hence no bases for investment motivation. But, 
prospects of larger future earnings play a strong motivating role in the case of students 
who attend medical schools, schools for dentists, engineers, accountants, etc. In that 
connection, Williams provides a clarification that "there are always some individuals 
who will go to the university under almost any circumstances. There are others who are 
equally certain not to do so. Between these extremes lies a spectrum of individuals more 
or less likely to go, depending on circumstances. The economic model claims that over 
parts of this spectrum, expectations of economic return are a factor influencing the 
decisions of some individuals." (Williams, 1984: 82) 
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Shaffer's criticism of human capital theory, it would seem, has not been pursued 
much further by economists. Convincing results of some ex ante studies of human 
capital theory (e.g., works of Freeman, 1971, 1976; Williams and Gordon, 1981; and 
Menon, 1997) and investigations of educational choice of students in which (future) 
earnings and the possibility of getting a job as the influential factors in students' choices 
were taken into account (e.g., study by Borghans et al, 1996: 71) indicate that there are 
unlikely to be such criticisms in the future either. 
The rest of Shaffer's points are methodological. For example, the difficulty of 
separating consumption from investment element of spending on education is directly 
related to providing more appropriate and accurate data (i.e., that of investment rather 
than both investment and consumption) to test the key notion of human capital theory. 
Trying to achieve the highest degree of accuracy in that respect indeed works in favour 
of rather than against human capital theory, because in such circumstances the rates of 
return to education, as Schultz (1959) puts it, would be higher than those of 
conventional way of computing. 
The matter of attribution of a specific return to a specific investment in man is 
again related to the method of data analysis. Of course, by applying regression analysis 
it is much easier to do so through controlling for other influential factors. 
In sum, it can be said that the notion of the human capital paradigm, that is the 
explanation of individual investment behaviour, has a strong theoretical and empirical 
base. However, in the 1970s screening hypotheses emerged that challenged the basic 
assumption of human capital theory that it is investment in human capital that improves 
the productive, and in turn future-earnings, capacity of individuals. In the following 
section the debate between human capital theory and its rivals is elaborated. 
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2.2.3 Screening Hypotheses 
In section 2.2.1, we reviewed the relevant issues concerning theoretical 
underpinnings of investment in human capital. We found that human capital theory 
could provide a theoretical explanation to justify individual behaviour in investing in 
themselves. As Cohn and Geske (1990: 34) point out, the basic premise of the human 
capital approach is that variations in labour income are due, in part, to differences in 
labour quality in terms of the amount of human capital acquired by the workers. This 
premise, however, is based on a strong assumption that investments in human capital 
improve the productivity of workers, and hence increase earnings through imparting 
useful knowledge and skills. This assumption has been attacked by critics3 who have 
argued that the higher earnings of more educated workers reflects their superior ability, 
higher social background, stronger motivation, etc. rather than specific knowledge and 
skills acquired during the educational process. These critics, therefore, are sceptical 
about the productivity-augmenting role of education. In their view education serves as a 
screening device to select the abler workers.4 In what follows we elaborate the debate 
between human capital theory and its rival hypotheses. 
3 Among others are Arrow (1973, 1974), Filtering Theory; Spence (1973), Signalling Theory; and Stiglitz 
(1975), Screening Hypothesis. 
4 It is worth noting that the signalling and screening hypotheses challenging the productivity-augmenting 
role of education are not exactly identical. For example, in the view of the signalling hypothesis education 
does not contribute to society's net output, however in the view of screening education does have social 
value by signalling the more productive workers and thus bringing about an improved allocation of 
labour. Discussion presented in this section is confined to the question of whether education is a 
productivity-enhancing element or a screening device. A more detailed discussion concerning differences 
between the hypotheses is provided, e.g., by Johnes (1993a: 18-22). 
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Human capital theorists have highlighted the matter of productivity-augmenting 
effects of investments in human capital. Becker, for example, states that education and 
training are the most important investments in human capital. Many workers increase 
their productivity by learning new skills and perfecting old ones while on the job. 
(Becker, 1964, reprinted in: 1993:31) He also makes clear that 'human capital analysis 
assumes that schooling raises earnings and productivity mainly by providing 
knowledge, skills, and a way of analyzing problems.' (Becker, 1993: 19) Mincer also in 
that connection remarks that "If productivity-augmenting investments in human capital 
continue after the completion of schooling, the time distribution of these investments 
over the working life creates age variation in earnings." (Mincer, 1974: 64) And finally, 
Schultz (1961, reproduced in: 1993b: 97) attributes direct expenditures on education, 
health, and internal migration to take advantage of better job opportunities, and earnings 
foregone by mature students attending school and by workers acquiring on-the-job 
training as clear examples of investments in human capital. He argues that in these and 
similar ways the quality of human effort can be greatly improved and its productivity 
enhanced. 
Figure 2.1: The relationship between Education, Productivity and Earnings under 
Human Capital Theory 
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These kinds of consideration have provided the basic premise and assumption of 
the human capital theory, which ascertains the productivity-augmenting role of 
investments in human capital, and particularly in education. That is, it is assumed that 
investment in human capital, in general, and education, in particular, as Fig. 2.1 shows, 
directly improve the productive capacity, and in turn earnings, of individuals. (More 
discussion is given in Mace, 1987.) However, this premise has been challenged by some 
alternative theories emerged in 1970s such as signalling theory (Spence, 1973), filtering 
theory (Arrow, 1974), and the screening hypothesis (Stiglitz, 1975). According to these 
theories, education acts as a signal for pre-existing abilities and as a means for the 
already better off to get the best jobs, and productivity, therefore, is not altered by 
schooling. (Groot and Hartog, 1994: 5350) Two sides are involved in the signalling 
views of education; individual side and employer one. 
For the first side, the screening hypotheses provide alternative explanation that 
justifies the individual investment behaviour in a rather different way. Spence's 
signalling view, for example, states that an employer cannot directly observe the 
productive capabilities of an individual at the time he hires him. Nor will this 
information necessarily become available to the employer immediately after hiring. 
What the employer observes, as Spence argues, is a plethora of personal data in the 
form of observable characteristics and attributes (i.e., signals) of the individual, and it is 
these that must ultimately determine the employer's assessment of the productive 
capabilities of an applicant. For each set of signals that the employer confronts, he will 
have an expected marginal product for an individual who has these observable 
attributes. This determines the offered wage to applicants with those characteristics. 
Potential employees therefore confront an offered wage schedule whose arguments are 
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signals. Signals are alterable and therefore potentially subject to manipulation by the job 
applicant. Of course, there may be costs of making these adjustments. Education, for 
example, is costly (signalling cost). The individual will invest in education if there is 
sufficient return as defined by the offered wage schedule. It is postulated in this view 
that individuals select signals so as to maximise the difference between offered wages 
and signalling costs. (Spence, 1973) 
From the employer side, the "signalling" theory, as mentioned, views education as 
a signal that yields useful information to identify individuals with higher expected 
productivity. That is, the employer that cannot observe the productive capabilities of a 
potential employee at the time of hiring uses some observable characteristics such as 
education to select more able and more productive applicants through offering 
appropriate wages to the applicants with those characteristics. (Fig. 2.2 depicts such an 
interpretation.) This process of selection seems to be very cheap for the employer 
(Wiles, 1974) because the employer does not pay the costs of education. However, it 
should be mentioned that the signalling and screening hypotheses fail to explain the 
behaviour of the self-employed workers and the employers that spend on their 
employees to develop the employees' productive capacities after hiring the applicants. 
(More explanation concerning these alternatives theories is given in: Lazear, 1977; 
Cohn and Geske, 1990: 58; and Groot and Hartog, 1994: 5350.) 
Arrow (1974: 51-52) also attempted to formalise views expressed by some 
sociologists that diploma serves primarily as a measure of performance ability rather 
than as evidence of acquired skills. In his well-known paper "Higher Education as a 











economic performance; it increases neither cognition nor socialisation. Instead, higher 
education serves as a screening device, in that it sorts out individuals of differing 
abilities, thereby conveying information to the purchaser of workers' services who has a 
poor idea of the workers' productivity. It is assumed instead that the buyer has very 
good statistical information concerning the statistical distribution of productivities, but 
nothing more, from general information or previous experience. That is, there are, 
Arrow (1974:52) assumes, certain pieces of information about the worker, specifically 
whether or not he has a college diploma, which the employer can acquire costlessly. 
The worker would undergo education to signal his ability, which is of interest to 
employers. Therefore, the role of education is only to identify the abilities of individuals 
for potential employers. 
Figure 2.2: The Relationship between Education, Productivity, and Earnings under the 
Screening Hypotheses 
Note: It is assumed that employers do not observe the characteristics of employees 
presented in the shaded area. 
For the purpose of illumination, we can classify the relationship between 
investment in human capital and earnings in two dimensions; First, the existence of a 
positive relationship between education and earnings, and second the way in which 
education influences earnings. Both kinds of explanation highlight the fact that 
increasing earnings is an outcome of educational investment. From the viewpoint of an 
individual, it makes little, if any, difference whether the human capital or the signalling 
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hypothesis is valid; in either case the same private return to education can be expected. 
But from the viewpoint of society as a whole and of employers the situation is different. 
That is, for a society if the signalling view is valid, then the social return to schooling is 
overstated. In such a case, instead of subsidising education, it would be better for 
society to invest its scarce funds in more productive activities by finding and utilising 
less costly ways to screen high-quality/able workers.5 From the employers' view, 
however, the situation is more complicated and the issues need to be elaborated further. 
The way in which education affects earnings is the key debate between human 
capital theorists and screening theorists. This dimension is concerned with demand for 
(the services of) human capital and it is employers who provide demand for (the 
services of) human capital. In that respect, therefore, some relevant questions emerge: 
How and why do investments in human capital explain earnings differentials? Why do 
employers offer higher pay to more highly educated workers? Is it because more 
educated workers are more productive or because education merely serves as a 
screening device that identifies the more able, highly motivated young people? 
These kinds of questions from the viewpoint of an employer can be elaborated in 
two dimensions; the employer's incentive for paying more to the more educated, and 
spending for training of their employees. Assuming perfect competition for both labour 
and product markets, Becker in his theoretical developments tries to make a connection 
between wage and marginal product of a profit-maximising firm. He argues: 
5 Since investment in human capital from the viewpoint of society is beyond the scope of this study we 
confine our analysis to the situation of individuals and employers. 
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If there were no on-the-job training, wage rate would be given to the firm 
and would be independent of its actions. A profit-maximizing firm would be 
in equilibrium when marginal products equalled wages, that is, when 
marginal receipts equalled marginal expenditure. (Becker, 1964, reprinted 
in: 1993:31) 
It should be inferred, therefore, that the willingness of the employer to pay more 
to more educated workers is directly related to the fact that more educated workers 
should also be more productive, so there would be a perfect relation between wages and 
marginal productivity. In these circumstances, as Becker remarks, firms would not 
worry too much about the relation between labour conditions in the present and future, 
partly because workers would only be hired for one period and partly because wages 
and marginal products in future periods would be independent of a firm's current 
behaviour. As Becker explains, it can be assumed that workers have unique marginal 
products (for given amounts of other inputs) and wages in each period, which are, 
respectively, maximum productivity in all possible uses and the market wage rate. 
It is worthwhile noting that the above-mentioned relationship between earnings 
and productivity is consistent with both human capital theory and its rival hypotheses. 
That is, in either consideration, whether it is education or innate ability that contributes 
to improving productivity, employers would pay more to more educated workers in that 
the more educated are abler and more productive. Therefore, there is no a clear cut 
difference between human capital theory and screening hypotheses, at least, for the 
purpose of hypothesis testing.6 However, the screening hypotheses fail to explain, for 
example, post-school investments and employer investment in human capital after 
6 In the next chapter, however, we will suggest a qualitative method of analysis to shed some light on the 
relationship between education/earnings and productivity. 
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recruiting their employees. That is, if education, in a general sense, did not contribute to 
productivity, it would not be justifiable for an employer to finance and provide training 
for improving the skills of workers and contribute to the payment of educational tuition 
fees of his employees studying in an educational institution. 
Training, as mentioned above, is one way that employers invest in their human 
resources. In his training theory, Becker developed, what I would call, an explanation of 
"firm investment behaviour" which he switches human capital theory to the issue of 
profit-maximising equilibrium of a firm through "taking into account on-the-job 
training". In Becker's view the inclusion of on-the-job training in the investment-
decision process of a firm alters the conditions of the equilibrium, which depend only 
on current period and creates a connection between present and future receipts and 
expenditures. He, then, remarks: 
Training might lower current receipts and raise current expenditure, yet 
firms could profitably provide this training if future receipts were 
sufficiently raised or future expenditures sufficiently lowered. Expenditures 
during each period need not equal wages, receipts need not equal the 
maximum possible marginal productivity, and expenditures and receipts 
during all periods would be interrelated. (Becker, 1993: 32) 
In fact the firm will invest in human capital only if the discounted benefits accruing to 
the firm from the human capital investment are sufficiently large to cover the costs of 
the investment. Only under the productivity-adding role of such investment receipts 
during all periods would be raised. 
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2.2.4 Other Benefits of Education 
So far, our consideration has mainly focused on the effects of education and 
training on earnings. There are some other benefits attributed to education that are 
retained by both the individual being educated and by society. In this section we 
elaborate such benefits in more details. 
Besides the effect of education on earnings various benefits retained by the 
individual have been identified such as the consumption value of education, the ability 
to achieve one's desired family size, increasing productivity in the home, influencing 
the health of family particularly due to the mother's education, higher social status, 
increasing the individual's choices regarding consumption activities and purchases as 
well as investment activities (option value), etc. However, it is hard to measure and, in 
turn, to incorporate such kinds of benefits in calculating private rates of return to 
education. They are rarely included in empirical estimates of the rates. It is conventional 
that to calculate the private rates economists have limited themselves to the earnings 
(i.e., earnings after tax) benefits of education (Carnoy, 1995b: 365) and to the direct 
costs of education incurred by the individual and earnings forgone. 
Social benefits include both the private benefits and other benefits, which the 
individual being educated cannot capture and other members of society absorb such 
benefits. The latter can be classified into two categories. First category is tax payments 
associated with the education benefit (i.e., lifetime earnings stream) which accompanied 
with public costs of education are conventionally incorporated into the private rates of 
return to evaluate the social rates of return to education. The other consists of some 
external benefits that can be captured by members of society other than the persons 
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schooled and their immediate family (Wolfe, 1995: 159) such as preserving and 
encouraging democratic freedoms, reduction of criminal activity, increases in social 
cohesion and technological change, changes in income distribution, encouraging 
economic growth and expanding economic activities (e.g., producing books, training 
teachers, etc.). (There are more details in, among others: Weisbrod, 1964; Blaug, 1976b: 
105-114; Cohn and Geske 1990: 37-40; Carnoy, 1995b: 364-69; Wolfe, 1995: 159-163, 
Bennell, 1996; and McMahon, 1997.) 
2.3 
	
Empirical Status of Human Capital Theory 
2.3.1 Education, Experience, and Earnings: Earnings Functions 
The individual investment behaviour in the context of human capital theory has 
been investigated by many researchers through applying regression techniques. It was 
Mincer (1958) who initially developed a basic regression analysis framework for the 
explanation of personal income distribution in the context of human capital theory. He 
tried to generalise Smith's simple idea about how the costs of training for a profession 
affect its average earnings. (Rosen, 1992:159) High earnings are required to compensate 
for the costs of entry, as an equalising difference. He connected the human capital 
theory to survey data on earnings and earnings inequality. Mincer developed a semi-log 
regression, which has two key explanatory variables; schooling and experience years, as 
proxies for human capital investment, and natural logarithm of earnings as the 
dependent variable. In his earliest work, he concludes: 
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The empirical evidence is clearly consistent with all the implications of the 
model about the effects of education, occupation, and age on patterns of 
personal income distribution. (Mincer, 1958: 302) 
In subsequent works, Mincer fully developed his earnings functions. In his 1974 
book, Schooling, Experience, and Earnings, using data derived from the US decennial 
Census and Becker's (1962) analytical framework, he introduces life-cycle variations in 
earnings into the regression equation that enabled him to change the emphasis from age 
to labour market experience in so-called "age-earnings profile" generally increasing but 
concave shape of the path of earnings with age. He interpreted on-the-job training 
broadly to include learning by experience as well as explicit participation in training 
programmes. Mincer estimated experience as age minus schooling years minus six (the 
age at which schooling begins in the USA). He included a squared experience element 
in his equation for the matter of concave-shape of earnings profile and theory 
implications that the return to investment through on-the-job training falls over working 
life, as the period over which they can be used becomes shorter and the opportunity 
costs of investment that increase over working life as a person's wage increases. 
(Mincer, 1974:84,129; 1979:10) That is, Mincer introduced his basic earnings function 
as follows:7 
= No + f3t  S, + 132 X; + [33 X,2 + e, 	 (2.1) 
where y, S, X, and e are log earnings, years of schooling, years of experience and the 
error term, respectively. 
7 Mathematical proof is given in, e.g., Mincer (1974:84-91). 
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Overall, the earnings function, that is equation (2.1), became a very popular 
function in the human capital research paradigm.8 Most studies have adopted a 
Mincerian specification in which, as mentioned above, the core regressors are years of 
schooling, years of experience, and years of experience squared. Some have tried to 
reaffirm partly the appropriateness of the function and others have attempted to criticise 
it due to ignoring some other influential factors such as ability, school quality, 
externalities of investments in human capital, social background, etc. 
Among the first group are the works of Psacharopoulos (1985), Dougherty and 
Jimenez (1991), Psacharopoulos et al. (1994), and the like that use the basic Mincerian 
earnings function and/or confirm, at least some of, its underlying assumptions. 
Dougherty and Jimenez's study9, for example, tries to test and evaluate the 
assumptions of Mincerian earnings function that, in Dougherty and Jimenez's (1992: 
82) view, are as follows: 
(i) The appropriate definition of the dependent variable is the logarithm of 
earnings, as opposed to [absolute] earnings as such or any other functional form. 
(ii) There is no interaction between the contributions of the schooling and work 
experience variables to earnings. 
(iii) A simple function can be used to model lifetime earnings, making no 
distinction between early and mature labour market experience. 
8 As Becker remarks in his Nobel Lecture, the earnings equation is probably the most common empirical 
regression in microeconomics. (Becker, 1992: 393) 
9 It is worthwhile noting that Dougherty and Jimenez also criticise some other aspects of Mincerian 
earnings function that we will elaborate later. 
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Using data, which is a random sample of urban males in Brazil from the 1980 
census, they conclude that the semilogarithmic earnings function is superior to its linear 
counterpart. "This semilogarithmic version [versus linear version] is support by Box-
Cox transformation, by relative homoscedasticity in both the schooling and work 
experience dimensions, and by the relatively normal distribution of residuals." (Ibid.: 
96) 
A study using Mincerian earnings function, conducted by Psacharopoulos et al 
(1994), uses data on a sample of 1825 workers from the 1990 Household Survey in 
Paraguay to analyse the relationship between investment in human capital and earnings, 
and to calculate rates of return to investment in education at different levels. It was 
found that the sign of the coefficients of the first specification conform with human 
capital theory and the results of the study are consistent with what has been found in 
other countries with similar socio-economic characteristics. (Ibid.: 321, 325) 
On the other hand, some other researchers have tried to criticise the Mincerian 
earnings function mainly because (i) it ignores some relevant factors influencing 
earnings such as ability, school quality, geographical location, industry and economic 
sectors, etc. and (ii) it faces the problems of heteroscedasticity and misspecification. In 
what follows we review some important empirical literature briefly. 
In his well-known paper, Griliches (1977) highlights the various econometric 
issues that arise in estimating a relation between the logarithm of earnings, schooling 
and other variables and focuses on the matter of ability as an omitted variable and the 
various solutions to it. In this regard, he addresses some key questions such as "Why 
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should the equation [Mincerian earnings function] have this particular functional form? 
What other variables should be included in the equation? ..." (Griliches, 1977: 1) 
In addressing the various solutions for the problem of omitted ability he 
emphasises two theoretical points as follows: 
(i) In optimizing models there is no good a priori reason to expect the 
"ability bias" (or the direct coefficient of a measure of ability in the earnings 
function) to be positive. Thus, it shouldn't be too surprising if it turns out to 
be small or negative. (ii) An asymmetrical attempt to protect oneself against 
possible biases by putting more variables into the equation or by looking 
only within finer and finer data cuts, can make matters worse, by 
exacerbating other biases already present in the data. (Griliches, 1977:18) 
Using data from National Longitudinal Survey of Young Men of USA, he tries 
to support the theoretical points and concludes: 
Treating the problem asymmetrically and including small direct measures of 
"ability" in the earnings function indicates a relatively small direct 
contribution of "ability" to the explanation of the observed dispersion in 
expected and actual earnings ... But, when schooling is treated 
symmetrically with ability measures, allowing it, too, to be subject to errors 
of measurement or to be correlated to the disturbance in earnings function, 
the conclusions are reversed ... (Ibid.: 18) 
It can be inferred that the result of analysis and examining the effects of an 
omitted variable (e.g., ability) on earnings to correct bias in the schooling coefficient 
partly depends on the assumption and/or the aim of the researcher. If s/he assumed that 
schooling is not related to the disturbance term, through employing a simple reduced 
form of earnings equation, omitting ability would lead to overestimating the returns to 
education. Including direct measures of ability (e.g., IQ) o  in the equation would solve 
10 A range of ability measures used in the literature have been summarised by Cohn and Geske (1990: 
50). 
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the problem of overestimating. On the other hand, if s/he tried to evaluate the returns to 
education in a situation where education is the result, in part, of optimising investment 
behaviour by individuals and/or their families, and the structure of ability/demand and 
opportunity/supply is taken into account in the endogenous equations, he might 
underestimate the returns to education by using the simple least squares. Because in 
such circumstances, schooling and error term are correlated due to interaction between 
ability and the schooling. 
Besides the above criticisms highlighted by Griliches, the empirical analysis of 
"ability, education and earnings" may face other serious questions. That is, it is innate 
ability whose effect must be taken into account and, therefore, it can be questioned 
whether 'ability' measures, such as IQ or other mental tests do reflect an individual's 
innate ability. In fact ability is an unobserved latent variable that not only is difficult to 
measurer but also, as Griliches (1977: 7) points out, both drives people to get relatively 
more schooling and earn more income, given the same years of schooling, and perhaps 
also enables and motivates people to score better on various tests. 
Moreover, there is a problem with the age at which measures were taken in the 
empirical studies. That is, these measures of ability, as Mincer (1976) states, grow over 
time with age and with the early growth of an individual's human capital. The results of 
correction for bias in the schooling coefficient would depend on the time at which 
ability was measured. For example, Griliches and Mason (1972) estimated that the 
More detailed discussion is provided, e.g., by Becker (1967; Reprinted in: 1993:108-158), Mincer 
(1974: 138), and Atkinson (1982:86-97). 
12 As Mace (1987: 27) states, it seems nobody has devised an adequate measure of innate ability. 
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coefficient of schooling is reduced by 7-10 percent, if the correction allows for ability 
measures prior to schooling. If post-school 'ability' measures are used, the downward 
bias in the schooling coefficient is exaggerated by almost 100 percent. (Cited in Mincer, 
1976: 170) 
Psacharopoulos and Layard (1979) attempt to apply and to criticise the Mincerian 
earnings function in another way. They claim that Mincer's regression approach in 
which log earnings are regressed on schooling, work experience and work experience 
squared, only yields valid estimations of the direct effects of schooling on earnings if 
there is no relationship between schooling and the amount of post-school investment 
and its profitability. A necessary (though not sufficient) condition for this to be true, 
according to them, is that the profiles of log-earnings, as experience varies, are 
vertically parallel for all schooling groups. Then they remark: 
Casual inspection is not sufficient to verify whether this is so. So the 
obvious approach is to specify a model in which the pattern of post-school 
investment and its profitability are allowed to depend on schooling. Such a 
model also allows one to estimate the rate of return to on-the-job training. 
(Ibid.: 167) 
Using data from the UK General Household Survey for 1972 and estimating the 
Mincerian earnings function, they found a strong relation between schooling and post-
school training. The rate of return to training, according to their estimation, grows with 
schooling and is much higher than the rate of return to schooling (Ibid.: 167). However, 
their empirical findings show a negative rate of return to training for earlier stages of 
schooling. For example, based on their estimates the rate is —31 percent for a person 
with no educational qualification, and -7 percent for an individual with 5 years of 
schooling. (Ibid.: 175) The figures seem to be inconsistent with human capital theory. 
49 
Geographical aggregation as a source of bias in returns to schooling is another 
matter that Birdsall and Behrman (1984) highlight in their study.13 They argue that 
estimates of the rate of return to schooling from cross-national samples are likely to be 
upwardly biased. Geographical aggregation, in their view, can cause such bias for a 
number of reasons: 
Omitted regional prices, systematic under-reporting of earnings and 
inclusion of unearned income, simultaneity bias due to the role of income in 
the determination of schooling, migration costs, geographical labour market 
disequilibrium, and systematic underrepresentation of the private cost of 
schooling (Ibid.: 68). 
Using data of adult males in Brazil and controlling for the geographical origins in which 
individuals went to school and the geographical destinations in which they now earn 
income, they have tried to explore the above possibilities of bias in the estimates of the 
returns. They conclude: 
Our estimates have patterns of intercept and rate of return shifts that are 
generally consistent with all of these possible sources of geographical 
aggregation bias, except for the last one. ... What we do show is that the 
combination of these biases is positive and substantial. (Ibid.: 68) 
Based on these findings, they ascertain the probability of overstating the true 
effect of schooling on earnings and on productivity, reported in some other studies such 
as Psacharopoulos (1981) and World Bank (1980). To avoid such problems, they 
believe that better procedures and data must be developed to control for geographical 
aggregation bias, and standard estimation must be reinterpreted in light of the possibility 
13 There is also ample empirical evidence that shows the rates of return vary across different geographical 
areas. Among others are the works of Hanushek (1973), Chiswick (1974), Rauch (1993), and Preston 
(1997). 
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of important geographical aggregation bias as well as of the more commonly 
acknowledged biases. (Ibid.: 69) 
The size of firm and team size are other elements that influence earnings and, 
therefore, contribute to earnings differentials. It is generally believed that large firms 
pay more for equivalent workers than do small firms. Using British data, Siebert and 
Addison (1991) found that plants employing 1000 or more pay 8 percent more than 
small plants (employing 100 or less), holding constant the human capital variables plus 
occupation and industry. 14 (Siebert and Addison, 1991, cited in Polachek and Siebert 
1993: 261) 
Idson in his recent study attempts to examine evidence on the relationship 
between an employee's earnings and the size of his team of co-workers. Using data 
from the 1973 Quality of Employment Survey which contains information on 1496 
individuals who are 16 years of age and older, he concludes that both team size and a 
team production environment exercise significantly positive effects on wages. He also 
finds that these effects are independent of establishment-size effects on wage, and the 
results, as he argues, indicate that while some portion of the employer-size effect in 
wages may be due to team effects, the employer-size effect remains significant even in 
the presence of team controls. (Idson, 1995: 203) 
Idson's findings tend to support the density of human capital that recently has 
been highlighted by Schultz (1993). Schultz tries to elaborate both internal and external 
14 
 It is well established, through using the OLS techniques, that employees are paid more in large firms. 
In chapter 6, attempts are made to find out whether earnings differentials attributed to firm size are caused 
by the largeness of firms or, for example, by human capital density. 
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effects of human capital. Schultz believes that there are favourable external effects from 
having a strong human capital environment. A key to these external effects, as he 
claims, is human capital density: Specialised doctors in large cities not in small towns, 
specialised plant breeders in large research centres, etc. (Schultz, 1993a: 14) This may 
be extended to working in enterprises that already have a high human capital density. 
This is one of the key themes explained in chapter 6 of this thesis. 
Investment in children made by families in the home is another factor that 
Griffin and Ganderton introduce as a source of bias in earnings equations. They try to 
study, therefore, differences in the rates of return to education across racial and ethnic 
groups by taking into account the effect of families investments in children through 
employing family background as a proxy and also school quality. Using data from the 
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth of the US, and after controlling for investments 
in children by parents and by schools (quality), they observed that each major racial 
group (blacks, whites and Hispanics) has a statistically similar rate of return to 
schooling and that family and schooling variables create more convergence than does 
the standard ability measure alone. They also find that the standard Mincer-type 
approach to estimating earnings functions overestimates the rate of return to education 
by about one-third. The overestimation, according to them, is due to not controlling for 
ability and background variables. Furthermore, they show that school quality does 
"matter" - students attending better schools obtain greater skills, which are then 
rewarded in the labour market with higher earnings. (Griffin and Ganderton, 1996: 139) 
Using data from the 1987 Survey of Recent College Graduates of the U.S., a study 
by Rumberger and Thomas (1993) examines three sources of qualitative influences on 
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the initial earnings of college graduates: college major, college quality and college 
performance. Its results show that all three types of qualitative factors influence initial 
earnings, but the effects of institutional quality and educational performance are not 
uniform for graduates with different college majors. (Rumberger and Thomas, 1993:1) 
There are studies that provide evidence of inter-occupational, inter-industry, and 
inter-sector earnings differentials. That is, the rates of return to education are different 
in different occupations, industries, and sectors, holding human capital variables the 
same. Using data of fulltime wage and salary earners aged between 16 and 64 years 
from the 1981 and 1991 censuses in Australia, Preston's study investigates such issues. 
Based on the results of the study, the determinants of earnings vary between private and 
public sectors. Males employed in the public sector earned 6 percent more than their 
private counterparts. There is also considerable variability in inter-industry wage 
differentials uncovered. The lowest paying industries are Welfare, Agriculture and 
Wood, and the highest Coal and Oil, Metallic Mining and Insurance. The results 
provide evidence that occupation also exerts a considerable effect on wage outcomes. 
After controlling for differences in human capital endowments, demographic 
characteristics, residential area, sector and industry of employment, the estimates reveal 
a distinct occupational-earnings hierarchy. (Preston, 1997: 72) The study concludes that 
while human capital model is a useful framework for the study of wage determination in 
Australia, it is unable to explain significant and persistent inter-industry, inter-
occupational and inter-sector wage differences. (Ibid.: 73) 
Besides the matter of bias, some studies criticise the assumption of 
homoscedasticity of Mincerian earnings function. The findings of the study by Wagner 
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and Lorenz using data from samples of German male full-time workers show that the 
hypothesis of homoscedastic errors is nearly always rejected. (Wagner and Lorenz, 
1988:95) The work of Dougherty and Jimenez (1991: 89), mentioned earlier, also 
reports evidence of significant heteroscedasticity with respect to schooling and 
experience in both cases of linear and semilogarithmic versions of Mincerian earnings 
function. And finally, in a very recent article, Akbari and Ogwang tested the validity of 
Mincer's semi-log specification of earnings function using Canadian data over the 
1980's. Findings based on their experiments, employing four different groups of full-
time workers,15 provide evidence on the rejection of the hypothesis of homoscedastic 
errors. An important implication of the results of their study, as they make clear, is that 
testing of hypotheses based on Mincer-type earnings functions may be unreliable if 
Canadian data are used. Consequently, they argue that past policy recommendations in 
Canada based on the estimates of Mincer-type earnings function are questionable. 
(Akbari and Ogwang, 1996: 138) 
The problem of bias in the estimates of rates of return to education caused by 
excluding the relevant variables from Mincerian type of earnings functions, reviewed 
earlier, echoes the issue of specification error. In that regard, some studies explicitly 
examine the appropriateness of the function with respect to its assumptions for different 
countries. The results of such studies provide evidence on the specification problem. 
That is, while Mincer specified his earnings function in the way that rates of return to 
schooling is constant between different levels of education and assumed that there is no 
15 Four different groups are Canadian-born males, Canadian-born females, foreign-born males, and 
foreign-born females. (Akbari and Ogwang, 1996: 135) 
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cross effect between years of schooling and years of experience, the works of, among 
others, Psacharopoulos and Layard (1976), Dougherty and Jimenez (1991), 
Psacharopoulos et al. (1994), Kingdon (1997) and Preston (1997) reveal evidence 
undermining such assumptions. That is, the rates of return to education vary across 
educational levels, and there is a significant interaction between years of schooling and 
years of experience.' 6 
In what was presented above, it has been demonstrated that (i) human capital 
variables are important determinants of earnings, (ii) the contribution of human capital 
variables to earnings (i.e., the rates of return to human capital) varies across 
occupations, industries, sectors, and geographical areas, and (iii) only some studies 
incorporated such considerations by using extended forms of Mincerian earnings 
function. Nonetheless, all empirical studies as such establish a relationship between 
education and earnings, and their results show a positive relation between human capital 
and earnings rather than how education increases earnings. In the following section we 
selectively review relevant studies investigating the relationship between education, 
productivity, and earnings, that is the question "how does education increase earnings?" 
2.3.2 Education, Productivity, and Earnings: Human Capital Vs Screening 
As mentioned in section 2.2.3, the human capital interpretation of earnings 
differences relying on the assumption of productivity-augmenting role of education has 
been challenged by some alternative hypotheses such as screening and signalling. Many 
16 There are some other critiques to be mentioned such as the variations of rates of return across time 
evidenced by, for example, Murphy and Welch (1989) that are beyond the scope of this study. 
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researchers have attempted to investigate and to criticise the assumption. They have 
employed various types of methods in their studies that can briefly be categorised as 
follows: 
1. Investigating the relationship between education and productivity (i.e., marginal 
products) in agriculture and industry; 
2. considering earnings of self-employed (compared with those of salaried employees), 
of dropouts (compared with those of employees who completed their course), or of 
employees working in jobs which are directly related to their educational 
qualification (compared with workers with the same qualification but their 
occupations are not directly related to their education); 
3. examining supervisors' ratings of their subordinates (in such studies job 
performance was used as a proxy for productivity); and 
4. addressing the question whether employers reward education for purely 
informational purposes in their hiring decision. 
It is difficult to measure productivity due to the fact that individuals who have 
completed different levels of education are generally in different types of jobs and 
producing different outputs (Carnoy, 1994:1693). However, according to most 
investigations, years of education seem to result in higher output. A survey, conducted 
by Lockheed et al. (1980, adopted in: Lockheed, 1987) for the World Bank, of 18 
studies that measured the relationship in low-income countries between farmers' 
education and their agricultural efficiency (as measured by crop production) concluded 
that a farmer with 4 years of elementary education was, on average, 8.7 percent more 
productive than a farmer with no education. This survey also found the effect of 
education to be even greater where complementary inputs, such as fertiliser, new seed, 
or farm machinery were available (i.e. a modernising environment). "On average, the 
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percentage gain as a result of 4 years of education was 10 percent higher in a 
modernising environment than in a traditional environment." (Lockheed, 1987:115-6) In 
the United States, Welch studied the farmer response to technological change (new 
seeds and other new inputs). His study suggests that those farmers with higher 
education have higher earnings from farming (when other inputs are controlled for), 
respond more rapidly to adopting new inputs once they are available, and obtain higher 
yields from the use of such inputs.'' (Welch, 1970) 
Several attempts have also been devoted to investigate the effect of education on 
productivity in industry. Fuller's (1970) investigation, for instance, in two electrical 
machinery plants in Bangalore, India shows a positive effect of education and training 
on output, especially when that training is in-firm. Min's (1987) study of academically 
and vocationally educated workers in a Chinese automobile factory also shows a small, 
but statistically significant, increase in productivity associated with more education, and 
a 6-11 percent higher productivity for those with vocational schooling than for those 
with academic schooling. (Cited in: Carnoy, 1994:1693) 
Efforts have been made to study the productivity-enhancing effects of education 
through comparing, for example, earnings of the self-employed assumed to operate in 
labour markets where screening cannot take place (as the control group) with those of 
salaried employees for whom screening may take place. Lower levels of schooling are 
17 The same findings reported by Foster and Rosenzweig (1995) who studied the effects of learning by 
doing and learning from others on the adoption of new seeds and new technologies. Based on their 
findings, they state that imperfect knowledge about the management of the new seeds was a significant 
barrier to adoption and this barrier diminished as the farmer experience with the new technologies 
increased. (Foster and Rosenzweig, 1995: 1176) 
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hypothesised for the self-employed since individuals in this group do not have to signal 
prospective employers with regard to their productive capabilities. Wolpin's study in 
that respect shows no significant difference in levels of schooling between self-
employed and salaried employed, and therefore, it tends to reject the screening 
hypothesis. (Wolpin, 1977) On the other hand, Riley's investigation suggests that the 
screening phenomenon is much more likely to occur in some professions (e.g., for 
teachers and scientists) than in others (e.g., for managers and engineers). (Riley, 1979) 
The results of Grubb's study (1993) using the same methodology and data from the 
National Longitudinal Survey of the class of 1972, indicate that vocational Associate 
degrees are used as screens, as are high school grads; in contrast, the baccalaureate 
degree does not operate as a signal. Since, as they state, it increases earnings 
substantially more in non-screened than in screened positions. (Grubb, 1993: 125) 
Arabsheibani and Rees (1998) attempted to test the screening hypothesis through 
employing the P(sacharopoulos)-test, which was proposed by Psacharopoulos (1979). 
The results of their study show that the rate of return to education for the private sector 
is higher than the public sector in the U.K. and do not support the strong screening 
hypothesis. (Arabsheibani and Rees, 1998:191) Johnes' study aims to provide evidence 
on a particular form of sorting behaviour, by offering a new test to the literature and 
using data from International Social Survey Programme. Its results lend little support to 
the sorting interpretation of the wage differential between groups of variously educated 
workers. (Johnes, 1998:665-6) 
On the other hand, Katz and Ziderman's study reports evidence of substantial 
screening effects based on their comparison of educational levels of pairs of screened 
(employed) and non-screened (self-employed) groups within similar occupational 
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categories in Israel.18 (Katz and Ziderman, 1980) However, it may be argued, as Lazear 
(1977:254) and Cohn and Geske (1993: 61) state, that potential customers may perform 
a screening function for education which would provide an incentive for the self-
employed to acquire or increase their educational credentials. 
Arabsheibani (1989) used another method, initially proposed by Wiles (1974), to 
test screening hypothesis versus human capital theory. According to this method 
salaries of workers in occupations in which they use relevant educational qualification 
should be compared to other workers with the same qualification but working in jobs 
which are not directly related to their education. Based on this method, the screening 
hypothesis is rejected if a premium is paid to the former group because in human capital 
theory it is assumed that what is learnt at school is knowledge useful in production. 
Using data from a random sample of university graduates in Egypt, Arabsheibani found 
that employers pay a higher premium in starting salaries when education is useful to 
jobs, which tends to support the human capital view. (Arabsheibani, 1989: 363) 
However, in that connection it should be assumed that jobs are relatively homogenous 
and therefore there is no heterogeneity across jobs in terms of, for example, learning 
opportunity that may affect starting salaries of employees. 
Some other investigations, using the same methodology (i.e., comparing earnings 
differentials of different groups) but employing different units of analysis (i.e., dropouts 
and their counterparts who completed their course), examine the relationship between 
education and productivity. Layard and Psacharopoulos' study, comparing the returns 
18 A more detailed survey of these studies is given in: Cohn and Geske (1993: 57-63). 
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on education of the dropouts with the returns for employees who have completed their 
course, shows that there are no significant differences in the return to education between 
these two groups. This empirical evidence suggests that screening is not a major part of 
the explanation for the question that "why education explain earnings differentials." 
(Layard and Psacharopoulos, 1974: 995) 
Another group of studies focuses on the issue of supervisors' ratings of 
subordinates as a productivity criterion, in fact, to study the relationship between human 
capital investments and job performance. Medoff and Abraham's study, for instance, 
tends to shed some light on the issue. Its conclusions suggest that supervisors' ratings of 
their subordinates adequately reflect the subordinates' true relative productivity in the 
year of appraisal and it seems clearly that there is a "no" answer, at least for white male 
managerial and professional employees working at sampled companies, for the question 
of "whether or not all but a small fraction of experience-earnings differentials can be 
explained by experience-productivity differentials." (Medoff and Abraham, 1982: 215) 
Little effort has been made to address directly the question of whether employers 
reward education for purely informational purposes in the hiring decision. Albrecht 
(1981) in his investigation addresses the question which is, I would say, the key 
argument of screening hypotheses. Albrecht assumes that an employer is considering 
applicants for a position who can be characterised by their educational background and 
by their 'information level', i.e. the amount of a priori information the employer has 
about them. According to the signalling hypothesis, employers need to use education as 
a source of information about applicant productivities, i.e. applicants cannot be induced 
to properly self-select by some cheaper means. Therefore, if the signalling hypothesis is 
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valid, employers will be forced to rely more heavily on education when considering 
those applicants about whom they have the least information. He decomposed the role 
of education in the hiring decision into a pure 'productivity component' and a pure 
`information component' for testing the signalling hypothesis through using a two-way 
analysis of covariance framework with interactions between education and 
`information'. The procedure was applied to recruitment of auto workers by Volvo, the 
Swedish auto manufacturer. In the case of Volvo's hiring behaviour Albrecht's findings 
indicate no support for the signalling hypothesis. According to his findings, Volvo 
prefers applicants with more education and (weakly) prefers applicants about whom 
more information is available, but in the absence of that extra information no 
significantly different premium is attached to extra education. That is, Volvo does not 
appear to rely on education for purely informational purposes in the hiring process. 
(Ibid.: 130-131) 
Overall, the literature reviewed19 indicates that various methods have been used to 
test the validity of screening hypotheses versus human capital theory. On the whole, the 
results tend to support the view of human capital theory rather than the view that 
screening is the main function of education. However, most empirical studies as such 
provide evidence on the fact that there exists a positive relationship between education 
and earnings. The question in fact is not whether education explains earnings 
19 
 Another set of studies (e.g., by Ashenfelter, 1993; Ashenfelter and Krueger, 1994) attempts to examine 
the productivity-enhancing role of education by using data collected from (identical) twins. Their results 
support the view of human capital theory. Since they use a special set of data, which enables them to 
control for innate ability and social background, the correlation observed between education and earnings 
tends to provide a better and more convincing answer than that of other empirical studies mentioned 
above with regard to the question of "how does education increase earnings?" 
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differentials but why it does, as Layard and Psacharopoulos (1974) put it. In other 
words, the core of the debate between human capital theory and screening hypotheses is 
concerned with demand for (the services of) human capital provided by employers. 
Therefore, one has to incorporate data from employer side to find out, for example, 
whether screening is the main function of education or education improves the 
productivity of individuals. Data from employer side would provide a more appropriate 
base to examine the productivity-augmenting role of education. Besides, most empirical 
studies like what were reviewed above failed to include all relevant variables such as 
job heterogeneity, the quality of education, innate ability, social background, etc. After 
including such variables, it is more plausible to evaluate the explanatory power of 
human capital theory versus screening hypotheses. In practice, however, regression 
techniques lack adequate statistical controls for such qualitative factors. Therefore, they 
cannot convincingly answer the debate between human capital theory and screening 
hypotheses. Blinder (1990:4) highlights the same argument in connection with the 
question "do profit sharing and incentives actually boost productivity, or do they simply 
attract the most productive workers to jobs where high productivity is rewarded?" 
2.3.3 Human Capital Investigation of Earnings in Iran 
Attempts to develop the productive capacity of employees through new 
educational activities in Iran date back to the early nineteenth century, when the Iranian 
government attempted to obtain the benefits of Western education by sending Iranian 
students to European universities to fulfil the needs for professional manpower. 
(Menashri, 1992: 48) Another development with the same motive was the opening of 
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the first new institution of higher education learning, Dar al-Fonun, on 28 December 
1851. Its object, like that of the earlier studies abroad, was to make western technology 
available to Iranians. It was a polytechnic designed to teach upper-class youngsters 
western technology and sciences, thereby preparing them for senior appointments in the 
army and the administration. (Ibid., p. 33) However, it was not until the 1930s that 
education has been understood as a twofold process: the acquisition of knowledge as 
well as character formation and training in good manners. It was also believed that 
education could produce rapid advances in the nation. Following beliefs like this, a 
more comprehensive formal education system was developed by establishing the 
Ministry of Education, priority was awarded to elementary education and opening the 
schools to children of lower classes has been encouraged. So, attending school was 
gradually becoming more common for all. This process was accelerated and expanded 
by establishing Tehran University in 1934. A significant growth in scale and diversity 
of education, especially secondary and tertiary, in response to the changes of 
modernisation and economic development has experienced since 1940s. Following 
these developments, the youth have had a choice of undergoing educational activities or 
entering the labour market.2°  
Nevertheless, economic analysis of educational activities is very recent and dates 
back to the early 1970s. Rahmani (1970), for example, attempted to evaluate social and 
private rate of return to investment in human capital to shed some lights on educational 
planning in Iran. However, he confines his analysis to five higher education groups as 
follows: 
20 For a more detailed discussion see Iran's chapter. 
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1. Literature and humanities 
2. Sciences 
3. Economics and commercial management 
4. Agriculture 
5. Engineering 
Using data from the 1965 labour force survey and the 1966 census as well as 
public scale wage/salary for temporary civil servants, he estimated an average income 
of agricultural workers, unskilled workers, skilled workers, technicians, and workers 
with higher education qualification. Assuming the age of 60 as a retirement age and 25 
years of work as working life, and considering 5 percent growth for the initial income of 
graduates, he estimated age-earnings profiles of the workers. He made some 
adjustments for tax, ability and unemployment to estimate income attributed to 
education. Using government budget figures, he estimated the average per student social 
cost of the five educational groups. He considered the average (pre-tax) income of 
secondary school graduates as indirect-social cost of education. To estimate private cost 
of education, he incorporated book and stationary expenses according to his own 
experience, as the direct cost and average income of a secondary graduate after tax as 
the indirect private cost. 
He finally, applying the conventional formula to calculating internal rate of return, 
that is (2.2), concluded that private rates of return to higher education were so high 
(more than 10 percent) that encouraged individuals to continue their education. 
=1 
— C)I (1+01= 0 	 (2.2) 
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where E and C are income and costs of education, respectively, and r is internal rate of 
return, T is age of retirement and t is age of starting work. 
Among the educational groups, he found that engineers could gain the highest rate of 
return, and, in contrast, graduates of humanity courses had the lowest return to their 
educational investments. Nevertheless, he still suggested education as an profitable 
investment for both private and public sectors. 
As mentioned above, Rahamani's investigation was based partly on some 
estimated and artificial figures rather than real ones. This can weaken any applicability 
and generalisability of the results. Moreover, neglecting other educational levels, he did 
not incorporate the effects of off-school training, geographical as well as job and sector 
diversity on earnings of the graduates in his consideration. 
Psacharopoulos and Williams (1973) investigated the determinants of earnings 
differentials (especially the effects of education on earnings) in the public sector of Iran. 
Their analysis is based on data (241000 observations) from the data bank of the State 
Organisation for Administration and Employment Affairs (SOAEA) referring to the 
great majority of pubic sector employees in Iran in 1971; however, the data bank did not 
include university teachers, judges, members of the armed forces, and the employees of 
mixed enterprises like the National Iranian Oil Corporation and Iran Air. 
They incorporated basic salary and allowances as earnings of the employees, and 
age, sex, educational level, and status as the determinants of earnings differentials into 
an earnings function by means of multiple regression. Running their basic earnings 
function considering age and education as continuous variables and status (being a 
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permanent or temporary employee) and sex as dummy ones, they conclude that one year 
of education, on average, increased earnings by 6 percent; whereas its effect on basic 
salary and allowances was to increase them by 4 percent and 13 percent respectively. 
The fact of being a permanent employee added about 41 percent to basic salary but 
nothing to allowances. On the other hand, the fact of being a temporary employee added 
almost 100 percent to allowances but 17 percent to basic salary. According to their 
investigation, the coefficients for "sex" show that whereas being male added only 2.5 
percent to basic salary it added 60 percent to allowances. 
In the next stage, they extended their experiments by entering age and education 
as dummy variables in order to allow for possible non-linearities (i.e., the effect of one 
extra year of university education may be different from that of one extra year of 
primary education). 
They found that earnings functions in relation to age appear to be "S" shaped, 
rising steeply up to the mid forties, after which the growth tapers off. The coefficients 
for education according to their experiments increase with each level, with the 
exception of Ph.D. All education coefficients for unofficial employees are above the 
ones for official employees. 
For the sake of public policy and educational priorities, they evaluated returns to 
education but, as they acknowledge, in a crude way. They concluded that whereas the 
social rates of return to education were in all cases below or equal to the private returns, 
the rates of return were much higher for primary education than for the other levels and 
that they were particularly low for secondary education. 
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Although Psacharopoulos and Williams' study is one of the most systematic to 
investigate the relationship between earnings and education in the context of Iran's 
economy, it lacks sufficient information to justify the methodology employed, and 
appropriate explanation of the results and the behaviour of some variables employed. 
Regarding the first point, it is worth noting that they did not provide enough 
information, for example, of using the average earnings of three-year age groups as 
"earnings" variable to see whether the age groups of each year were the same grouped 
individuals or not. Furthermore, they did not justify using the semi-log rather than any 
other form of earnings function in their investigation. 
Overall, they focused mainly on the extent to which education and the other 
variables employed contribute to increasing the earnings of the employees. They could, 
however, have presented a human capital explanation and interpretation illuminating 
how the determinants explain the earnings differentials. For example, the coefficients 
for "sex", as Psacharopoulos and Williams point out, evaluate the effect of gender on 
earnings, which show that being male increases basic salary only 2.5 percent whereas it 
adds 60 percent to allowances. They interpret this behaviour of the variable in the way 
that there was virtually no discrimination against women in official pay scales, but the 
operation of the labour market meant that in terms of earnings men receive considerably 
more than women. However, women's investment in human capital through on-the-job 
training would be one of the main factors that can explain, in part, the differences in a 
more reasonable way. That is, it is more reasonable to hypothesise that women invest 
less than men in themselves through on-the-job training due to having more, for 
example, work experience interruptions. Age is also another determinant involved in 
their investigation that they did not provide sufficient explanation for its behaviour. 
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Finally, the study is confined to public sector employees. In the public sector it would 
be the case that employees are paid based on their educational qualifications rather than 
their productivity.2' 
2.4 Summary and Critique of the Methodological Underpinnings of 
the Empirical Work 
In the above sections, we have reviewed the theoretical underpinnings of the 
individual investment behaviour towards the human capital and the incentives to 
undergo educational and training activities. An attempt was also made to comment on 
empirical studies applying Mincerian earnings function. We have briefly reviewed the 
behaviour of firm investment in human capital and the neo-classical theoretical 
consideration of the willingness of employers to pay more to more highly educated 
workers. It has been found that there is a widespread view among economists (under 
individual investment behaviour) that spending on education and training is more an 
investment activity than a consumption one. Some other social scientists, however, have 
provided rather different explanations for the behaviour such as screening and signalling 
hypotheses arguing that an individual undergoes educational activities to signal his pre- 
21 It should be mentioned that during past few years, a few studies conducted evaluating the rates of 
return to education using cost-benefit analysis technique. To evaluate the benefits of education they used 
public salary schedules rather than real figures on earnings of graduates. For that reason we did not 
present such studies, which are Master degree dissertations, in this section. A study by Henderson (1983) 
also examines the question whether the systematic exclusion of 'own-account' workers result in an 
upward bias in the estimated rates of return to schooling. Using data from a 1975 socio-economic survey 
conducted in Tehran and based on his findings, he concludes that "in contradiction to conclusions drawn 
from Chiswick's (1976) study, the high rates of return to schooling found in many studies of less-
developed countries do not appear to be the result of the systematic exclusion of the self-employed from 
the estimating samples." (Henderson, 1983:97) 
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existing ability. These alternative views, therefore, mainly attack the productivity-
augmenting role of education but they do not weaken the interpretation of education as 
a private investment. 
In terms of the empirical investigation of human capital theory, it has been 
found that some studies appear to confirm the superiority and especially the semi-log 
structure of the Mincerian earnings function that dominates the investigation of earnings 
differentials in the context of human capital theory. On the other hand, the standard and 
basic form of the function, for the purpose of the estimation of rates of return to 
education, has been criticised because it ignores other factors influencing earnings. For 
example, education and training are key variables in connection with studying earnings 
differentials, theoretically. In practical and conventional empirical terms, however, it is 
years of schooling and of experience, which have been employed as proxies to measure 
education and training variables. In such circumstances, a variety of heterogeneities like 
heterogeneity in innate ability, quality of education and training (experience), social 
background, etc. that in reality, as Becker remarked in his theoretical consideration, 
exists and affects both human capital accumulation and earnings would remain 
excluded. This exclusion would lead to a situation where the error terms and the other 
explanatory variables are correlated, which raises the issue of bias and relaxes one of 
the basic assumption of ordinary least squares (OLS) technique22 that has been used 
extensively in the literature. Most empirical studies fail, partly due to lack of data, to 
incorporate such relevant predictors in the analysis. Little effort has been made to 
evaluate the extent to which these factors affect earnings variation. 
22 More discussion is provided in, e.g., Maddala (1992:253-54). 
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As evidenced in the literature, the relationship between human capital variables 
and earnings is not the same across occupations, firms, economic sectors, industries, 
geographical locations, etc. These kinds of heterogeneity raise another econometric 
problem (i.e., heteroscedasticity) in which the variance of the error term in an earnings 
equation does not remain constant, as assumed in the conventional OLS estimates. As a 
consequence, the OLS estimates would be inefficient and may mislead us in testing of 
hypotheses. Quite recently, this issue has attracted some attention23 but little effort has 
been made to examine and detect the sources of such a problem. Moreover, such 
variations in the relationship may be of interest to be investigated. For example, it 
would be very informative, in terms of policy implications and/or theoretical 
investigation, to examine the question of why the contribution of years of schooling to 
earnings is more in some occupations, firms, etc. than in others, holding human capital 
variables constant. These kinds of consideration remain another uncharted territory. 
It is conventional that to estimate years of experience (i.e., potential years of 
experience) a researcher subtracts "years of schooling and age of starting school" from 
age of an employee and assumes that a graduate would start his working life 
immediately after graduation. However, this measurement would be a very crude 
estimation of investment in human capital through experience in the context of 
economies like developing countries, which experience a high rate of unemployment 
and/or a low rate of literacy. That is, the assumption that a graduate starts his/her 
23 
 For example, studies by Wagner and Lorenz (1988), Dougherty and Jimenez (1991), and Akbari and 
Ogwang (1996). 
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employment immediately after his/her graduation would be unreasonable and perhaps 
unrealistic.24 
Furthermore, in the conventional way, years of schooling have been considered as 
the proxy for education in the way that the effect of one school year in primary level 
contributes to increasing earnings as much as one school year in tertiary level. However, 
as Bowman (1968: 247) has highlighted and some empirical research has shown, a year 
of elementary schooling is not economically the same as a year in, for example, college 
education. 
It is also argued that more educated people can invest in themselves more than 
less educated ones through (on-the-job) training. This means that there is a positive 
relationship between schooling and post-schooling investments, which justify partly the 
increasing gap between earnings-experience profiles of different educational levels. 
Nevertheless, the Basic Mincerian earnings function and many other empirical 
investigations fail to provide evidence to support such an important consideration. 
Finally, the literature reviewed shows that most criticisms of human capital 
analysis of earnings differentials focus on bias in the evaluation of the effect of 
education on earnings. So far, however, little effort has been made to examine the 
matter of the efficiency of the estimates. That is, it has not been considered whether the 
estimates have minimum variance and, therefore, are reliable for hypothesis testing. 
24 A study by Arabsheibani (1996:10) highlights this issue as measurement error in the calculation of the 
"potential experience." 
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The above mentioned criticisms of studying returns to investment in human 
capital and evaluation of effects of education and training on earnings, in my view, stem 
from two sources; the lack of appropriate measurement and, in turn, data, and 
weaknesses in the methods of analysis. The matter of data and errors measurement has 
long been a problem in empirical economic studies. Broadly speaking, three types of 
errors can be identified in this connection: 
• Recording errors 
• Response or sampling error 
• Errors due to using an imperfect measure (i.e. proxy variables) of the true 
variable, which is often not measurable and is called "latent" variables. (For 
more discussion see: Maddala, 1992: 448; Griliches, 1986: 1476.) 
The major part of the criticisms, it would seem, relates to the third type of errors, 
though it is also very likely that other errors occur when the methods of data collection 
are survey and questionnaires. In the case of human capital where the variables consist 
of education in school, off-school education, health care and job searching, these 
variables cannot be measured directly. Researchers often use some relevant proxies for 
that purpose. In the case of education, for example, various proxies have been used such 
as schooling years and school quality. However, there are also some other factors such 
as household investments in their children during schooling periods, effects of 
educational system, and the like which can affect the measurement of the real effect of 
education on earnings. 
Furthermore, when we assume that education can be more effective in increasing 
earnings in a more complicated and highly technological situation, in a bigger 
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enterprise, etc. it means that such variations in the contribution of years of schooling to 
earnings are, as human capital theory predicts, the outcome of variation in human 
capital accumulation. Therefore, there will be scope for further investigation to measure 
the effects of education on earnings more accurately. So far little attention, if any, has 
been devoted to these kinds of consideration. The reasons for ignoring these factors are 
threefold; the first can be attributed to the fact that different units of analysis (e.g., 
individuals, firms, industries, etc.) are, in practice, involved in human capital analysis of 
earnings differentials. Through using a single-level of analysis like OLS, a researcher 
has to choose only one kind of unit and the effects of the characteristics of other units 
would remain excluded.25 The single level method, therefore, can provide a very crude 
model of any reality, which dominated by a hierarchical structure. 
The second reason is concerned with using data grouped across individuals, firms, 
industries and geographical areas. Human capital theory focuses on the behaviour of 
individuals (employees or employers). These individuals are heterogeneous in terms of 
their embodied human capital and earnings. The above mentioned factors (i.e. firms, 
industries, etc.) also affect both human capital and earnings and, therefore, are very 
important to be investigated in the human capital analysis of earnings. That is, as 
Mincer (1974: 80) remarks, the observed profiles of earnings differ a great deal among 
specialities and types of employers that may be of interest. Grouping which can be 
provided across individuals, firms, industries, cities, etc. removes such sources of 
heterogeneity. There would, thus, exist a contradiction between grouping data, which is 
25 It should be mentioned that through using dummy variable technique it is possible to include some 
limited aspects of the characteristics of other kinds of unit. Discussions concerning the units of analysis 
and econometric problems are given, e.g., in: Barker and Pesaran (1990). 
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very common in the conventional approach of analysis, and achieving a satisfactory 
stage of measuring the effects of education and other variables on earnings. 
And finally, the third reason is the lack of an appropriate analytical approach, 
which allows the researcher to incorporate such kinds of heterogeneities. A single-level 
approach of analysis, as mentioned earlier, is very restrictive in this respect. 
Interpreting how education and training explain earnings differentials, most 
economists, as Carnoy (1994: 1694) points out, agree that there is a positive relationship 
between education and productivity but providing convincing evidence has been an 
elusive enterprise. The review of empirical studies of human capital investments and 
productivity has revealed that education and training have positive and significant 
effects on productivity. On the other hand, studies that compare earnings of a screened 
group (e.g., the employed) with those of a non-screened one (e.g., the self-employed) 
show conflicting results though with a tendency to support human capital theory. While 
attempts to link education to productivity through using supervisors' ratings tend to 
support screening and signalling hypotheses, the approach examining the question of 
whether employers use education for purely informational purposes in their hiring 
decisions, applied for the case of the Swedish auto manufacturer Volvo, provides no 
support for the signalling hypothesis. 
To test the screening hypotheses versus human capital theory most studies have 
employed indirect methods that are mainly useful to establish the relationship between 
education and earnings. The core of the debate between human capital theory and 
screening hypotheses, however, is concerned with productivity-adding role of 
education, which directly relates to the demand rather than the supply side of human 
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capital. That is, data from employers is needed to examine the debate. Moreover, the 
alternative theories could not provide a satisfactory explanation, particularly as they fail 
to take into account other forms of investment in human capital such as out-of-school 
education and training, job searching, and investment in human capital by employers. 
The main reasons for the conflicting results from the empirical studies 
examining the debate between human capital theory and its rival hypotheses may rely 
on the fact that the relationship between investments in human capital and productivity 
is not properly understood (Mace, 1984: 42) and/or the conventional methods of 
investigation used perhaps cannot provide satisfactory results in that respect. With 
regard to the latter case, it can be stated that regression techniques, in practice, lack 
adequate statistical controls for qualitative factors such as innate ability, quality of 
education/experience, motivation, etc. Therefore, they cannot convincingly answer the 
debate between human capital theory and screening hypotheses. 
Furthermore, the reasons why employers offer more wages and salaries to more 
highly educated employees and why employers, as Williams (1978: 364) remarks, 
should emphasise educational qualifications in the selection of employees for (high-
level) jobs has not been investigated properly. 
In the case of Iran we have briefly reviewed attempts to develop the productive 
capacity of human resources through new educational activities. We have found that 
these activities date back some 200 years. However, a systematic economic analysis of 
the activities is very recent and very rare. Especially, there is no study that investigates 
the determinants of earnings and the relationship between education, training and 
earnings in the manufacturing sector of Iran's economy. 
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The main purpose of this chapter, after reviewing the theoretical underpinnings of 
investment in human capital, was to demonstrate that regression analysis technique (i.e. 
OLS) used extensively, during past three decades, in order to evaluate the rates of return 
to investment in human capital faces serious statistical problems, which may affect both 
the extent of rates of return to human capital measurements and the reliability of testing 
of hypotheses. Such issues are very important in terms of policy implications. In the 
next chapter we propose to examine alternative methods of data collection and analysis 
that can improve the accuracy of estimates and provide a more appropriate and detailed 
interpretation and explanation of results. 
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Chapter 3 Research Methodology 
3.1 Introduction 
This study, as mentioned earlier, focuses on an investigation of the relationship 
between investments in human capital (education and experience) and increasing 
earnings with special reference to the manufacturing sector of Iran's economy. The 
relationship will be examined through regressing the characteristics of employees and 
firms on earnings by employing an earnings function consisting of educational 
qualifications, experience and enterprise as the main explanatory variables and earnings 
of employees as the dependent variable. Furthermore, the reason why higher education 
leads to higher earnings will also be studied through conducting interviews with senior 
managers. 
In this chapter we discuss and elaborate how our research questions are 
investigated. We start this chapter by addressing the research questions and sub-
questions. In the second section, the relevant concepts are discussed and a discussion 
and justification of units of analysis as well as variables employed are presented in the 
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next two sections. Then, methods of collecting data are elaborated and justified. Finally, 
methods of analysis are introduced and justified in the last section, which also contains 
a discussion of a proposed experimental statistical procedure. 
3.2 Research Questions 
The research questions and sub-questions that are investigated in this study are as 
follows: 
1) Do investments in human capital through education and experience lead to higher 
earnings in the manufacturing sector of Iran's economy? If so, to what extent? 
To what extent does education contribute to increasing earnings? To what extent 
does experience increase earnings compared with education? In the context of the 
manufacturing sector in Iran are years of schooling more appropriate to account for 
earnings differentials attributed to education, or educational levels? Is the estimation of 
years of experience in the conventional way (i.e., age minus age of starting school 
minus years of schooling) an appropriate measurement for investment through training 
(experience) in the context of the manufacturing sector? 
2) Is a multilevel analysis a more appropriate approach than the conventional OLS 
one for evaluating the effects of investments in human capital on earnings? 
Are there any advantages for the multilevel method in applying earnings functions 
in the context of human capital theory compared with a single-level one? What criteria 
should be considered to explore the advantages of multilevel techniques? Are data used 
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dominated by a hierarchical structure? Are the effects of education and experience on 
earnings the same in different firms and in different geographical localities, holding 
constant human capital variables? What statistical problems arise due to ignoring cluster 
effects on earnings that may be explained partly by firm level variables such as size and 
nature of firm and geographical location? 
3) Is the contribution of human capital investments to increasing earnings, if any, 
due to the productivity-augmenting role of education or does education serve as a 
"screening" device, identifying more able people? 
3.3 Concepts 
The main purpose of this study is to investigate the extent to which investments in 
human capital through education and training lead to increasing earnings. For that 
purpose a single level method (i.e., applying ordinary least squares) and a multilevel 
approach (based on random coefficient models) of analysis are employed. In what 
follows we discuss the main concepts involved in this study. 
Education is defined as development and improvement of knowledge and intellect 
through the formal education systems (schools and universities). This concept will be 
measured by either years of schooling and/or educational levels. 
Training means development and improvement of knowledge and intellect through 
informal systems such as on-the-job learning, measured by years of experience, on-the-
job training and off-the-job training, measured by hours of training. 
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An employee is a full time-male worker working in one of the selected firms. 
Earnings consist of wage/salary and any other payment such as accommodation and 
food benefits, allowances, etc. that an employee earns from the main employer during a 
specific period, for example, a year. 
A firm is an institution in the manufacturing sector that buys or hires inputs (i.e. labour, 
capital, and raw materials) and organises them to produce and sell its output (goods or 
services) to maximise its benefits (profit, sale, etc.). 
A single-level method of analysis: At a single-level of analysis the data from different 
groups, firms, etc. are pooled and a single analysis is carried out between all, for 
example, employees in the total sample. In symbols, a regression analysis of this type 
with one explanatory variable can be stated as follows: 
= ao 	 ei 	 (3.1) 
where y, is the dependent variable, an individual's earnings; x is an explanatory 
variable, say years of schooling of the individual; and e, is error term or, more 
precisely, random effect and the effects of omitted variables, if any. It is assumed that 
the residuals are uncorrelated across the observations. In this method of analysis the 
effects of clustering on earnings are ignored; and it is assumed that the groups have a 
similar effect on all workers' earnings. (For an extended model under a single level of 
analysis see section 3.7.) 
A multi-level method of analysis: At a multilevel of analysis the effects of groups are 
taken into account. In such a consideration, it is believed (Goldstein, 1987, 1995) that 
80 
social and many other systems typically have a hierarchical organisation in which 'units' 
at one 'level' are grouped and clustered within units at the next higher level. In work 
settings, for example, workers are grouped and clustered together for production within 
factories/firms. This gives, at least, two levels; the lowest or level 1 being that of the 
workers; the level two being that of the firms. (Diagram 3.1 depicts such a two-level 
model.) If one is interested in the factors which influence workers' earnings through a 
multilevel perspective then among those factors, he will generally wish to include the 
characteristics of the workers themselves, such as education, experience, etc. as the first 
level variables and those of their enterprises, such as size of the firm, geographical 
location, etc. as the second level variables. (It is postulated that the firms operate in a 
non-competitive market and, therefore, the effects of firm characteristics on earnings are 
not the same.) It is worth noting that in this method of analysis the reduced form of the 
equations has two or more error/residual terms and the residuals of observations in the 
same, e.g., firm are correlated to each other. In contrast, the residuals of observations in 
different units of the second level are still assumed uncorrelated. (More details are given 
in, e.g., Goldstein, 1995; and Woodhouse et al., 1995.) 
Diagram 3.1: Two-Level Model 
Level 2: Firms 1 
Level 1: Employees 




be the regression equation, where y,, are (log of) earnings (of higher level of education), 
po, intercept or (log of) earnings of lower level of education, xy individual 
characteristics (human capital proxies), e,, error terms at level 1, nj number of 
employees working in firm j, and m number of firms. 
If there are some variables, z ,, that can explain the variation of 130 and 0, 
across the enterprises, we can write: 
Poi = Poo ± aizi uoi 	 (3.3) 
P, = Pio +a,z, 	 (3.4) 
where z are cluster/firm characteristics, and u0 1  and u11 are error terms (residuals) at 
level two. Substituting these in Eq.(3.2), we get 
Ij — Poo + 	 + 	 + azz ;xi; + (e + uoi + ulixii) 
	 (3.5) 
where ay, / / az = a, + a 2 x,j are the marginal effects of group characteristics 
on earnings and f3,0 the (direct) contribution of the human capital investments to 
increasing earnings. 
3.4 Units of Analysis and Sample Selection 
This section begins with discussion of the selection of the sample of employees 
and firms that are the units of quantitative analysis. Then, the selection of interviewees 
that are the units of qualitative analysis is discussed. 
3.4.1 Sample of Employees and Firms 
In the quantitative part of our investigation, the units of analysis due to employing 
a particular methodology (i.e., a multilevel analysis) are of two different kinds; the units 
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of the first level of analysis are all full-time male workers in the selected companies. It 
is the full-time workers not part-time ones that the investigation is concerned with 
because data regarding experience of part time employees is usually not available. We 
also focused on male workers' situation rather than both male and female employees for 
two reasons; female workers normally in acquiring their human capital through 
experience are faced with more interruptions and discontinuity than men. (Mincer, 
1979: 17) The information about these interruptions and discontinuities are rarely 
available. Moreover, female employees have mainly been employed in the public sector 
of Iran and due to the nature of activities in the target factories the proportion of female 
workers is very low compared with that of male workers and we would, therefore, not 
have sufficient number of observations to run a separate earnings function for female 
workers in each company. 
In the second level of analysis, the units are the firms/enterprises at which the 
employees (i.e., the units of first level) are working. Each enterprise is considered as 
one observation at this level. The companies were selected from the (medium-size) 
modern manufacturing sector of Iran.' The preference for the manufacturing units is 
three fold: First, the units of manufacturing sector are large enough, in terms of the 
number of full-time male workers, to run a separate earnings function for each firm. 
It is worthwhile noting that the manufacturing sector in Iran comprises firms employing a wide variation 
in the number of employees; ranging from a firm with no salaried employee to a firm with thousands of 
employees. Firms employing 50 or more workers are defined as large firms. What we mean by modern 
manufacturing units is the units that make goods on a large scale using machinery. In this study, 
therefore, the (traditional) manufacturing units that are usually classified as small units are excluded. 
Very large firms and enterprises that are involved in oil and heavy industry are also not included. (More 
details about the composition of manufacturing units in Iran is provided in chapter 4.) 
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Second, their employees usually have a range of qualifications (both educational and 
training ones) and therefore these units could be more appropriate to study the 
relationship between human capital variables and increasing earnings. Finally, the units 
usually have better and more organised personnel information and it was, in turn, more 
likely to collect a sufficient number of observations to conduct our investigation by 
employing a two-level model of analysis. 
Thus, finding the appropriate cases within the units of manufacturing sector was a 
major issue at this stage. For this we had initially a puzzle which, on the one hand, we 
did need a large number of observations (both employees and firms) to conduct a 
multilevel analysis. On the other hand, we had to collect the data under the situation of 
limited resources. In these circumstances, designing questionnaires and distributing 
them among a large number of units (e.g., 10,000 employees and about 70 companies2) 
to collect the data were impossible. Because it would be very time consuming for such a 
large number of observations and almost impossible to have a random sample of 
employees and firms from the manufacturing sector. The possibility of the collaboration 
of employers to distribute and to collect the large number of questionnaires was very 
low. The matter of returning a sufficient number of questionnaires, which would consist 
of a variety of educational qualifications, years of experience and other relevant factors, 
was another important factor in the selection of sample. 
2 The recommended number of higher level units of analysis is 30 or more. Assuming the rate of response 
at 40-50 percent, we had thought of 70 firms as higher level units for the fieldwork and conducting a two-
level of analysis. 
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The alternative method was to have access to employees' file data. This way has 
advantages compared to distributing questionnaire among employees, besides not 
having disadvantages the latter approach. It would be possible to have data of all full-
time male workers, instead of a selected sample, who have a variety of qualifications. 
Having access to the file data also reduces errors in response, recording, etc., which are 
very important in the estimation of the effects of human capital variables on earnings 
differentials.3 However, the selection of units of level two remained the main issue at 
this stage. It should be emphasised that in order to examine the second research 
question, it was extremely important to select the units of level two in a way that reflect 
the issue of clustering in the real world. 
To overcome the above-mentioned problems and to find the most appropriate 
units/cases, we had to go to Iran (i.e., the field) and began to consult some experts4 in 
the manufacturing sector. We thought that focusing on manufacturing firms located in a 
big city would be appropriate for our study. However, the findings of meetings with the 
experts who had experience in data collection from such firms (e.g., conducting 
industrial surveys and censuses) showed that we should not confine our case study only 
to a single city. Because, according to their experience, the companies would not 
3 More detail is given in chapter 2. 
4 
 Our first meeting of this kind was with an expert in economics (holding MA/S in economics) employed 
in public sector (in Mashhad an eastern city of Iran), and as a part of his official tasks he collaborates with 
the member of Statistics Centre of Iran in conducting industrial censuses and surveys. The second 
meeting was with two other experts in economics in Tehran who are involved in the manufacturing sector 
issues and policies. 
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properly collaborate with us in the data gathering. Besides the meetings, we had also 
studied relevant-published documents regarding the manufacturing sector of Iran. 
So at this stage we had arrived at the point that we should contact some 
organisations and official authorities that would have authority and power in relation to 
a large number of firms in the manufacturing sector in Iran. After considering some 
organisations, we were advised and introduced to one of the most appropriate 
organisation (i.e., the Organisation of National Industries, ONI, affiliated to the Ministry 
of Industry) which has had a close managerial relationship with more than 70 mixed 
(i.e., private and semi-private) companies in the manufacturing sector.5 In fact, the 
government in some cases is one of the shareholders and the matter of allocating foreign 
exchange for the importation of companies is also another policy instrument to 
strengthen the relationship. These companies are, however, independent in their 
employment policies and, seeking profit maximisation through market mechanisms, 
have also a wide range in the number of employees ranging from 20 to 2000 personnel. 
The firms, therefore, were regarded as appropriate cases and clusters for studying the 
effect of clustering on the estimates of human capital variables and of firm size on 
earnings. The companies are also located in different geographical areas of Iran so that 
this element, accompanied with the size of firms, can be considered as two key variables 
of the second level of analysis. Their employees have also a variety of educational 
5 Other alternatives were possible to choose. For example, it was possible to contact a holding company to 
collect data of the characteristics of its employees and factories/firms. However, we did not find a holding 
company that had 30 or more firms/factories that would be appropriate for examining earnings 
differentials through employing two-level models. 
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qualifications as well as years of experience which this variety enables us to test the key 
ideas of human capital theory. 
We, then, began contacting some general managers of the organisation and in turn 
were able to establish some meetings with them as well as with some senior experts in 
some departments of the organisation who have been completely familiar with the 
situation of the companies. In these meetings we had discussed the aim of study and the 
data needed. So we could have their agreement and collaboration in collecting the data. 
As mentioned earlier, the target firms were regarded as appropriate clusters for human 
capital study of earnings differentials through employing two-level models, which 
would enable us to examine the variation of contribution of human capital variables on 
earnings across the firms.° Although the firms are not a random sample from the 
manufacturing sector or the Iranian economy and this may weaken the generalisability 
of results to the whole economy, our findings can provide evidence of the fact that (i) 
data used are dominated by a hierarchical structure, and (ii) in a hierarchical system the 
OLS approach employed extensively in empirical studies is not appropriate and may 
give misleading results. Therefore, our findings of the contribution of human capital 
variables to earnings would help us to provide answers for the first set of research 
questions. Such findings would be generalisable to the situation of other firms whose 
main objective is profit maximisation. 
6 More details about the characteristics of the sample are presented in chapter 5. 
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3.4.2 Sample of interviewees 
To supplement the quantitative analyses and to explore further the relationship 
between investment in human capital, earnings, and productivity, we conducted 
interviews with employers or their representatives. By this means it is possible to 
explore whether employers see and regard investments in human capital, in general, and 
education, in particular, as a productivity-augmenting phenomenon. 
The interviewees were chosen from the staff of the firms who were responsible for 
making and implementing their company's pay practices, and employment and training 
policies. Therefore, the target people have been the chief executive or a member of 
management board, administrative deputy, personnel manager, and/or training 
department manager of a firm, because such persons were regarded as appropriate 
interviewees whose responses could help us to examine the third research question. 
With regard to the number of interviewees, the main purpose was to choose as many as 
possible such people for interview. Given our resource constraints, the target firms 
were, however, confined to the cases where the firms have had a representative (office) 
in Tehran or Mashhad. As a first step, we had to meet the chief executive to obtain his 
agreement to interview his colleagues for further information. During distribution of the 
questionnaires of quantitative data, attempts were made to arrange meetings with the 
appropriate staff. We also contacted them through telephone for an appointment. The 
details of interviewees and data collected are presented and analysed in chapter 7. Data 
derived from this sample would complement those of our questionnaires by exploring 
the complexity and the heterogeneity involved in working places in terms of human 
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capital accumulation and the relationship between human capital variables, earnings, 
and productivity. The results would shed light on the third research question. 
3.5 Variables and Questionnaires Design 
Various sources have influenced the choice of variables for this study; human 
capital theory, previous empirical studies, the particular methodology applied and 
information gathered in pilot fieldwork before the main data collection. Human capital 
theory and relevant empirical studies are concerned with two kinds of variables; human 
capital variables and earnings. In terms of human capital variables, as mentioned above, 
this research focuses on education and training. 
Education, as one of the main elements of human capital in the context of Iran's 
educational system, can be measured in two ways; years of schooling and educational 
level. The number of years of schooling refers to the years that employees spent in 
educational institutions such as primary schools, secondary schools and colleges or 
universities. Educational level consists of four levels of education; primary, orientation, 
secondary, and tertiary.8 Data of educational qualifications reported in the 
The main purpose of pilot fieldwork was to evaluate the appropriateness of the questionnaires designed. 
More discussion in that respect will be presented later in this section. (A copy of the questionnaires is 
included in Appendix 2.) 
Primary school begins after the age of six and lasts five years. Then, and after finishing the five years 
successfully, a student follows a guidance or orientation course lasting three years. These eight years of 
schooling are assumed to be general education. Secondary education lasts four extra years. The course of 
tertiary level in the Institutions of Higher Education usually lasts 2 years for upper-diploma, 4 years for 
Bachelor of Science, 6 years for Master of Science/Art as well as for medical, dental, and veterinary 
courses, and 8 years for PhD. There is also literacy programme for adults which is composed of two parts; 
the preliminary and the complementary. The preliminary stage is equivalent to two years of schooling at 
primary level and the complementary to four years of schooling at the primary level. (Further elaboration 
is provided in chapter 4.) 
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questionnaires as levels of education can be converted to years of schooling, or vice 
versa, using the information from Iranian educational system elaborated in chapter 4. 
The subject of study was also included in the questionnaire because we assumed 
that employees with different educational background, in terms of subject or college 
major, earn differently, holding other characteristics of employees the same. However, 
only some companies provided such data, and in practice we could not use this 
incomplete data for the purpose of quantitative analyses. 
Although the quality of schooling is an important element of human capital, it is 
hard to measure so we did not attempt to measure it. However, the application of 
multilevel technique enables one to evaluate the extent to which the unmeasurable 
variables, such as the quality of schooling, may contribute to the variation of the 
contribution of years of schooling on earnings. This issue is elaborated in section 
3.7.1.2, Methods of Analyses. 
Training as another element of investments in human capital is considered in three 
dimensions; on-the-job learning, on-the-job training, and off-the-job training. On-the-
job learning contributes to human capital accumulation through experience in carrying 
out an operation and familiarity with techniques as a result of experience. This element 
of human capital is measured by years of experience. It is conventional that years of 
experience are measured by subtracting "age of starting school plus years of schooling" 
from 'age' of employees. In this study, however, attempts were made to have the real 
figures of years of experience. Actual (years of) experience consists of two parts; 
experience inside the current company (i.e., internal experience) and that outside the 
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current working place (external experience), so the years of experience inside can be 
regarded as the relevant experience and then it is possible to make a comparison 
between effects of the inside and outside experience on employees' earnings. By 
employing actual years of experience we in fact relax one of the basic assumptions of 
the empirical human capital analysis of earnings that students start their working life 
immediately after graduation. 
The age of employees was also included in the questionnaire to estimate the years 
of experience for the cases where appropriate information directly on years of 
experience were not provided. In that respect, it should be noted that some companies 
did not provide information about their employees' years of experience outside their 
own company perhaps because of lack of such information. To fill the gap, information 
of age was used. In addition, maturity with age is another factor that may create 
earnings variation. Including age in an earnings function would account for such 
variations. 
Training on/off the job, as elaborated in chapter 2, is another source of investment 
in human capital, which contributes to productivity and earnings of employees. On-the-
job training consists of any training on-the-job under the supervision of a supervisor, 
and off-the-job or specific training consists of any training course that the employees 
have had, related to their current job, in working place or in any educational 
establishments in both private and public sector. The employers were asked to give us 
data in connection with training of their employees in any measurement (i.e., hours of 
attendance, months, course, etc.). Information about training would enable us to 
91 
evaluate the effect of investment in human capital through training on employees' 
earnings. Unfortunately, only some firms provided data on training and, therefore, we 
could not include a variable for all observations in earnings functions to account for 
earnings differentials attributed to training, unless for a specific firm that data on 
training was provided. However, training data is also useful for the qualitative analysis. 
Besides the human capital variables, information about some other characteristics 
of employees such as marital status, job situation and working conditions was collected. 
Although these variables are not directly concerned with human capital theory, they 
may affect the results of studying the relationship between human capital variables and 
earnings differentials. Marital status, job situation and working conditions, for example, 
may not contribute to human capital accumulation but they may influence the earnings 
of employees. With a given level of human capital, non permanent employees may earn 
more money partly as a risk premium due to lack of non-pecuniary benefits of their job 
such as job security and promotion expectations; employees who work in difficult 
conditions, at night, or as a shift worker receive more wages and salaries. Although, we 
had hoped that data on such factors would be provided, only data on marital status and 
job seniority were provided by all firms and data on the other factors are incomplete. 
Empirically, due to employing hourly earnings and the fact that almost all employees 
were married, only job seniority is incorporated in our earnings functions. Incomplete 
data of other variables, however, are useful for an explanation of extreme values 
(outliers). 
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Job title, as mentioned above, was also included in the questionnaire in connection 
with the belief that a part of earnings differentials is attributed to job heterogeneity. 
Particularly, it is expected that supervisors and managers receive more earnings for their 
extra responsibilities. In this connection, we also assumed that jobs such as management 
and supervision provide a better opportunity for human capital accumulation. Besides, 
educational qualification and experience are two important factors that determine access 
better jobs. Therefore, data on job seniority can help partly to evaluate the option value 
of education and experience to access better jobs. 
Data about earnings, as the dependent variable, include (gross) annual earnings so 
that we are able to evaluate the effects of human capital on (gross) earnings 
differentials. We employ hourly earnings instead of annual earnings as the dependent 
variable in that some employees started their working life, for example, at the middle of 
the year and also because of the lack of information regarding earnings of second and 
third jobs, if any, of the employees. Hours of work (especially overtime hours of work) 
in the main job also vary among employees with different educational qualifications. 
For example, it may be the case that less-educated workers mainly work with one 
employer and, therefore, their overtime hours of work in their current working place are 
more than those of more highly educated workers. Thus, it seemed more reasonable that 
hours of work in the main job be also included in the questionnaire to collect 
appropriate data regarding both usual and overtime hours of work to calculate hourly 
earnings of the employees.9 
As mentioned earlier, one of main purposes of this study is to evaluate the 
appropriateness of multilevel methodology in the human capital analysis of earnings. 
9 A more detailed discussion concerning the appropriateness of "hourly earnings" for human capital 
analysis of earnings is provided by Blinder (1976:12). 
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This methodology dictates that data of different units of analysis should be collected, 
depending on the number of levels of analysis. In this study, a two level method, 
consisting of employees as level 1 units and firms as level 2 units, is employed. Data 
regarding the second or higher level of analysis was collected. Units at the second level 
are firms or enterprises in the manufacturing sector; the size of firms, geographical 
locality, and type of industry are considered to be the main explanatory variables at this 
level. Including these variables in this analysis is not because they are a major concern 
of this study, but because ignoring such variables would lead to some statistical 
problems, as elaborated in section 3.7.1 of this chapter, which may mislead the results 
and, in turn, conclusions of the analysis. Besides, the cluster effects (i.e., earnings 
differentials attributed to firm level) may help to explore new aspects of human capital 
investment such as externality effect of human capital density. For that purpose we 
employ some contextual variables such as the average stock of human capital in each 
firm to find out whether the employees working in a firm with higher human capital 
density are paid more. Including firm level variables through applying a multilevel 
methodology also helps to find the real explanatory variables at firm level. 
To be aware of the factors that influence earnings of the employees in further 
detail, before conducting the main data collection we also studied some employment 
contracts, wage/salary lists, and visited two firms to check the appropriateness of our 
questionnaires with the staff of the firms who were involved directly in personnel and 
administrative departments. Initially, we had been introduced to two companies located 
in Tehran to have meetings with managers and officers in the companies to find out the 
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most appropriate way of collecting the required data. In the meetings aims of the study 
were discussed and variables employed were reviewed. The staff were also ask 
concerning any other factors that affect earnings of their employees. With the assistance 
of such persons, two questionnaires, each consisting of the variables of one level of 
analysis elaborated above, were revised and finalised for distribution. The two 
questionnaires were photocopied (a copy of the English translation of the questionnaires 
is included in Appendix 2) with two letters, an introductory one from the researcher 
highlighting the purpose of the study and making the point that data would remain 
confidential to facilitate providing data, and another from the organisation introducing 
the researcher to the companies. We thought that the situation of different firms may not 
necessarily be the same and that people in different firms may have different 
interpretation of the items included in the questionnaires. To solve any possible 
ambiguity in answering the questionnaires, we allocated two telephone numbers for 
possible contact with the researcher or his assistants. 
3.6 Interviews and Collecting Qualitative Data 
To supplement the quantitative analyses and to explore further the relationship 
between investment in human capital, earnings and productivity, interviews with senior 
managers of the selected companies were held. By this means it is possible to explore 
whether employers see and regard investments in human capital, in general, and 
education, in particular, as a productivity-augmenting phenomenon. Moreover, since the 
sample of employees was selected from a relatively homogeneous set of firms and 
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employees, it is not possible to decompose the observations into two groups of screened 
and non-screened workers, as Wolpin (1977) suggests, in order to study and test the 
validity of the assumption of human capital theory or the view of screening hypotheses. 
As mentioned above, interviews with the senior managers of selected companies 
who were responsible for their company's wages and salaries, employment and 
recruitment policies, and training programmes were conducted to find out: 
1. Do the employers consider education and training (ET) as productivity-enhancing 
factors in their recruitment policy and training programmes? 
2. Is there is a link between ET and earnings of their employees? 
3. How can the extreme values of earnings be explained? 
For the purpose of collecting this qualitative data, a semi-structured questionnaire 
was designed. (A copy of the questionnaire is provided in Appendix 3.) The first part of 
the questionnaire is concerned with educational qualifications. Questions of this part are 
to find out whether employers use educational qualifications as a screening device to 
select more able individuals or they have greater expectation of education. In the second 
part, the behaviour of employers concerning human capital accumulation through 
experience is considered. We also sought to explore partly the heterogeneity involved in 
human capital accumulation across different jobs. Training section of the questionnaire 
deals with the investment behaviour of employers in connection with training and 
improving the skills of their employees. Finally, the last part tends to find possible 
explanations for the extreme values and outliers found in the quantitative regression 
analyses of earnings. 
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Data derived from the interviews did not enable us to test screening hypotheses 
versus human capital theory rigorously, but the results of the analysis of this qualitative 
data would shed light on the question "whether increase in earnings attributed to 
investments in human capital is due to the productivity-augmenting role of ET or 
whether education serves as a screening device that identifies the more able people." In 
particular, the results would provide evidence on employers' investment in their already 
selected employees such as financing training programmes (both general and specific 
training) and contributing to the payment of tuition fees of the employees who studied 
in an (higher) educational institution. 
3.7 Methods of Analysis 
In this section, the quantitative and qualitative methods of analysis are discussed. 
At first, the basic earnings function, which is an extended form of the Mincerian 
earnings function, is explained and justified. This section is followed by a discussion of 
the procedure whereby we examine the reliability of hypothesis testing of OLS 
estimates. The last part of the quantitative analysis section deals with a discussion of a 
proposed experimental multilevel statistical analysis. 
3.7.1 Quantitative Method 
In terms of the quantitative methods of analysis, two general methods can be 
identified to evaluate the effects of investments in human capital on earnings; Internal 
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Rate of Return Method° (IRRM) and Regression Analysis (i.e., Mincerian earnings 
function). Both of the methods have extensively been applied by many researchers but 
using earnings function has several merits. An earnings function enables a researcher to 
isolate the effects of explanatory variables on a dependent variable. The earnings 
function, as Mincer (1979:13) states, permits an estimation of the effect of schooling on 
earnings uncontaminated by and separately from estimates of effects and volumes of 
post school investments and other kinds of investments. For example, by including 
experience rather than age variable as a more appropriate measure of post school 
investments it is possible to estimate the effect of (on-the-job) training on earnings more 
accurately, because, age is an especially poor substitute for experience in the analysis of 
women, whose labour market experience tends to be discontinuous. The earnings 
function, however, can be adapted to discontinuous work histories as well. 
The association between the schooling and post schooling investment or any other 
independent variable is another relation that can be ascertained in connection with the 
application of earnings functions. For instance, it has been shown that more educated 
people invest more through post school investment. The cross effect of years of 
schooling and years of experience can account for earnings differentials attributed to 
such extra investment. 
10 
 What is meant by internal rate of return is the rate that equalises the benefits of an investment with its 
cost. That is: 1(B, — C, )/ (1+ r)` = 0 
=i 
The rate of return (r) derived from the formula is regarded to be equivalent to the coefficient of years of 
schooling in Mincerian earnings function. 
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A multilevel approach is based on a regression analysis methodology. Therefore, 
to make a comparison between a single-level and a multilevel approach, the regression 
analysis technique is essential. To date, regression analysis especially Mincerian 
earnings function has been used extensively by many researchers in the context of 
human capital theory for both developed and developing countries. The superiority of 
the Mincerian earnings function (i.e., semi-log structure) is shown in the empirical 
analysis of earnings functions, (we reviewed the most relevant empirical studies in 
chapter 2.) We, therefore, start our consideration by using the Mincerian earnings 
function,' 1 which is as follows: 
Y; = Po + PIS; P2X, 133 X 2 + e, 	 (3.6) 
where y, is natural log earnings of higher level of human capital; po, intercept, 
equivalent to natural log earnings of lower level of human capital; Si , years of 
schooling; X, , years of experience; and e ,, error terms. The function is based on the 
assumptions that (i) contribution of each year of schooling to earnings is the same 
across educational levels, (ii) there is no interaction between years of schooling and 
years of experience, and (iii) the variance of error terms is the same for all observations. 
However, in the belief that data used provide evidence on the rejection of the 
assumptions, we consider the earnings function inadequate for the purpose of the 
analysis of earnings differentials in the manufacturing sector of Iran. Expanded forms of 
the function, which include other important variables (e.g., years of schooling squared, 
" The mathematical proof of the function is given in, e.g., Mincer (1974 and 1979) and Polachek and 
Seibert (1993). 
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cross effect of years of schooling and years of experience, and management, which 
significantly influence earnings) are also used. That is, it was assumed that an extra year 
of schooling contributes to earnings differently across educational levels. Moreover, it 
was assumed that the effect of an extra year of schooling in higher education level is 
more than that in, e.g., secondary education partly due to vocationalisation of higher 
education and the fact that the capability of a student in higher education to invest in 
himself is more than that of a student in secondary education. These heterogeneities 
contribute to heterogeneity of earnings capacity. As mentioned earlier, more educated 
people invest more through training (experience) and employees in higher level jobs 
may earn differently. The basic earnings function including individual variables for the 
purpose of this analysis is as follows: 
yi = po + p,s, + p,s1 2 + p3 x,+ 13,X,2 + [3,S, X, + 06 (MANG), + e, 	 (3.7) 
The function captures the non-linearity between years of schooling and earnings, the 
increasing gap between earnings-experience profiles of different educational levels, and 
earnings differentials due to job seniority. However, it ignores the effects of firms on 
earnings and assumes a constant variance of error term for observations (that is the 
points that we will focus on in the multilevel methods). The basic Mincerian earnings 
function (i.e., Eq. (3.6)) and many other empirical studies adopting a similar 
specification (including Eq. (3.7)) ignore the grouping of employees into firms, and the 
data are treated as a single sample of 
	 observations. In other words, it is assumed 
that, for example, firm characteristics have a constant effect on all workers' earnings. 
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Figure 3.1 shows a linear relationship between human capital (HC) and earnings (y) 
under a single-level approach. 
Figure 3.1: A Hypothetical Linear Relationship between Human Capital and 




3.7.1.1 Reliability of Hypothesis Testing 
Before running any model through the multilevel methodology, we shall attempt 
to test the hypothesis that data used are dominated by a hierarchical structure through 
using intra-unit correlation. This correlation measures the proportion of the total 
variance, which is between firms. It also measures the correlation between different 
employees in the same firm. That is, when cluster effects exist the covariance between 
two employees in the same firm is not zero and given by: 
2 Cov(u +e 
	 +e )= Cov(u 
	 •)= 06 , 	 0/2 	 0/ 	 1/0 (3.8) 
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The correlation is, therefore: 
cru2o 
e0 /40 
which is referred to as the `intra-firm correlation'. (An analogy is made for the case of 
firms based on Goldstein, 1987: 13, 1995:19.) The existence of a non-zero intra-firm 
correlation, resulting from the presence of more than one residual term in the model, 
means that traditional estimation methods, such as OLS are not appropriate. (Ibid.) In 
other words, when o-,2„ # 0 we would conclude that data are dominated by a hierarchical 
structure and, therefore, employing a multilevel approach is more desirable. 
In the context of human capital analysis of earnings, the issue of clustering effect 
can be discussed in a variety of ways. The capability of managers, for instance, in 
different firms (i.e., clusters) is not necessarily the same. An able manager can lead 
his/her firm to a very successful position in terms of profitability, and this can affect the 
earnings of all employees working in the company, and not the earnings of workers of 
other firms. Technological aspects of production vary across firms and these variations 
may affect human capital accumulation and in turn earnings capacity differently. As we 
reviewed the literature in chapter 2, large firms pay more on average to their employees 
than small firms, given employees' characteristics the same. Large firms may also 
employ more able and more educated people. Internal labour market in different firms is 
not necessarily the same. This heterogeneity would differently affect the accumulation 
of human capital and in turn earnings of employees across the firms. Cluster effects as 
such lead to creating a situation where the correlation between error terms of two 
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employees working in the same firm to be non zero, which indicates a hierarchical 
structure (i.e., Eq. (3.8)) 
Ignoring the hierarchical structure, as mentioned earlier, may mislead us in testing 
of hypotheses (depending on the extent of cluster effects). To demonstrate this statistical 
problem, we extend Eq. (3.8) by including some firm level variables. That is 
= 00 + 01 ,5,1 
 + 12 S,1 + 03 A-11 + 03 x,21  + fl Sit X,> + 05 (MANG), 
+ 137 (SIZE) + A (INDST) + A (LOCN) + (3.9) 
i = 1,2,...,n1 ; number of employees in firm j 
j= 1, 2, ..., m; number of firms 
where S, X, HANG, SIZE, INDST, and LOCN are years of schooling, years of 
experience, management, size of firm, industry, and geographical location, respectively, 
and the e„ are assumed to be a random sample from N(0, o-2 ). In this model we attempt 
to incorporate some firm characteristics in the model by using dummy variables, though 
through an ad hoc procedure. We run the earnings function through employing both the 
multilevel and single-level techniques for overall observations for the sake of reliability 
of hypothesis testing. 
Considering 130 , )3„ and P2 , as random coefficients can provide evidence on the 
question of whether or not unreliability of hypothesis testing is the case when we use an 
OLS method. The results of our experiments in that respect are presented in chapter 6, 
section 6.4. 
103 
3.7.1.2 Multilevel Analysis 
In this section, the multilevel methods of analysis employed in this study are 
elaborated. As a first step, the following earnings function including only employee 
characteristics but with firm fixed effect will be considered. That is, in this model the 
intercept is considered as a random coefficient varying among all companies. In other 
words, it is assumed that only starting wage and salary is different among the firms. 
Figure 3.2, in comparison with Figure 3.1, shows such relationships between human 
capital and earnings under a multilevel approach. As is seen, the intercepts vary among 
the units of the second level. 
Figure 3.2: Hypothetical Constant Relationships between Human Capital and Earnings and 
Varying Intercept across Firms (under a Multilevel Level of Analysis)'2 
Earnings 
Human Capital 
12 To avoid complexity in this Figure and the next one we consider the varying relationship between 
earnings and human capital in five firms/clusters. 
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To describe the relationships for several firms through using an earnings function, 
we write, for firm j: 
	
= p„, + pis,,  + p,s,,2 + 0,x,, + 04 x,,2 + ThS,1X1, + p,(MANG),,+ e,1 	 (3.10) 
To make (3.10) into a two-level model, we let po become a random variable, that is: 
Po = Poo + U, 
Substituting po, in model (3.10) we get: 
Yij = Ro o + Pis,/ + P2 2 	 )9, X u 	 f34 X,2; + 	 p, (MANG),j + u 1 + 	 (3.11) 
where the e,1 again are a random variable of level 1 from N(0, a2 ) and the u, are a 
random variable of level 2 with E(u ,)-= 0 and Var (u 1 )= cr 2u . Model (3.10) differs from 
Model (3.7) only by the inclusion of specific intercept parameters for each firm. One 
could apply, however, a single-level method to estimate a varying intercept model 
through including a dummy variable for each firm (i.e., in the case of this study 35 
dummy variables). In that case, the number of coefficients to be estimated would be 41 
rather than 7 for a model like model (3.10). 
In the second step, we look at the coefficient of years of schooling as a varying 
parameter, which varies among all units of level 2. That is, the effect of education (i.e., 
years of schooling) on earnings is different among the firms. In reality, it is plausible to 
assume that educational qualifications are rewarded differently in different firms, as 
mentioned above. Again let: 
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P0 0 ± 	 + 	 + [3 3 X + 134 X + f3,Su X + 136 ( MANG),/ + (u, + eu ) (3.12) 
where 131, = Pio + u11 . Substituting pl in the model (3.12) we get: 
y u = P0 0  + 0, 0 s,, + p 2 s,, + p3 x 1, + 04 x,,2 + ps s,,x,, + f36 (MANG),/ + 	 (3.13) 
=u0j +uli S„ +eu 
In (3.13) we have 3 random variables which the eu as before are the employees level 
error terms, and Ucli and 1411 
 are the firm's effects on the earnings differentials. 




Earnings function (3.14) considers the parameter of years of experience as a 
varying coefficient. In this consideration it is supposed that not only the intercepts (i.e., 
earnings of employees with zero year of schooling and experience) are different 
( Poi = Poo + 	 but also the effects of both years of schooling and experience on 
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earnings, as Figure 3.3 shows, vary across the enterprises. That is, an additional year of 
schooling/experience, based on Figure 3.3, may contribute some 15 percent to 
increasing earnings in firm A, while the corresponding figures in firms B, C, D, and E 
may be 10 percent, 3 percent, 4 percent, and 2 percent, respectively. Under this 
situation, the earnings function is as follows: 
= f3„o + 13,s,, + p 2 s,, + 	 + )94 x,, + p5 su x,,+ p,(MANG),/ + 	 (3.14) 
w = uo , + 	 + u 21 X + 
As is seen from the model (3.14), the variance of wu is not the same for all observations. 
It varies with years of schooling and years of experience and shows that a constant 
variance assumed in a single level of analysis is not plausible. 
In further detail, it can also be assumed that the coefficients of explanatory 
variable at first level (e.g., years of schooling and years of experience) vary among the 
units of level one. This assumption is particularly plausible when cross-section data are 
used. Examination of such an assumption would help to study the effects of 
heterogeneity in innate ability, social background, quality of schooling and experience 
and the like, as elaborated in chapter 2, which affect human capital accumulation and 
earnings capacity, on employees' earnings. Specifically, in the case of years of 
schooling (experience), it can be assumed that variation in the quality of schooling 
(experience), in part, cause the variation in the coefficient of years of schooling 
(experience). In fact, by imposing such assumptions, the error term at level 1 is 
decomposed in two or three elements. That is 
e u =e00+Sy hi+Xijezij 
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where ely and e2„, are variations in the contribution of years of schooling and years of 
experience to earnings, respectively, across level 1 units partly due to the quality of 
schooling and experience. The reduced form of earnings function would be as follows: 
yu = p„0 + p,su + 13 2 S + 	 13 4 X + f3,S, X „ + 136 ( MANG),, + w,*, 	 (3.15) 
where 	 = u o , + u„S,J + u 2i X + S„e,, + X „e 2„ + e 011  
In the above circumstances, it is assumed that the coefficients are varying among 
the units and companies due to randomness and chance. However, we can extend the 
model to a more complicated one by including firm-level explanatory variables such as 
the size of firms, industry, geographical location, etc. to justify, in part, the variation of 
parameters across the firms. In other words, in reality, it is plausible to assume that 
educational qualification and investment in human capital through experience are 
rewarded differently in different firms due to differences in management, geographical 
location, economic sector, size and the like. The results of such extended models are 
presented in chapter 6. 
The focal aim of all the above mentioned experiments is to find out: (1) Is there a 
hierarchical structure across the units of analysis? (2) Is the testing of hypotheses based 
on single-level models of analysis unreliable when data used are dominated by a 
clustered or hierarchical structure? To what extent do employees' characteristics as well 
as firms' characteristics contribute to earnings? 
One of the basic arguments highlighted by multilevel methodologists is that in a 
varying coefficient situation and when the data in fact have a hierarchical structure 
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applying classical regression analysis which is based on a single-level model with just 
one residual random term and assuming that these residuals are uncorrelated across 
individuals will produce unreliable results for testing of hypotheses. In such a situation, 
it is argued that the estimates of the regression parameters are still unbiased but 
inefficient. (Goldstein, 1995) The estimates of the variances are, therefore, biased, that 
is the expected value of the estimated variance is smaller than the true variance. In other 
words, we would be underestimating the true variance of the OLS estimator.13 This 
affects hypothesis testing of the regression parameters, that is we may reject the null 
hypothesis (H0 ) while it is true. 
To illustrate the matter of underestimating the variances and its effect on testing of 
hypothesis let: 
p- B 
t= 	  
S. E. ((3) 
which has a t-distribution with (n-k) degrees of freedom be the true observed t-value 
under the correct estimation of true variance of p (i.e., under a non-hierarchical 
structure). Under a hierarchical structure and, in turn, underestimating the true standard 
error of OLS estimator (i.e. S.E .0  ) the t statistic will be overestimated, that is t*  >t 
* 
where t =  13— B  
S. E.* ((3) 
13 More details are given, e.g., in: Goldstein (1995) and Maddala (1992). 
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since S .E * .([3)<S .E .(13) . 
In other words, if we ran a model using the multilevel technique, t test statistic of the 
coefficients would decrease compared with those of OLS. The results of the 
experiments presented in chapter 6 show that it is the case with our data. 
3.7.2 Qualitative Methods 
As illustrated in chapter 2, most empirical studies examining the relationship 
between education earnings and productivity have used regression techniques. 
Regression techniques using cross-section data cannot convincingly answer the question 
of "does education improve the productivity of employees or does education serve as a 
screening device to identify more able workers?" because in regression techniques it is 
not possible to control for other important factors such as innate ability, motivation, and 
job heterogeneity.14 In qualitative methods, it is assumed that employers are able to 
monitor and evaluate the performance of their employees with respect to their 
characteristics. Therefore, the analysis of the interviewees' responses would provide a 
more appropriate and convincing answer to the research question. 
Therefore, qualitative methods of analysis are employed to investigate whether 
increasing earnings attributed to education and training is seen by employees to be due 
14 It is worth noting that some attempts were made to control for these (unmeasurable) factors through 
using proxies or using special sets of data. For example, using data of identical twins, Ashenfelter and 
Krueger (1994) were able in part to control for innate ability and social background. However, they did 
not include any measurements into their analysis accounting for heterogeneity in quality of education and 
experience, motivation, occupation, industry, and the like. 
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to productivity-augmenting role of education or whether education serves only as a 
screening device to select abler people. Data collected through interviews are used to 
study this aspect of human capital theory and its alternative theories such as screening 
and signalling hypotheses. 
A number of main themes (i.e., education, experience, and training) have been 
identified, which correspond to the sections of chapter 7. The data has been analysed in 
detail and reported using indicative quotations to explore the employer behaviour in 
connection with investment in human capital and productivity. 
The complementary data derived from the questionnaires designed for collecting 
quantitative data were used in order to study whether training in a specific company 
contributes to employees' earnings. Such data would also help to examine the question 
"whether more educated workers invest more than the less educated in themselves 
through training." 
3.8 Summary and Conclusion 
In this chapter, we have presented and elaborated the research design and methods 
of analysis. First, the main research questions and the concepts involved in this study 
were introduced and elaborated. In section 3.4 units of analysis, consisting of employees 
and firms, and the selection of samples were discussed and justified. The variables used 
were discussed in section 3.5. The section ended with a discussion of questionnaire 
design. Unlike most empirical studies, we collected data for the quantitative analysis 
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through questionnaires whereby employers were asked to provide data about the 
variables requested. This approach was more appropriate in terms of having a sufficient 
number of observations to conduct a two level method of analysis and enabled us to 
collect more accurate data of employees and firms' characteristics. 
Since the debate between human capital theory and screening hypotheses is 
studied through conducting interviews and employing qualitative methods, the sample 
of interviewees and qualitative data collection were elaborated in section 3.6. We also 
considered the appropriateness of the qualitative methods of analysis, in comparisons 
with regression techniques, which are used in this study in order to examine the 
productivity-enhancing role of education. 
Studying the advantages of the multilevel method of analysis as an alternative 
methodology for human capital analysis of earnings is one of the main aims of this 
thesis. Attempts were made, in section 3.7, to discuss and to elaborate various statistical 
problems that dominate the OLS estimates using data dominated by a hierarchical 
structure. Potential merits of multilevel methods in the context of human capital 
analysis of earnings were also discussed. As a result, the multilevel technique was 
regarded as a more efficient one for the purpose of estimation and hypothesis testing 
and a more powerful technique for the exploration of the determinants of earnings 
especially for a cross-section analysis. In particular, it helps one to study various 
sources of earnings variation and determinants of earnings in a more systematic, rather 
than an ad hoc, way. 
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Chapter 4 Structure of Economy and Education System of 
Iran 
4.1 Introduction 
The first section of this chapter presents some general information regarding 
geographical situation and demographic composition of Islamic Republic of Iran. The 
next section looks at current political structure and government of the country. Since 
units of analysis have been selected from the manufacturing sector of Iran's economy, 
attempts are made to present the current situation of the sector in comparison with 
whole economy in terms of value added (GDP) and the structure of employment as well 
as the composition of employees' qualifications. Finally, after giving some historical 
background of the education system of Iran, the current situation of the education 
system is described to shed some light on the ways of measuring education and training 
for the purposes of this study. 
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4.2 General Background 
The Islamic Republic of Iran is a mountainous, high plateau country with an area 
of 1,648,000 kilometres. It stretches from the Caspian Sea and independent countries in 
the north to the Persian Gulf in the south and from Turkey and Iraq in the west to 
Afghanistan and Pakistan in the east. Iran thus forms strategically the land-bridge 
between the Middle East and Asia. 
The country is rich in minerals (i.e., copper, oil, gas, and coal), and exportation 
of petroleum is the principal source of foreign currency. 
According to the census taken in 1996, the population then numbered 60.1 
million. Some 39.5 percent of the total population were under the age of 15, and 4.4 
percent were aged 65 and over. The annual growth rate between 1986 and 1996 was 1.9 
percent. (Plan & Budget Organisation, 1997a: 117) 
Nearly 66 percent of the Iranian people are of Persian origin while 25 percent 
have Turkish origins, 5 percent have Kurdish origins, and 4 percent Arab origins. The 
official language of Iran is Persian (Farsi). Nearly 99 percent of the people of Iran are 
Muslims and 91 of them are followers of the Shi'ate sects, but there are also Sunni 
Muslims, Christians, Jews, Zoroastrians, and Baha'is. (Shamsavary, 1992: 326) 
4.3 Political Structure and Government 
Iran's constitutional monarchy was ended in 1979. In the same year a new 
constitution established an Islamic republic in which principles of Islam were to be the 
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foundation for social, political, and economic relations. A religious leader, who is 
elected by the Assembly of Experts elected by direct vote of people, called the Wali-e 
faqih oversees the operation of the government. In what follows we briefly view the 
structure of executive, legislative, and judiciary of Iran. 1 
4.3.1 Executive 
The chief executive and head of state of Iran is a president (the highest official 
after the office of leadership in the country) who is popularly elected to a four-year term 
by the direct vote of the people. His re-election for a successive term is permissible only 
once. 
Ministers will be appointed by the President and will be presented to the Islamic 
Consultative Assembly for a vote of confidence. The President is the head of the 
Council of Ministers. He supervises the work of the ministers and takes all necessary 
measures to co-ordinate the decisions of the government. With the corporation of the 
ministers, he determines the programmes and policies of the government and 
implements the laws. 
Each of the ministers is responsible for his duties of the President and the 
Assembly, but in matters approved by the Council of Ministers as a whole, he is also 
responsible for the actions of the others. 
The discussion presented in this section is based on "The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 
1990". 
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Local government: Iran consists of 26 provinces, according to the 1996 census, 
which are divided into 252 counties and 680 districts; districts are subdivided into 
villages and municipalities. (Statistics Centre of Iran, 1997) Provincial and district 
officials are appointed by the central government; municipalities elect their own 
mayors. Fig. 4.1 depicts the hierarchical structure of provincial authorities. 












Legislative authority in Iran is vested in a unicameral parliament called the 
Islamic Consultative Assembly. Its 270 members, popularly elected by direct vote of 
people for terms of four years, can dismiss the country's president by a no-confidence 
vote. Laws enacted by the Assembly must be approved by the Council of Guardians, 
who ensure accordance with Islamic code and the constitution. All citizens age 15 and 
older are entitled to vote. 
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4.3.3 Judiciary 
The judiciary is an independent power, the protector of the rights of the individual 
and society, responsible for the implementation of justice and entrusted. The highest 
regular tribunal in Iran is the Supreme Court, the president of which is appointed by the 
religious leader (Wali-e faqih). A legal system based on Islamic law was introduced as 
part of the Islamic Revolution of 1979, and courts established prior to the revolution 
were later abolished. 
4.4 Economy 
In this section, we shall present data on the composition of gross domestic product 
(GDP) of Iran's economy. In particular, the situation of the manufacturing sector will be 
discussed. Then, the structure of employment in the whole economy, in general, and in 
the manufacturing sector, in particular, will be reviewed, using data from the last two 
censuses. 
4.4.1 Gross Domestic Product 
The gross domestic product (GDP) in 13742 (1995-96) was 15455 billion rials3 at 
constant prices (1361=100). Economic growth was 3.1 percent as compared with the 
previous year. The proportion of the components of GDP that is agriculture, oil, 
2 Iranian Year that 1374 is equivalent to March 1995- March1996. 
3 Iranian money unit. 
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industry, and services are 24.2, 16.3, 21.3, and 38.5 percent respectively. Comparing the 
growth rates of the economic sectors, we observe that industry enjoyed the highest 
growth rate (5.7 percent) in 1374 compared with the previous year. Amongst the 
components of the industry sector (i.e., mining; manufacturing; electricity, gas, and 
water; and construction) manufacturing attributes major part of value-added of the 
sector to itself (i.e., 66.2 percent). It also experienced a high growth rate (5.8 percent), 
however, the 'electricity, gas and water' enjoyed 5.9 percent growth compared with the 
previous year. (Plan & Budget Organisation, 1997c: 6) 
4.4.2 Employment 
The number of employed people in Iran according to 1996 census was 14.6 
million, which 23 percent of those employed were working in agriculture, forestry, of 
fishing; industry including manufacturing mining, electricity, gas, and construction 
employed 30.7 percent, and services employed 44.5 percent. The equivalent figures 
from the census 1986 are 29, 25.3 and 42.3 percent respectively, which show a 
significant shift from agriculture to manufacturing sector. 
In terms of qualification of the employees, as Table 4.1 reveals, in 1986 only 5 
percent of the employees had higher education qualification, 17 percent secondary 
school, 9 percent orientation school (guidance cycle), and 69 percent primary or lower 
level of education. During the following ten years (i.e., 1986-1996) the educational 
qualifications of the employed people experienced a significant change in favour of 
more educated people. The proportion of people with higher educational qualification 
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increased from 4.5 to 9.8 percent. The equivalent figures for the employed with 
secondary education and guidance cycle are 18 and 18.2 percent respectively. 
Whereas the agriculture sector attracted minimum qualified employees, services 
sector has had maximum percentage of educated employees among its employees. For 
example, the percentage of employees with higher educational qualification in the 
agriculture sector was less than one percent in 1986 and 1996 whereas the 
corresponding figures for the services are 9 and 18.7 percent respectively. As Table 4.1 
shows, the percentage of the employed people with higher education qualifications has 
increased substantially (more than twice) during the period. 













Agriculture 1986' 29.1 100 93.6 3.8 2.0 0.2 
19962 23.0 100 88.9 11.2 4.1 0.6 
Industry 1986 25.3 100 79.8 8.6 9.3 1.7 
1996 30.7 100 62.9 21.3 13.2 3.8 
Manufacturing 1986 13.2 100 75.3 10.4 11.9 1.7 
1996 17.5 100 58.0 23.3 15.1 3.6 
Services 1986 42.3 100 46.4 13.0 30.6 9.0 
1996 44.5 100 32.6 19.9 28.5 18.7 
Not Classified 1986 3.3 100 59.2 9.9 20.2 6.4 
1996 1.8 100 54.3 15.5 19.5 10.7 
Total 1986 100 100 69.0 9.1 16.5 4.5 
1996 100 100 54.7 18.2 18.0 9.8 
Note: * Total number of employed workers were 11.04 and 14.6 million in 1986 and 1996, 
respectively. 
** The figures consist of the proportions of the employed with primary school 
qualification, adult-literacy programme, and non-formal qualification, and the 
illiterate. 
Source: 1. Statistics Centre of Iran (1988: 129) 
2. Statistics Centre of Iran (1997: 145) 
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The industry sector also has enjoyed an increasing proportion of more educated 
people. For example, the percentage of the employed with guidance cycle qualification 
increased from 8.6 percent to 21.3 percent. The corresponding figures for employees 
with higher education are 1.7 percent and 3.8 percent. Amongst the components of 
industry sector, 52 percent of the employees of the sector were working in the 
manufacturing which the proportions of employees with higher education, secondary, 
orientation, and primary or less education level in 1986 were 2, 12, 10, and 75.3 percent 
respectively. The equivalent statistics for 1996 are 3.6, 15.1, 23.3, and 59. As in other 
economic sectors, manufacturing sector also attracted more educated people. 
4.4.3 Manufacturing Sector 
As discussed in the previous section, the manufacturing sector enjoyed a relatively 
high growth rate of employment and value added. In this section, the structure of this 
sector is elaborated in further detail. 
In 1986, 13.2 percent of those employed were working in the manufacturing 
sector. The equivalent figure for 1996 is 17.5 (i.e., on average, a growth rate of 5.7 
percent per year) which shows a considerable increase in the number of employed 
population in the sector. The proportion of the employed persons with different 
educational qualifications indicates that the structure of the qualifications of the 
employees has dramatically changed in favour of higher education. As Table 4.1 shows, 
while the proportion of employees holding "primary or less" educational qualifications 
decreased from 75.3 to 59 percent during 1986-1996, the proportion of employees with 
guidance cycle, secondary and tertiary education increased from 10.4, 11.9 and 1.7 
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percent to 23.3, 15.1 and 3.6 percent, respectively. During the period, the number of 
employed people with guidance cycle and tertiary education enjoyed the highest growth 
rate. 
The composition of educational qualifications of the employed persons in the sub-
sectors of manufacturing sector is presented in Table 4.2. As is seen, the composition of 
educational qualifications across the sub-sectors is not the same. The proportion of 
employees with primary education in the sub-sector of "Non-Metalic Mineral Products" 
was 83.2 percent in 1986 whereas the equivalent figure for "Paper, Cardboard, and 
Publishing" is 52 percent, which is the lowest figure among the sub-sectors and 
indicates that the proportion of employees who hold higher educational qualifications 
are reasonably high, in comparison with the former sub-sector. The proportion of 
employees with tertiary education was the lowest for the sub-sector of "Textile, 
Clothing and Leather", as expected, and highest for the sub-sector of "Chemicals, 
Petroleum, Coal, Rubber and Plastic" in 1986. Figures about the composition of 
employees with tertiary education show that the sub-sectors of "Chemicals, Petroleum, 
Coal, Rubber and Plastic", "Basic Metal Industries" and "Paper, Cardboard, and 
Publishing" could attract more highly educated individuals. A number of explanations 
can be addressed with regard to this phenomenon such as technological heterogeneity, 
size of establishments/firms, and economic sector (i.e., public or private). It seems that 
the size of firms is one of the main reasons that can explain, in part, heterogeneity in 
educational qualifications across the sub-sectors. This is, it is more likely to be the case 
that larger firms attract more highly educated workers. 
Table 4.3 shows the number of firms/establishments in the sub-sectors of the 
manufacturing sector and reveals that most units of the manufacturing sector (i.e., 96.4 
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percent) have employed 0-9 workers. However, this pattern is not the same among the 
components of the manufacturing sector. As is seen, the proportion of firms with larger 
size in sub-sectors such as "Paper, Cardboard, Publishing & publishing", "Chemicals, 
Petroleum, Coal, Rubber and Plastic", "Non-Metalic Mineral Products", and "Basic 
Metal Industries" is higher than that in other sub-sectors. As presented above, the 
proportion of employees with higher education levels is higher in the former group than 
that in the latter one. Therefore, it is reasonable to infer that more educated workers are 
employed in larger firms. Data collected for this study presented in chapter 5 support 
this argument. 
Table 4.2: Employed Population in Manufacturing Sector by Educational Level, 1986 
(Percent) 




Secondary Tertiary Not 
Reported** 
Food, Beverages & Tobacco 100 80.0 8.8 9.4 1.2 0.63 
Textile, Clothing & Leather 100 82.0 9.1 7.6 0.6 0.83 
Wood & Wood Products 100 74.5 12.1 11.8 0.9 0.63 
Paper, Cardboard, Publishing & 100 51.9 13.5 29.7 4.1 0.83 
Chemical, Petroleum, Coal, & 100 55.9 10.6 26.5 6.3 0.73 
Non-Metalic Mineral Products 100 83.2 6.7 8.2 1.2 0.63 
Basic Metal Industries 100 64.8 9.0 20.2 5.4 0.61 
Machinery, Equipment & 100 64.1 15.6 17.1 2.4 0.73 
Other Industries 100 53.7 16.3 25.3 3.7 1.03 
Total 100 75.3 10.4 11.9 1.7 0.73 
Note: * The figures consist of the proportions of the employed with primary school 
qualification, adult-literacy programme, and non-formal qualification, and the 
illiterate. 
** Educational qualifications were not reported. 
Source: Statistics Centre of Iran (1988: 129) 
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Table 4.3: Manufacturing Establishments by Number of Workers (1990) 
(Percent) 
Sub-Sector Total 0-9 10-99 100-999 >=1000 
Number As % of 
Total 
% 
Food, Beverages & Tobacco 60939 20.5 100 97.5 2.2 0.2 0.0 
Textile, Clothing & Leather 104611 35.2 100 97.8 2.0 0.1 0.0 
Wood & Wood Products 33823 11.4 100 98.9 1.0 0.1 0.0 
Paper, Cardboard, Publishing 3099 1.0 100 85.2 14.0 0.7 0.1 
& 
Chemical, Petroleum, Coal, & 3919 1.3 100 72.1 25.2 2.3 0.3 
Non-Metalic Mineral Products 19476 6.5 100 86.3 13.1 0.5 0.1 
Basic Metal Industries 1796 0.6 100 84.2 14. 1.2 0.6 
Machinery, Equipment & 66065 22.2 100 97.0 2.8 0.3 0.0 
Other Industries 3641 1.2 100 97.1 2.9 0.1 0.0 
Total 297369 100.0 100 96.4 3.3 0.3 0.0 
Source: Statistics Centre of Iran (1995:109) 
4.5 Education System 
In what follows, in the first place, historical information about education system 
of Iran is presented. Then, the current structure of formal education is explained in 
terms of enrolment ratios, number of students, and number of graduates. This section is 
followed by a discussion of adult and non-normal education. Finally, the administrative 
and supervisory structure of the education system is briefly reviewed. 
4.5.1 Historical Background 
Prior to the Arab conquest and the propagation of Islam in 642 AD, the 
Zoroastrian religion dominated the area emphasising three duties which parents and 
society were supposed to teach the children: pious thoughts, good deeds, and kindly 
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speech. Physical education was also taught to ensure a sound body. After 642 AD and 
the country's conversion to Islam, the concept of knowledge enjoyed an important place. 
The Qur'an speaks repeatedly of its importance: 'alm (knowledge) and its derivations 
"make up around one percent of its vocabulary." (Rosenthal, 1970; quoted in: Menashri, 
1992: 15) Islamic tradition (sunnah) makes the search for knowledge a duty of all 
Muslim men and women throughout their life, and in any place. (Motahhari, 1961: 108-
109) Even greater importance is attached to knowledge in the Shi'ate sects, so one of the 
main qualifications required for the source of religious imitation is to be the 'most 
learned' cleric. Moreover, Islamic tradition linked knowledge and status. According to 
Shi'ate tradition, as al-Isfahani puts it, "knowledge lifts the lowly person to the heights. 
Ignorance keeps the youth of noble birth immobile." (Re-quoted in Menashri, 1992: 15) 
Islam did not, however, encourage the search for knowledge merely for the sake of 
status. Status was expected to come to those who engaged in searching knowledge. In 
other words, various aspects of human life (i.e., the physical, intellectual, social, 
emotional, moral) receive attention in Moslem scriptures. However, the main focus is 
on the development of human character, of moral behaviour, and of one's relationship to 
God. All other aspects are expected to be necessary conditions to interact in a way that 
contributes to the person's character and moral growth. (Obeid, 1994: 3021) 
Due to the above situation of knowledge in Islam, the mosques became centres of 
learning. The Qur'anic and Islamic schools emerged with a curriculum of scripture, 
logic, Arabic, and grammar. These schools, that is Maktabs (i.e. elementary schools) 
and Madresahs (i.e. higher schools), especially after the Muslim conquest, dominated 
for centuries. Learning and education centres expanded to hospitals (Menashri, 1992:16) 
as well as some higher education establishments such as Academy of Jundi-Shapur in 
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South West of Iran, and Nizamiyyahs in some Iranian cities. (Shamsavary, 1992: 326) 
These centres remained centres of scientific inquiry, training and education. Teaching 
religion remained central to Muslim scholars, but instruction for the life of this world 
had its place too. (Menashri, 1992: 16) 
Notwithstanding these developments, devastating wars and invasions led to long 
periods of political and economic instability and thus to the downfall of many excellent 
centres of higher learning. (Shamsavary, 1992: 326) A state education system was 
introduced in late 19th century based on the centralised French model and, by the early 
1980s, only the Maktabs and Madresahes could survive. Since 1980s onwards, early 
stages of religious literacy, particularly Quranic course, which had been provided by 
Maktabs, have been taught in schools and Literacy Movement as a part of curriculum. 
Modern elementary and secondary schools were opened in Iran only in the 
1870's. Public elementary schools, however, were opened from 1890 onward, and all in 
all, in 1918/9 that is more than a century after the first contacts with western education 
were made by sending Iranian students to European universities in 1811, there were no 
more than several dozen new elementary schools (with a total of 24033 pupils) and few 
secondary schools (with 2392 students). (Menashri, 1992: 60) The curriculum and the 
pedagogical approach differed from one school to another according to the educational 
philosophy of founders. It was, as Sadiq (himself a student at such a school) noted, a 
period of "experimentations with a new education." (Quoted in Menashri, 1992: 61) 
However, they all were completely different from the traditional system and the 
majority of teachers and headmasters were graduates of foreign schools or of Dar al- 
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Fonun4 and were not dependent on the religious establishment. In line with the tendency 
already prevalent before the constitutional revolution during 1906-1921, advocates of 
educational reform attached overriding importance to elementary education. The early 
stage of education, more than the later ones, was a prerequisite for a durable 
constitutional regime and an essential condition for building a modern nation-state, for 
social and economic progress, and, of course, for expanding and improving higher 
education. (Ibid.: 77) 
The history of higher education in Iran dates back 2000 years when famous 
educational institutions such as the Academy of Jundi-Shapur became intellectual 
sanctuaries for the learned men. Iran's recent history of higher education, however, goes 
back to the mid-nineteenth century when a renewed process of radicalism and reform 
engulfed the whole country which led to establishing Dar al-Fonun in the mid 
nineteenth century with the specific aim of solving Iran's urgent need for trained labour 
force. (Shamsavary, 1992: 326) 
A systematic approach to higher education had to wait until the 1930, when the 
Education Act of 1934 established the university of Tehran, which brought all small and 
separate colleges and schools of higher education under a single administration. A 
significant growth in scale and diversity of higher education in response to the changes 
of modernisation and economic development has been experienced since the 1940s. 
(Ibid) 
4 Dar al-Fonun was the first new institution of higher learning in Iran established on 28 December 1851. 
Its object was to make western technology available to Iranians. It was the first educational institution in 
modern Iran to be set up by the political, rather than the religious, establishment, and the first to teach 
western sciences. (Menashri, 1992: 53) 
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New attempts to improve and expand education were made in the 1950s. Iran 
participated in the UNESCO/UNDP world literacy programme and a World Conference 
of Ministers of Education was convened in Tehran in 1965. An international institute for 
adult literacy was established in the Iranian capital in 1968, and literacy rates increased 
to 55 percent for males and 30 percent for females. However, millions of persons could 
still not read and write and school enrolment rates were low, particularly in rural areas 
and among women. (Aziz-zadeh, 1994: 3007) 
Following the Islamic Revolution of 1979, the content of education was changed 
so that all teaching and curriculum should not be against Islamic principles. Efforts were 
also made to teach the Holy Qur'an, the traditions of Islam, and the Constitution of the 
Islamic Republic. Since education and development of people's knowledge have been 
one of the key aims and priorities of the Islamic revolution, efforts were devoted to 
expand educational facilities so during the first-five-year development plan of Iran the 
education capacities expanded extensively in both public sector, by increasing the 
proportion of education in government budgets and establishing new educational 
facilities for Adult Literacy, and private sector, by establishing private schools and 
Islamic Open University. The education structure of Iran, following the above 
developments, gives all students a reasonable chance to study according to their 
attitudes and aptitudes. 
5 
 The proportion of education of government budget during the plan period has improved considerably 
and varied between 25% and 33%. Public educational expenditure has experienced an average growth of 
38 percent per year during 1989-1995. (Plan & Budget Organisation, 1997c: 39-41) 
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4.5.2 The Structure of Formal Education System 
So far, we have presented historical background information about education in 
Iran. In this section we elaborate the current status of educational system in more detail. 
In the first section, the situation of primary and secondary education is viewed. The 
section is followed by a discussion of higher education status. 
i) Primary and Secondary Education 
There exists one year pre-primary education for five-year-old children. However, 
Primary Education is the first stage of formal education. It begins at the age of six and 
lasts five years. Then follows a guidance or orientation course lasting three years. These 
eight years of education are assumed to be general education. 
Secondary education comprises four-years of formal schooling for youths. After 
passing the requirements of the guidance/orientation course, pupils can continue their 
studies in one of the many areas of the secondary level, which is divided into two main 
branches: technical-vocational and academic. Technical-vocational is an alternative for 
those students who have completed the orientation course and wish to continue their 
education in technical and vocational fields.°  
After successfully passing final examination at the end of each academic year 
pupils can pursue their education at the next stage. In other words, promotion from one 
grade to the next is mainly based on the results of an end-of-year internal examination. 
6 Before restructuring the pre-university education system in 1971/2, each of elementary and secondary 
schools lasted 6 years and there was not any orientation course or intermediary schools. (Menashri, 1992: 
177) 
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In each subject, children's work is mainly scored on a 0 to 20 scale. An average score 
across subjects of at least 10 is required for promotion. Those falling below 10 must 
repeat the year. 
At the end of primary education, a regional test is administered and a certificate is 
awarded to the successful candidates. A provincial test is administered at the end of the 
lower-secondary level of education (i.e. orientation) and again a certificate is awarded to 
successful students. Admission to secondary education requires certain levels of 
performance in each specific subject area. The test at the end of secondary education is 
administered at the national level, and the successful candidates are awarded a diploma 
certificate. 
As Table 4.4 reveals, during 1985-1994 enrolment ratios experienced a substantial 
improvement. In 1985 the enrolment ratio of primary level was 96 percent and increased 
to 99 percent in 1995. The corresponding figures for secondary level are 44 percent and 
69 percent, respectively, which show that during the period further education has been 
promoted substantially. However, the enrolment ratios for pre-primary education 
remained the same. 
Table 4.4: Gross Enrolment ratios by educational levels 
(percent) 
Pre-primary Primary Secondary Tertiary 
1985 7 96 44 4.1 
1995 7 99 69 14.8 
Source: UNESCO (1997): 3-47 and 3-48. 
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During 1989-1996 period, the number of students in the general education level 
experienced a substantial growth. The number of primary school students rose from 8.9 
million in 1989 to 9.2 million in 1996 (about one percent growth per year). The number 
of guidance cycle students increased from 3.1 million in 1989 to 5.3 million in 1996 
(about 8 percent growth per year). In the secondary level, the number of students 
reached 3.8 million in 1996, up from 1.7 million in 1989 (about 12 percent growth per 
year). (Plan & Budget Organisation, 1997b: 96) 
ii) Higher Education 
After secondary school graduation, the students who wish to continue their higher 
education take part in an annual multiple-choice nation-wide examination for entry to 
universities, teacher-training centres, and colleges of technology. Admission to all these 
institutions is based on the completion of secondary schooling and the results of the 
examination. 
A university has one or more faculties which offer courses usually lasting two 
years for upper Diploma, four years for Bachelor of Science, six years for Master of 
Science or Arts and medical, dental and veterinary courses, and later on Doctor of 
Philosophy. (Aziz-zadeh, 1994: 3008) Higher education is categorised as medical 
education, sciences, technical education and engineering, social sciences and 
humanities, and agricultural and veterinary. 
In 1985 the enrolment ratio at tertiary level was very low (e.g., 4.1 percent). The 
figure, however, has experienced considerable increase during 1985-1995. That is, it 
increased from 4.1 percent in 1985 to 14.8 percent in 1995. (Table 4.4) In terms of 
number of graduates, higher education also experienced a substantial improvement 
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during recent years. As Table 4.5 shows, during the 1989-1996 period, the number of 
graduates increased from 51 thousand in 1989 to 161 thousand in 1996 (an average 
growth of 18 percent per year). The figures for the number of graduates of non-public 
higher education institutions are even more impressive. That is, during the period the 
number of graduates experienced some 23 percent growth per year. It should be noted 
that the substantial growth in the number of graduates is partly as a result of the 
establishment and development of Islamic Azad University in 1980s that has branches 
in different cities. Students who study at the university also have to pay their own 
tuition fees.' The remarkable increase in the number of the university's students could 
be explained in the way that the students invest in themselves through education for 
their future benefits.8 
Table 4.5: Number of Graduates of Higher Education Institutions between 1989-96 
(thousand) 
Graduates 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996* Growth % 
Public** 33 37 43 52 59 64 74 85 15 
Non-Public 18 25 32 42 50 59 66 75 23 
Total 51 52 75 95 109 123 140 161 18 
Notes: * Estimation 
* *The teacher training centres are excluded. 
Source: Plan & Budget Organisation (1997b: 102). 
In some cases the parents of the students and/or their employers, in the case where the student is 
employed, may contribute to pay the tuition fees. 
8 We shall elaborate this issue in chapter 5 and 6. 
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Table 4.6: Number of students in universities and higher education institutions 
(thousand) 
Academic Year 	 Percentage 
change 
1990-91 1991-92 1992-93 1993-94 1994-95 
Islamic Azad University 176 223 303 368* 431* 25.1 
Public Universities & ... 312 344 376 437 479 11.3 
Total 488 567 679 805 910 16.9 
Note: * Excludes students who discontinued their studying. 
Source: Central Bank of I.R. of Iran (1995): 116-117. 
4.5.3 Adult and Non formal Education 
Although, adult education dates back to 1936 (Menashri, 1992: 96), in the 1980's 
great interest and effort were devoted to non-formal education, particularly to literacy 
work to eradicate illiteracy. The literacy programme provided by the Literacy 
Movement has two parts: an initial stage of 180 hours followed by a second stage of 288 
hours. The primary stage is equivalent to two years of schooling at the primary level and 
the second stage to four years of schooling at the primary level. (Ministry of Education, 
1990: 33) The programme is offered in special institutes or in the work place, leading to 
literacy of skill certificates. (Plan & Budget Organisation, 1997b: 96) Some 10 million 
illiterates participated in literacy classes in the period 1980-90. About 65% of these 
classes were allocated to women and more than 60 percent of them were held in rural 
areas. (Aziz-zadeh, 1994: 3009) 
4.5.4 Administrative and Supervisory Structure of Education System 
The organisation of the modern educational system in Iran was closely modelled 
on that of France and is, therefore, highly centralised. The Ministry of Education 
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through its central bureaucracy and regional representatives administers and finances 
the schools at primary and secondary levels of education. The Higher Council of 
Education, as an autonomous and legislative body, approves all policies and regulations 
related to education at pre-university level. Efforts are being made to establish regional 
education councils and to develop their authority in allocating funds and a considerable 
range of administrative duties. (Aziz-zadeh, 1994: 3009) 
In the first and second five-year development plans (1989-1998), the 
government has also indicated its intention to expand non-profit schools, which are 
financed by parents. 
The administration and management of educational activities in higher education 
in public sector vested in the Ministries of Culture and Higher Education, and Health 
and Medical Education. The latter ministry is responsible for medical higher education 
and the former one for non-medical. Islamic Open University, which was established in 
order to make higher education accessible to all enthusiastic and willing individuals is 
managed and administrated by the Council of the University. Higher Council for 
Cultural Revolution also approves policies mainly related to higher education. (Ibid.) 
4.6 Summary and Conclusion 
In this chapter an attempt was made to present general information on the political 
structure and government, the structure of economy, in terms of GDP and employment, 
and the structure of education, in terms of enrolment ratios, number of students, and 
administrative and supervisory structure of education system in Iran. In particular, data 
on the situation of the manufacturing sector was presented in further detail, which such 
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information is useful to be compared with the characteristics of sector derived from the 
sample of observations collected for this study. Such a comparison will be made in 
chapter 5. 
In reviewing the current structure of education, we found that the number of 
students, especially those studying at higher education institutions and universities, 
increased dramatically during the last decade. In chapter 5 and 6, through conducting a 
human capital analysis of earnings, we shall explain such a phenomenon. 
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Chapter 5 Education, Experience, and Earnings: Empirical 
Analysis 
5.1 Introduction 
In the first part of this chapter the sample of observations, both firms and 
employees, is described. This section is followed by a description of the characteristics 
of firms and employees. For that purpose, the characteristics of firms and employees are 
elaborated in further detail through presenting their mean and standard deviation. 
Earnings-experience and earnings-age profiles are also employed to establish the 
relationship between human capital variables and earnings through plotting diagrams. 
This section is followed by a presentation of first part of our regression analysis 
employing standard and classic ordinary least squares (OLS). By applying the OLS 
method, we attempt to evaluate and then discuss the effects of individual and some firm 
characteristics that account for earnings differentials. A comparison is made between 
the results of the OLS analysis from this study with those of other empirical studies. 
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5.2 Some Descriptive Evidence 
One of the main purposes of this study is to investigate the questions: Do 
education and experience contribute to increasing earnings of employees in the 
manufacturing sector of Iran's Economy? If so, to what extent? After discussing the 
characteristics of data collected, in the following sections attempts are made to answer 
the questions through using the simple tabulation method and earnings-experience/age 
profiles. 
5.2.1 The Sample of Firms and Employees 
To investigate the relationship between human capital investments (education and 
experience) and earnings, a sample of firms from the manufacturing sector have been 
selected as a case study. 1 The basic units of analysis are full-time male employees 
working at the selected firms. To collect appropriate data in that regard two 
questionnaires (one consists of the characteristics of employees and the other consists of 
the characteristics of employers/firms), elaborated in chapter 3, have been designed and 
distributed among 65 companies located in different geographical areas of Iran. The 
questionnaires were distributed among the firms by the researcher and two assistants in 
the cases where the firms have had a representative (office) in Tehran, and by mail for 
the cases where there was not a representative. As Table 5.1 shows, data of both 
The process of sample selection was discussed in chapter 3. 
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individuals and firms' characteristics from 42 companies (i.e., 65 percent rate of 
response) have been collected. Of these, 35 companies provided appropriate data on 
which this analysis is based. Therefore, seven firms' data were excluded because data 
given concerning the characteristics of these firms were not complete and appropriate 
for final analysis. For example, two companies provided data of earnings only for the 
last month of the year. Usually employees are paid more in that month due to New Year 
allowance and the like. Another firm did not provide data concerning the educational 
qualifications of its employees. 
Main economic activities of the firms can be classified into food and beverage, 
textiles and clothing, paper and cardboard, chemical and medical, non-metallic mineral, 
and machinery and fabricated metal products. 
Table 5.1: The Sample of Firms and Rate of Response 
Number of Companies Percentage 




Selected for final Analysis 35 54 
At the individual level of analysis we have 15755 observations (full time male 
employees) that the average number of observations (employees) within each company 
is 450. However, the number of employees varies from 19 to 2162 among the 35 
companies. As Table 5.2 reveals, some 10 firms have employed fewer than 100 
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(between 1-99) workers each, 18 employed between 100 and 999 people, and 7 had 
1000 or more employees. In other words, 550 employees have been working in 10 
firms, 4965 persons were employed in 18 enterprises and 10240 individuals in 7 firms. 
Table 5.2: The sample of Firms by number of employees 
1-99 100-999 1000 and 
over 
Total 
Sample of Firms 10 	 18 	 7 	 35 
Number of Employees 550 	 4965 	 10240 	 15755 
As % of Total 3.5 	 31.5 	 65.0 	 100 
Table 5.3: The Composition of Firms and Employees by Geographical Location 
Small Cities Large Cities Total 
Number 	 Percentage Number Percentage Number Percentage 
Firms 8 	 22.86 	 27 	 77.14 	 35 	 100 
Employees 4501 
	 28.57 	 11254 	 71.43 
	 15755 	 100 
Average YS* 5.8 	 6.3 	 6.1 
Average YX* 10.5 	 13.9 	 12.9 
Note: * YS and YX stand for years of schooling and years of experience. 
In terms of geographical location, 8 firms of 35 (i.e. some 23 percent) are located 
in small cities.2 The rest are located in large cities. Table 5.3 presents the composition 
2A large/big city is defined a city that has one million or more population. A city with less than one 
million population is considered as a small city. 
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of firms by geographical location. It is seen that employees working at firms located in 
large cities have a higher average of years of schooling and years of experience. 
5.2.2 Characteristics of Employees 
Average years of schooling of all individuals across all firms is 6.1 years. The 
corresponding standard deviation for years of schooling across all companies is 4.1 
years. Looking at years of schooling in different educational levels (i.e., primary, 
guidance cycle, secondary, and tertiary), we can observe that average years in each 
educational level are 2.9, 6.7, 11.4, and 15.7, respectively. The corresponding figures 
for standard deviation are 1.9, 0.9, 1.0, and 1.2, respectively. The percentage of 
employees with primary education is about 50 per cent. Some 25 percent of employees 
have guidance cycle education, 22.3 per cent secondary education and 3.3 per cent have 
tertiary education. It is worthwhile noting that the equivalent figures for manufacturing 
sector derived from general housing and population census 1996 are 59.0, 23.3, 15.1, 
and 3.6 percent, respectively. (More details are provided in chapter 4.) 
Table 5.5 shows the distribution of employees' years of experience by level of 
education. The overall mean years of experience is 12.9. However, the corresponding 
figure for employees who hold the qualification of education level 1 is 15, which is 
higher than the mean of other educational levels. It shows that more educated 
employees have fewer years of experience. In terms of years of experience within and 
outside of current firm (internal and external experience), the observations show 
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different patterns. While employees with educational levels 1, 2 and 3 have mainly 
worked for their current firm (i.e., about 87 per cent of their working life), employees 
with tertiary education have only worked some 50 per cent of their working experience 
for their current employers. 
Table 5.4: Mean Years of Schooling by Educational Levels 
Educational 
Level 
Mean Std. Dev. As % of Total* As % of Total** 
1 2.9 1.9 49.5 58.0 
2 6.7 .9 24.9 23.3 
3 11.4 1.0 22.3 15.1 
4 15.7 1.2 3.3 3.6 
Total 6.1 4.1 100 100 
Note: Educational levels 1, 2, 3, and 4 are equivalent to 0-5, 6-8, 9-12, and 13 or 
over years of schooling. 
* The percentage of employees in each educational level. 
** Figures presented in the column are derived from Table 4.1 and indicate the 
composition of educational qualifications in the manufacturing sector. 
Table 5.5: Distribution of Employees' Years of Experience by Educational levels 
Educational Level Experience Inside 
Current Firm 
Other Experience Total 
Mean As % of Total 
1 12.9 2.1 15.0 49.5 
2 10.4 0.9 11.3 24.9 
3 8.9 1.6 10.4 22.3 
4 5.4 5.0 10.4 3.3 
Total 11.2 1.8 12.9 100 
Table 5.6 shows the average hourly earnings of the employees by educational 
levels and years of experience and reveals a positive relationship between human capital 
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variables (education and experience) and earnings. That is, more educated workers 
receive much more earnings than less educated ones, and employees with more years of 
experience compared with less experienced workers have also received more earnings. 
For example, an employee with educational level 1 and with no experience earned 1177 
rials per hour in 1374 (i.e., 1995-96). The corresponding figures for employees with 
educational levels 2 and 3 are 1497 and 2682, respectively, holding experience years 
constant (i.e., X=0). The differences reveal that secondary education could contribute 
some 320 rials (27 percent) to increasing hourly earnings. The corresponding figure for 
higher education is even higher. That is, employees who have tertiary education 
compared with those who have education level 1, would earn 1505 rials more (i.e., 127 
percent), holding years of experience constant (e.g., X=0). 
Furthermore, holding years of schooling constant, we can observe the same 
relationship between investment in human capital through on-the-job training (i.e., post-
school investment) and hourly earnings. For example, an employee with 0 years of 
experience on average earns 1177 per hour while an employee with 20 years of 
experience, given the same schooling level (i.e., education level 1), earns 1908 rials. 
The difference is about 62 percent for 20 years of experience (2.4 percent per year). In 
other words, it might be said that an extra year of experience could contribute some 2.4 
percent to increasing hourly earnings. The corresponding figures for all observations 
and for employees with tertiary educational qualification are 1.5 and 2.7, respectively. 
The empirical findings provide evidence on the fact that investment in human capital 
after completion of schooling (i.e. through experience) is also productive and creates 
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variation in the earnings of individuals. This variation may be across age or years of 
experience; age variation of earnings is referred to as earnings-age profile, and 
experience variation to earnings-experience profile. 










0 1177 1497 2682 1493 
2 1275 1728 3024 1534 
4 1330 1483 2606 1415 
6 1452 1638 2777 1550 
8 1436 1753 2866 1600 
10 1538 1933 2743 1675 
12 1676 2424 3366 1946 
14 1621 2334 3109 1826 
16 1752 2294 2936 1862 
18 1844 2429 4663 2003 
20 1908 2304 4597 2021 
22 2081 2473 4370 2221 
24 2118 2633 5368 2262 
26 2017 2379 5249 2135 
28 2151 2724 4521 2285 
30 1846 2270 5591 1974 
Total 1671 2009 3354 1802 
5.2.3 Earnings-Experience and Earnings-Age Profiles 
So far some descriptive figures of the relationship between earnings and the 
employee characteristics were presented. The figures, however, do not show the 
systematic variation of earnings with human capital variables. Earnings-experience 
profiles depict such a relationship. Figure 5.1 demonstrates that earnings increases with 
years of experience. It also shows that such a relation exits for groups of employees 
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with different educational background. However, the steepness of earnings-experience 
profiles for each educational group is not the same. More educated employees have a 
steeper earnings-experience profile than the less educated. In other words, the gap 
between the profiles increases with years of experience. This empirical evidence can 
explain partly the idea that more educated people invest more through experience and 
training. 
Earnings-Age Profiles, Figure 5.2, also show the same pattern in connection with 
the relationship between education and earnings. Earnings are higher at higher levels of 
education, and increases with age through the working life. However, the rate of 
increase in hourly earnings diminishes with age. The differences among educational 
levels are also systematic. The absolute and relative growth rate of earnings increases 
with educational level. In other words, while educational level increases, the effect of an 
extra year of schooling on increasing earnings is incremental. The profile of earnings 
for employees who hold higher educational qualification indicates that the working life 
of more educated workers starts some 4 years after that of the less educated. After quite 
a short period, earnings of employees with higher education overtake those of the less 
educated. 
Comparing the profiles of earnings-experience with those of earnings-age shows 
that earnings-age profiles are steeper than earnings-experience profiles. It can be 
implied that years of experience cannot capture the whole earnings differentials during 
working life. In other words, there are some other factors that affect employees' 
earnings such as the quality of education, off-school training, managerial responsibility, 
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place of employment, etc. that need to be included in the analysis. For example, 
employees who had managerial responsibilities earned almost twice as much other 
employees. (Table 5.7) However, on average, managers are the individuals who are 
more educated and experienced. The average years of schooling of an employee with a 
managerial job is 10, in comparison with 5.7 years of a non-manager employee. The 
equivalent figures for years of experience are 17 and 12.5, respectively. By using a 
simple tabulation, however, it is not possible to evaluate the effect of such factors on 
earnings. 
Table 5.7: The composition of years of schooling and years of 
experience of employees by managerial responsibilities 
Manager Non-Manager Total 
Years of Schooling 
	 10 5.7 6.1 
Years of Experience 
	 17 12.5 12.9 
Hourly Earnings 	 3364 1638 1801 
5.2.4 Summary 
Overall, the above mentioned evidence as well as the earnings-experience profiles 
reveals a positive relationship between human capital characteristics and earnings. 
However, earnings differentials are affected by different factors and we cannot attribute 
the whole earnings differentials only to years of schooling and experience and/or 
managerial responsibilities. For instance, as presented above, managers are paid more, 
in comparison with non-manager employees. One reason is that the managers are the 
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more educated and the more experienced personnel, as demonstrated above. Larger 
firms or firms located in big cities may pay more to their employees. 
On the other hand, by using this device (that is a simple tabulation and earnings-
experience profiles) we cannot include such factors and, in turn, evaluate the real effect 
of education (years of schooling) and experience on earnings. Therefore, we have to 
employ a more powerful device of data reduction (i.e., a regression analysis) that 
enables us to evaluate the effect of human capital investments on earnings after isolating 
the effects of other influencing factors more accurately. Next section deals with the 
regression analysis. 
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18 1270 802 1203 
20 1283 1140 1239 
22 1209 1197 768 1202 
24 1296 1646 1812 1422 
26 1314 1529 2158 1397 
28 1377 1550 2307 1469 
30 1444 1691 2537 1556 
32 1530 1763 2637 1630 
34 1701 1997 3062 1828 
36 1705 2313 3366 1947 
38 1753 2312 3289 1921 
40 1778 2234 3647 1951 
42 1795 2454 3569 1986 
44 1865 2359 4364 2066 
46 1833 2292 3713 1970 
48 1913 2648 4351 2094 
50 1803 2395 5546 2005 
52 1815 2649 3288 1899 
54 1921 2477 4898 2046 
56 1808 2172 1831 
58 1840 2171 5394 1959 
60 1667 2646 7669 1754 
62 1571 2121 6575 1686 
64 1606 1531 6213 1643 
Total 1670 2009 3354 1801 
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5.3 Human Capital Earnings Functions, An OLS Analysis 
5.3.1 Introduction 
To what extent do education and experience contribute to increasing employees' 
earnings in the manufacturing sector of Iran's Economy? 
In the previous section, some descriptive evidence has been presented showing 
that there is a positive relationship between human capital measurements (i.e., education 
and experience) and earnings in the case of the manufacturing sector of Iran. As argued, 
there are some other factors that affect earnings of employees such as managerial 
position, firms' characteristics, etc. Isolating the separate effect of each determinant of 
earnings is not possible through the tabulation method. It is necessary to employ a 
regression technique to estimate an earnings function for that purpose. An earnings 
function relates variations in earnings to variations in explanatory variables such as 
education and experience. The regression derived coefficients could be either in general 
form, that is referring to, for example, the average contribution of an extra year of 
schooling to increasing earnings, or in educational level specific form. In this study, 
both techniques are employed. 
So far, as Psacharopoulos states (1987: 218), earnings functions have been used 
for various purposes such as: 
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- isolation of the effect of one individual variable on earnings, 
- rate of return analysis, 
- income growth accounting, 
- income distribution analysis, 
- study of interaction effects, etc. 
This study is mainly concerned with the first and last uses of earnings functions. That is 
we attempt to study the contribution of years of schooling and experience to earnings. 
We employ Mincerian earnings functions to fulfil the above purpose under the classic 
OLS approach. In this analysis, education, experience, and management are considered 
as main characteristics of employees and the size of firm, geographical location, and 
industry as firm's characteristics. In this section, the results of an OLS analysis are 
presented; in the first section, the estimated effects of employee variables on earnings 
are presented and then discussed. The section is followed by the examination of the 
effects of firm characteristics on earnings. Finally, attempts are made to evaluate the 
marginal effects of education and experience on earnings. 
5.3.2 Employees' Characteristics 
In what follows we attempt to estimate the effects of the conventional human 
capital variables on earnings by employing the basic Mincerian earnings function. As 
argued in chapter 3, the function with such a specification is not adequate for the 
analysis of earnings determinants in the context of the manufacturing sector in Iran. To 
examine this hypothesis, we extend the function through including variables for the 
interaction effect of years of schooling and years of experience on earnings, managerial 
responsibility, and non-linearity in the effect of schooling on earnings. Finally, the 
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decomposition of experience into internal and external experience is of interest to see to 
what extent internal, in comparison with external, experience contributes to increasing 
earnings, which is the subject of the last part of this section. 
5.3.2.1 Education and Earnings 
Education as one of the key elements of human capital has been recognised in 
theoretical and empirical analysis of earnings differentials. Generally speaking, the 
function-derived estimates of the contribution of education to earnings could be either 
the contribution of an extra year of schooling or that of a higher level of education. In 
the former case we employ years of schooling as a continuous variable and in the latter 
case, four educational levels will be incorporated as dummy variables. 
Years of Schooling and Earnings: Table 5.9 reports the results of runs of 
earnings functions consisting of individuals' characteristics. The variables included in 
Model 1 consist of years of schooling as the only explanatory variable. As results show, 
years of schooling explain about 8.3 per cent of hourly earnings differentials. In other 
words, some 8.3 percent of the earnings inequality in the distribution of employees' 
earnings can be attributed to individual differences in years of schooling. Under this 
situation, where (years of) schooling is added as the only explanatory variable, an extra 
year of schooling contributes some 2.64 per cent to increasing earnings. However, the 
relationship between years of schooling and earnings is not necessarily a linear one, as 
assumed in the basic Mincerian earnings function. 
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Figure 5.3: Relationship between Hourly Earnings and Years of Schooling 
The empirical relationship between years of schooling and earnings is presented 
in Figure 5.3. The Figure suggests that there exists a non-linear relationship between the 
variables. We incorporate such non-linearity by adding years of schooling squared (i.e., 
"edun2" variable) into our earnings function, Model 2. Entering this new variable 
increases the explanatory power of the model (R2 increases form 8.3 per cent to 10.3 per 
cent). That is, the model with a non-linear relationship between education and earnings 
can explain some 10.3 earnings differentials. The coefficient of `edun2' is positive, 
indicating a higher contribution of schooling to earnings at higher levels of education. 
In other words, while years of schooling increases the contribution of years of schooling 
to earnings is getting larger. An employee with 10 years of schooling, for example, 
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would receive 4.2 percent more from one extra year of schooling. The corresponding 
figure for an employee with 16 years of schooling is 7.4 percent. 
5.3.2.2 Experience and Earnings 
As discussed in chapter 2, years of schooling is only one of the human capital 
variables. Individuals also accumulate their human capital through (on-the-job) training. 
We measure this variable by using years of experience. As is well established, the 
relationship between experience and earnings is concave to the origin (Figure 5.1: 
Earnings-Experience Profiles). This concavity, as human capital theory predicts, is due 
to the fact that investments are accumulated at younger age but continue at a 
diminishing rate throughout much of the working life mainly because of increasing 
marginal costs of investment with experience. (Mincer, 1974: 129) It means that 
individuals after graduation and at the start of their working lives invest in themselves 
much more than late in their working lives. In other words, the rate of post-school 
investment during working life is declining. At this stage, we enter years of experience 
and years of experience squared into the earnings function to account for such a 
relationship. In fact, the basic Mincerian earnings function is run that enables us to 
make a comparison between our empirical results and the findings of other studies. 
Doing this, it is found that the model can explain some 28.1 per cent of earnings 
differentials. (Model 3, Table 5.9) The marginal contribution of years of experience, 
derived by taking the first derivative of log-earnings with respect to the experience 
term, would be as follows: 
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x =.0379 - (2*.0006)x (5.1) 
That is, an extra year of experience increases hourly earnings about 3.8 percent at the 
start of working life. At the end of the first decade of experience the figure is 2.6 
percent and when X=20 the contribution of experience is only 1.4 percent. The negative 
sign of the coefficient of years of experience squared confirms the expected concavity: 
earnings increase with experience at a decreasing rate. 
Table 5.9 Estimated Effects of Employees' Characteristics on Earnings 
Variable* Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
edun .0264 -.0121 .0389 .0119 -.0070 .0067 
(37.80) (-5.6) (60.1) (6.0) (-2.8) (2.8) 
edun2 .0027 .0019 .0023 .0011 
(18.8) (14.5) (17.0) (8.9) 
exp .0379 .0387 .0279 .0311 
(34.4) (35.3) (19.6) (23.5) 
exp2 -.0006 -.0006 -.0005 -.0006 
(-14.8) (-16.1) (-11.2) (-15.2) 




cons 7.24 7.33 6.91 6.87 7.00 6.97 
(1407) (1069) (770) (699) (483) (517) 
R2 .083 .103 .281 .290 .297 .392 
S.E. .3586 .3547 .3176 .3155 .3141 .2921 
F 1428 907.8 2051 1611 1328 1692 
Note: In all tables in this chapter figures in parentheses are t statistics and all 
coefficients are statistically significant (at 10% or lower level), otherwise it is 
stated. Log-Hourly Earnings is also the dependent variable. 
* Definitions of variables and notations used are presented in Appendix 1, 
Table Al. 
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Under the circumstances that experience and experience squared entered as 
explanatory variables, an additional year of schooling would increase earnings some 3.9 
percent. This figure is 50 percent more than the schooling coefficient based on 
schooling earnings function (i.e., Model 1 of Table 5.9) in which we do not incorporate 
investment through experience. The result shows not only experience is an important 
variable but also ignoring post-school investment, through on-the-job training in our 
consideration, leads to bias in estimating the contribution of schooling to earnings. 
Including years of schooling squared in the basic Mincerian earnings function (i.e. 
Model 4) improves the explanatory power of the model slightly. That is, the employed 
earnings function with years of schooling squared can explain about 29 percent of 
earnings inequality among employees. 
The results of the basic Mincerian earnings function employed in this study, 
Model 3, are consistent with other empirical work. For example, in his well-known 
study Mincer reports that the earnings function including years of schooling, years of 
experience, years of experience squared can explain about 28.5 percent of earnings 
differentials. (Mincer, 1974:92; Table 5.1) The results of a study by Psacharopoulos 
and Layard (1979: 175, Table III, Regression 3.2) show that an earnings function with 
the same specification explain about 31.6 percent of variation in earnings. A study by 
Arabsheibani and Rees (1998: 190; Table 1, Column 1) provides similar empirical 
evidence: The three variables of years of schooling, years of experience, and years of 
experience squared explain about 22.3 percent of earnings variation. 
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5.3.2.3 Interaction Effect of Education and Experience on Earnings 
The issue of schooling effects on post-school human capital accumulation has 
long been of interest. It is argued that employees with higher education are able to 
invest more through learning on the job. There should be, then, a positive relationship 
between schooling and post-school investment. To account for such an effect, an 
interaction variable for interaction between years of schooling and years of experience 
(i.e., "SX" variable) on earnings have been included in the human capital earnings 
function (Model 5). The coefficient for this variable as expected is positive and 
including the variable contributes slightly to increasing the explanatory power of the 
model. Therefore, the contribution of an extra year of experience in this situation 
depends on both schooling and experience. That is: 
ay 
— = p x + 2/3,2 x + f3,,s =.0279 — (2*.0005)x+.001s 
a 
(5.2) 
The marginal effect of experience indicates that employees with higher education 
have received more additional earnings than those who are less educated partly due to 
their extra post-school investment. In other words, the greater volumes of investment 
through on-the-job learning imply steeper earnings-experience profiles for more highly 
educated people. 
156 
5.3.2.4 Management and Earnings 
Earnings inequality due to occupation has long been a matter of debate in 
empirical analysis of earnings functions. On the one hand, it has been argued that 
ignoring occupation as one source of earnings differentials leads to bias in estimating 
the effects of human capital investments on earnings. On the other hand, it is claimed 
that better jobs are offered to better-qualified and educated workers. Therefore, access 
to better job is a consequence of higher schooling and experience. Under these 
circumstances, it is argued that including a variable to account for earnings inequality 
due to job variation thus would underestimate the effect of schooling. Our data can only 
allow us to distinguish managerial and non-managerial occupations. Therefore, we first 
ran a human capital earnings function for employees with no managerial position. The 
results of this model would show whether or not including a variable for managerial 
responsibility understates the effect of schooling on earnings. 
Table 5.10 shows the contribution of schooling on earnings based on the human 
capital earnings functions 5 and 6 presented in Table 5.9. It indicates that schooling 
effects under different situations are not the same. Under earnings function 5, for 
example, the contribution of schooling is much more than the situation where 
managerial responsibility (i.e., `mang') is included as an explanatory variable. To see 
whether the difference is bias in the estimated effects of schooling, we ran a separate 
earnings function under which employees (observations) with managerial position have 
been excluded. Row 3 of Table 5.10 presents the results and indicates that the estimated 
effects of schooling are very close to those of model 6 including `mang' variable. 
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Therefore, an earnings function excluding managerial responsibility, as in Model 5, may 
overstate the effects of schooling years on earnings. 
However, it should be noted that it does not mean schooling and experience do 
not have anything to do with managerial responsibility. It could be argued that job 
seniority (i.e., management) is another kind of human capital. Because access to such 
jobs and positions could be costly. For example, candidates may need to attend special 
courses for the purpose of being a manager. Better workers are also selected into higher 
level jobs. (Ferrall, 1997: 27) This selection could be due to better quality of schooling 
and experience as well as higher ability. Regardless of the issue of innate ability, both 
quality of schooling and quality of off-school investments are theoretically the 
components of human capital acquired through education and experience. However, 
years of schooling and experience do not account for such components. Besides, higher 
level jobs could provide a better opportunity for investment through on-the-job learning. 
Such elements can create additional human capital accumulation and in turn steeper 
earnings-experience profiles for managers. 
Thus, it is more desirable to include "management" as another explanatory 
variable to account for such effects. By doing this, we find that being a manager 
increases hourly earnings some 45 percent. In these circumstances, the human capital 
earnings function, Model 4, explains more than 39 percent of inequality in the 
distribution of workers' earnings. 
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Table 5.10: Estimated Effects of Schooling on Earnings (%) 
Condition N S=10 S=20 
X=0 X=10 X=0 X=10 
1 Including `mang'; Model 6 	 15755 2.9 3.2 5.1 5.4 
2 Excluding `mang'; Model 5 	 15755 3.9 4.9 8.5 9.5 
3 Excluding observations 	 14269 
where ' m ang=1 ' 
2.8 3.2 5.2 5.6 
4 (2) - (1) [Bias!!] 1.0 1.7 3.4 4.1 
Note: The schooling estimates are based on ay / = f3, + 2/3 Z + sx x . 
* The exclusion of observations where mang=1 might raise the issue of 
sample selection problem. To examine whether the matter of sample 
selection would affect the estimates, we used Heckman two-step 
estimation procedure, Heckit. It was found that the coefficient of lambda 
is not significant at 10% or better level and, therefore, the estimates of 
earnings function 3 do not suffer from the problem of sample selection. 
Table 5.11: Probability of being a Manager Associated with Education and 
Experience 
X,i,  
S----> 	 5 12 16 18 
10 0.011 0.206 0.570 0.741 
20 0.087 0.475 0.734 0.822 
30 0.262 0.578 0.713 0.762 
Note: To estimate the probability, a logistic model consisting of S, S2, X, X2, 
and SX was employed. S stands for years of schooling and X for years 
of experience. 
There is also another point that should be elaborated. As stated above, more 
educated and experienced persons are selected for higher level jobs. Therefore, the issue 
of the option value of education and experience emerges from the job seniority. To deal 
with this issue, we employ a logistic model to evaluate the probability of being a 
manager due to higher education and more experience. Table 5.11 reveals the results. It 
indicates that the probability of being a manager increases with years of schooling and 
with years of experience. For example, the probability of being a manager for a person 
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with 12 years of schooling and 10 years of experience is about 21 percent. The 
equivalent figure for an individual with 16 years of schooling and 20 years of 
experience is about 73 percent. Therefore, it is plausible to assume that for an individual 
with the latter characteristics about 73 percent of earnings differentials attributed to 
management can be ascribed to the option value of education and experience. 
5.3.2.5 Internal and External Years of Experience and Earnings 
As suggested in chapter 3, years of experience can be decomposed into two 
elements; Experience inside the current firm and prior or external experience in other 
firms. It is expected that internal experience would have a larger effect than external 
experience on earnings of employees since the former one is more relevant to the 
current job. In this connection we estimated earnings functions to evaluate the relative 
effect of the two kinds of experience on earnings. Table 5.12 shows the results and all 
estimated earnings functions provide empirical evidence on the fact that internal 
experience has a stronger effect on earnings than prior experience (about twice). Model 
1, for example, shows that an extra year of internal experience contributes some 1.9 
percent to increasing hourly earnings in comparison with 0.8 percent of a year of 
external experience. The same results are held for Model 4, Table 5.12. That is one 
extra year of internal experience increases earnings about 2.8 percent and the equivalent 
figure for external experience is 1.4 percent. 
In terms of the explanatory power of earnings functions, it should be noted that 
decomposing experience into internal and external experience slightly improves the R2 
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of the models. For example, earnings function 6, Table 5.9, consisting of a variable for 
total years of experience, explains about 39 percent of earnings differentials while the 
comparable earnings function 4, Table 5.12, consisting of two separate variables for 
internal and external experience, has better explanatory power (i.e., 40.7 percent). 
Our findings reported above are consistent with the results of other empirical 
work. Mincer and Higuchi (1988: 105, Table 1), for instance, report that (i) internal 
experience (i.e. tenure in their terminology) has a stronger effect on wages in both Japan 
and the United States and (ii) the growth of wages with tenure in Japan is greater than 
that in the U.S. 
Table 5.12: The estimates of effects of internal and external experience on 
earnings 











EXPint 0.0185 0.0283 0.0165 0.0280 
(45.9) (23.2) (28.0) (21.2) 
EXPext 0.0075 0.0192 0.0009 0.0141 
(10.3) (12.3) (1.14) (9.0) 
EXP2 -0.0004 -0.0004 
(-8.5) (-9.7) 
SX 0.0006 0.0004 
(8.3) (4.5) 
Mang 0.4261 0.4330 
(47.9) (48.7) 
CONS 7.19 7.14 7.08 7.01 
R2 (%) 11.91 12.31 40.34 40.69 
Note: Figures in brackets are t-statistics. The coefficients shaded are not 
statistically significant at 10 percent level. 
EXPin and EXPext stand for internal and external years of experience, 
respectively. 
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So far, we have examined the effects of employees' characteristics on earnings 
through employing earnings functions and found that all coefficients, according to t 
statistics, are highly significant and consistent with the human capital theory as well as 
most other empirical studies. That is, investments in human capital through education 
and experience lead to higher earnings and the results tend to support the notion that 
individuals develop their (future) earnings capacities through education and on-the-job 
learning. In other words, the observed correlation between human capital variables 
(schooling and experience) and earnings provides support for the hypotheses that 
education and learning through experience are investments which receive pecuniary 
returns in the labour market. 
As discussed above, the relationship between years of schooling and earnings is 
found to be non-linear. Nevertheless, this non-linearity is assumed in the way that the 
incremental effect of an extra year of schooling is independent of different educational 
levels. However, it is not necessarily the case. That is, in reality the contribution of an 
additional year of schooling to earnings may be different across different levels of 
education. (Bowman, 1961: 247) The following section deals with this issue. 
5.3.2.6 Variation in Contribution of Years of Schooling with Levels of Education 
Human capital theory does not predict to what extent years of schooling at 
different educational levels contribute to earnings. In other words, it is not clear 
theoretically, as elaborated in chapter 2, whether or not the contribution of schooling in 
different educational levels should be the same. For example, does an extra year of 
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schooling in primary level increase earnings as much as a year in tertiary level? To 
achieve an equilibrium, however, in life-cycle theory of earnings it is assumed that 
return to education is diminishing. (Willis, 1986: 551-4; and Cooper and Cohn, 1997: 
108-9) If this is the case, the contribution of years of schooling to earnings derived from 
Mincerian earnings function, which is conventionally considered as return to education, 
should decrease with years of schooling as the proxy of investment in human capital 
through education. However, empirical investigations of this aspect of human capital 
theory provide conflicting results. For example, Mincer in his well-known work (1974: 
54, 92) found a decreasing rate of return to schooling derived from an earnings function 
where he excluded hours of work. However, the rate was found to be constant when he 
entered hours of work as another explanatory variable. Mincer and Higuchi's study 
(1988: 125; Table AII, Regression A) using data of Japan and USA presents different 
patterns of the non-linear relationship between years of schooling and earnings. As the 
findings of the study show, in the case of Japan, the coefficient of years of schooling 
squared is negative indicating that years of schooling increase earnings but do so at a 
decreasing rate. In contrast, in the case of the United States the coefficient of years of 
schooling squared is found positive demonstrating the point that years of schooling 
improve earnings at an increasing rate. Psacharopoulos and Layard (1979: Table III, 
Model 3.3) in the case of Britain and Kingdon (1997: 26) in the case of India have also 
found an increasing rate of the contribution of schooling years to earnings, which is 
consistent with the findings presented above. However, by including years of schooling 
squared as a continuous variable in an earnings function it is implicitly assumed that 
years of schooling increase the marginal effect of schooling on earnings but do so at a 
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constant rate. In reality, this may not be necessarily the case. By using a dummy 
variable for each educational level we relax this assumption. 
Running an earnings function consisting of dummy variables for different 
educational levels, we have found a non-linear relationship between education and 
earnings. That is, the contribution of an extra year of schooling to earnings increases 
with levels of education. Table 5.13 reports the results of our experiments. As can be 
seen from the results of earnings function or Model 1, education level 1 (i.e. "DS21" 
variable) contributes about 6.7 percent to earnings in comparison with the base 
education level. Education level 2 (secondary education) increases earnings about 11 
percent more than that of education level 1. Finally, the effect of education level 3 
(higher education) on earnings is 46 percent more than that of education level 2. 
Overall, the effect of higher education level in comparison with the base education level 
is 63 percent (i.e., 15.5 percent per year of higher education).3 The equivalent figures 
for secondary education level is 17.3 percent (4.3 percent per year). Earnings functions 
2 and 3, Table 5.13, including experience and management variables, also show the 
same patterns: the effect of education on earnings increments with levels of education 
3 To formulate an equation that reveals differences between the effects of different educational levels on 
earnings through using dummy variables, there are two alternatives; one is to employ a binary variable in 
the way that a comparison is made between the base or control educational level and the highest 
education level. That is, the dummy variable take on the value 1 if an individual has that particular 
education level and zero otherwise. To compute the marginal effect of each educational level to its 
previous level of education one has to subtract the coefficient of lower level from that of higher level. The 
other is to redefine the dummy variables to be 1 if the individual has the degree, rather than whether the 
degree is the highest degree obtained. For example, for someone with a Higher Education level, all binary 
variables for higher education, secondary education, and primary are 1. In this way of formulation, the 
coefficient of each level of education gives the marginal value of the level to earnings. (More explanation 
is given in: Greene, 1993: 231-6.) The second method is used in this study to evaluate the marginal effect 
of each educational level on earnings. 
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and the effect of higher education is the highest among the levels of education. For 
instance, higher education level, based on earnings function 2, increases earnings by 46 
percent, compared with secondary education level. The corresponding figure for 
secondary education level is 14 percent. 
Table 5.13: Estimated Effects of Employees' Characteristics on Earnings 
Using Dummy Variables 
Variables 1 2 3 
DS21 .0669 .1478 .1059 
(10.2) (24.6) (18.9) 
DS22 .1065 .1388 .0903 
(14.1) (20.5) (14.2) 
DS23 .4559 .4575 .2859 
(27.3) (31.3) (20.1) 
EXP .0387 .0339 
(35.0) (33.1) 




CONS 7.32 6.91 6.97 
(1572) (810) (874) 
R2 .1019 .2805 .3857 
S.E. .3549 .3177 .2936 
F 596.0 1227.7 1648 
Note: 0- 4 years of schooling completed have been considered as the 
base or control education level and 5-8, 9-12, and 13+ years of 
schooling completed as education levels 1, 2, and 3 respectively. 
Estimated coefficients of educational levels show the marginal effect 
of each education level to lower level of education rather than to the 
base level of education. 
DS21, DS22 and DS23 are dummy variables used for education levels 
1, 2 and 3, respectively. 
The incremental effect of education on earnings with level of education can be 
viewed as evidence to support a number of hypotheses concerning investment in human 
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capital through education. It can be viewed in the way that higher levels of education, 
compared to lower levels of education, are more vocationalized and occupationalized in 
the sense that students are thought subjects, which are more relevant to a specific job. 
(Williams, 1985) In other words, if we consider the essential contribution of education 
in terms of the dissemination of knowledge of both the know-how and know-what 
types, skill and cognitive knowledge, this finding also sheds light on the fact that 
primary and secondary levels of education provide students mainly know-what 
knowledge rather than know-how kinds of knowledge. In contrast, higher education 
supplies mainly know-how knowledge, which is more relevant to a job. (Machlup, 
1984: 432-4) 
The above mentioned patterns of earnings differentials can also be presented in 
connection with the assumption that a student studying at a higher level of education 
can invest more in himself compared to a student studying at secondary or primary 
level. It is expected that this extra capability of human capital accumulation, therefore, 
improves earnings capacity. It is worthwhile mentioning that the higher ability/capacity 
accumulating human capital may be a result of higher innate ability or additional 
knowledge and skills acquired at schools and universities. In the latter case, the findings 
support human capital theory and in the former one the screening hypotheses. However, 
as stated in chapters 2 and 3, regression techniques are not able to shed light on this 
important issue. 
Finally, as observed in chapter 4, the number of students and graduates of the 
higher education institutions in Iran increased dramatically during the last decade. The 
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higher contribution of an extra year of schooling at higher education level is an 
explanation for that phenomenon. That is, it can be regarded in the way that students 
were motivated by economic factors, in particular earnings, to continue their education. 
However, as presented above, the improving earnings capacity does not 
necessarily mean that the rate of return to education also increases. Costs of education 
for different individuals, due to differences in abilities and opportunities, and for 
different educational levels are not the same. Besides, there are other benefits such as 
employability, trainability, etc. that are attributed to education. Human capital analysis 
of earnings using earnings functions take no account of all the productive attributes 
developed by education, as Mace (1987: 28) remarks. Thus, we should be cautious 
about the common practice of interpreting the coefficient for years of schooling as the 
rate of return to education.4 If we interpret the coefficients of years of schooling as 
return to education neglecting, 	 ., direct cost of education it is likely that we face 
contradictory results with the life-cycle theory. That is, under such circumstances there 
would not be an achievable equilibrium for an individual investing in himself through 
education and he would continue his foil 
	 ial education for ever. In reality, however, it is 
not the case. Therefore, the coefficient of schooling in the Mincerian earnings function 
cannot be interpreted as returns to education but as the contribution of schooling to 
earnings. To evaluate the returns to education one has to incorporate direct cost of 
4 A more detailed discussion is given in Johnes (1993a: 30-31). 
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schooling as wells In other words, the assumption that direct cost of education is 
negligible or is the same for different educational levels, as most empirical studies using 
Mincerian forms of earnings function reviewed in chapter 2 claim, does not seem 
plausible.°  
As mentioned earlier, besides the employees' variables there are some other 
factors affecting employees' earnings. Taking into account these factors may also 
influence the schooling and experience coefficients. The extent to which these variables 
contribute to earnings and affect the marginal effects of schooling and experience is 
studied in the following section. In the next section, therefore, we will analyse the 
effects of firms' characteristics on earnings using OLS methodology. 
5.3.3 Firm Characteristics and Employees' Earnings 
In the previous section, we presented the results of earnings functions using 
employee characteristics as explanatory variables. It was assumed that there is no firm 
effect on employee earnings, if there is, the firm effect is the same for all employees. In 
5 Although little attempt has been made to investigate whether the coefficient of years of schooling 
derived from Mincerian earnings function can provide an unbiased estimation of return to education, 
Psacharopoulos and Layard state that only if the investment ratio, ki, and the rate of return to post-school 
investment are independent of schooling and experience the coefficient on years of schooling is an 
unbiased estimator of the rate of return to schooling. (Psacharopoulos and Layard, 1979: 169) As their 
findings and ours show they are dependent on schooling and, therefore, schooling coefficient derived 
from Mincerian earnings function is a biased estimation of return to education. As a result, in this study 
we do not intend to interpret the schooling coefficient as return to education. 
6 An interesting critique of the estimates of rates of return to education is provided by Bennel (1996). A 
more detailed discussion concerning costs of education is given in Verry (1987). 
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this section such an assumption is relaxed and an attempt is made to include firm 
variables (size, geographical location, and industry) in earnings functions to investigate 
the contribution of these variables on earnings.' 
Model 1 of Table 5.14 includes the size of firm using dummies. For that purpose, 
the firms are divided into three categories; firms employing between 0 and 99 
employees, as the base group; firms whose number of employees are between 100 and 
999; and firms that employ 1000 or more people. The results are presented in Table 
5.14 and indicate that the size dummies slightly improve the explanatory power of the 
earnings function. (R2 increases from 39.2 percent to 40 percent.) The coefficient for the 
size variables (i.e. SizeD2 and SizeD3) indicate that firms categorised into the group 
two pay some 1.3 percent more to their employees in comparison with firms employing 
fewer than 100 people. The equivalent figure for a firm with 1000 or more employees is 
7.1 percent. After controlling for geographical location and economic sector or industry, 
we find that the coefficients of dummies for the size of firms are 3.9 and 7.4 
respectively. The findings, therefore, indicate that larger firms pay more to their 
employees, holding individuals' human capital variables constant. 
It is worthwhile mentioning that human capital theory deals with individual as unit of analysis. By 
including firm's variables into human capital analysis of earnings, we inevitably enter the situation that 
the analysis involves two kinds of unit; individuals and firms in which individuals are clustered. From the 
viewpoint of statistics it is possible to include limited aspects of firms' characteristics through applying 
dummy variable technique when a single-level of analysis is employed. In this section we attempt to 
include size of firm, geographical location, and sector/industry by using dummy variables. More detailed 
consideration of firm's characteristics is presented in chapter 6, the Multilevel Analysis. 
8 Such categorisation is adopted because it enables us to employ dummy variables and to compare the 
results with those of other empirical studies. 
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Table 5.14: Estimated Effects of Employees and Firms' Characteristics on Earnings 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
edun .0039 -.0045 -.0087 
(1.6) (-2.0) (-4.0) 
edun2 .0013 .0015 .0016 
(10.2) (12.4) (13.9) 
exp .0303 .0260 .0272 
(22.9) (20.6) (22.6) 
exp2 -.0006 -.0006 -.0006 
(-15.3) (-16.3) (-17.6) 
sx .0003 .0005 .0004 
(3.7) (6.8) (5.9) 
mang .4467 .4346 .4006 
(49.9) (51.0) (49.1) 
SizeD2 .0129 .0294 .0385 
(1.0) (2.4) (3.2) 
SizeD3 .0712 .1078 .0743 
(5.6) (8.8) (6.4) 




cons 6.94 6.85 6.88 
R2 .3976 .4543 .5046 
Note: The number of employees is considered as firm's size. Firms are divided 
into three categories: firms employing between 0-99 employees (i.e., base or 
control group), firms whose number of employees are between 100 and 999 (i.e., 
SizeD2), and firms that employ 1000 or more persons (i.e., SizeD3). 
Geographical location is included by using dummy variable (LOCN=1 if the 
firm located in a big city having population more than one million and =0 
otherwise). 
The firms are grouped into two; group 2 (i.e., SctrD) consisting of firms 
supplying services such as transportation, commercial and trade,9 and group 1, 
base group, consisting of firms producing manufacturing goods such as textile, 
food, car parts, electronic products, and non-metallic mineral products. 
The firms supplying such services might be regarded as units of the service sector rather than the 
manufacturing sector. It should be noted that these particular firms provide transportation, distribution, 
and exportation services for specific producers of manufacturing products. In fact, such services should 
have been provided by the appropriate department of the producers. Perhaps for this reason the firms 
providing the services regard themselves as manufacturing units rather than units of the service sector. 
For the purpose of statistical analysis and since the nature of their activities is different from that of other 
firms, a dummy variable is employed to account for such differences. 
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Our findings reported above are consistent with other empirical studies. For 
example, Siebert and Addison (1991; quoted in Polachek and Siebert, 1993: 261) using 
British data find that plants employing 1000 or more pay 8 percent more that small 
plants (employing 100 or less), holding constant the usual human capital variables plus 
occupation and industry. 
It is also argued that geographical location is one of the determinants of earnings. 
Firm located in big cities may pay more to their employees. To study this point, we 
include geographical location in the earnings function by using a dummy variable that 
takes on the value 1 if the firm located in a big city and zero otherwise. (Model 2) We 
find that an employee working in a firm located in a big city earns some 20.5 percent 
more than an employee who works in a firm located in a small city. Moreover, 
including geographical location improves the explanatory power of our model 
considerably, that is by 14 percent. 
Different firms in different industries may behave differently with respect to 
employees' pay. To deal with this issue we classify our observations at firm level into 
two categories; firms producing mainly services such as transportation and distribution, 
and trade and commercial services, group 2; and group 1 consisting of other firms, the 
base or control group. At this stage we incorporate the matter of industry by defining a 
dummy variable, it takes on 1 when the firm belongs to group 2 and 0 otherwise. Doing 
this, we find that the employees working in firms classified as group 2 receive some 
23.4 percent more than their counterparts working in group 1 firms. 
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The results reported above are consistent with other empirical studies. Mincer and 
Higuchi (1988) using the United States and Japanese data study the effect of industry on 
wage and wage growth-tenure by employing a dummy variable for each of 16 industries 
and an interaction variable (i.e. industry-dummies multiplied by tenure) for interaction 
between industry and tenure on wage. They have found significant effects for most of 
16 industries used in their study. For example, based on their investigation, an employee 
working in Publishing and Printing industry of the U.S. earns 22.6 percent less per hour 
than his counterpart working in mining industry (i.e. the base industry). The equivalent 
figure for the case of Japan is the reverse, that is a person working in publishing 
industry is paid 65.6 percent more than his counter part in mining industry. The 
coefficients for interaction between industry and tenure for the US and Japan are 1.14 
and -0.63 percent respectively. (Mincer and Higuchi 1988, Table AIV: 129-130) 
5.3.4 Marginal Effect of Education and Experience on Earnings 
As reviewed in chapter 2, returns to schooling derived from Mincerian earnings 
functions employed in empirical analyses of earnings have been criticised because such 
analyses ignore some relevant variables. It has been argued that the omission of such 
variables leads to bias in estimates of return to schooling. Of these variables at the firm 
level are firm's size, geographical location, and industry. As presented above, the 
results of the analysis show that all these variables significantly affect earnings of 
employees and, therefore, ignoring these variables may lead to bias in the estimated 
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coefficients. The extent of bias depends on the relationship between existing 
explanatory variables and omitted ones. 
To study the bias due to firm variables, we compare the contribution of years of 
schooling derived from model 6 of Table 5.9, from which the firm level variables are 
omitted, and model 3, Table 5.14, in which the firm level variables are included. Table 
5.15 presents the results. It shows that at lower levels of education and earlier working 
life (experience) marginal contributions of schooling years derived from model 6 are 
overestimated. In contrast, the effects of years of schooling on earnings at higher levels 
of education are underestimated. The marginal effect of schooling for an individual 
with, say, 10 years of experience and 5 years of schooling is overstated about 45 
percent. The equivalent figure for a person with 30 years of experience and 18 years of 
schooling is —10 percent showing an underestimated effect. 
The results of the OLS analysis, therefore, indicate that the basic Mincerian 
earnings function is not appropriately specified for the purpose of examining earnings 
differentials in the manufacturing sector of Iran, and needs to be extended by 
incorporating the firm variables. Moreover, using OLS methodology, we were not able 
to examine the question why larger firms pay more to their employees. We do this in 
part in the next chapter. 
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Table 5.15: Marginal Effects of Years of Schooling on Earnings (%) 
Ps S=5 S=12 S=16 S=18 
1 fls,a 2.07 3.61 4.49 4.93 
2 X=10 f3,b 1.13 3.37 4.65 5.29 
3 Bias 45.4 6.6 -3.6 -7.3 
4 [3,,a 2.37 3.91 4.79 5.23 
5 X=20 13,b 1.53 3.77 5.05 5.69 
6 Bias 35.4 3.6 -5.4 -8.8 
7 f3„a 2.67 4.21 5.09 5.53 
8 X=30 13,b 1.93 4.17 5.45 6.09 
9 Bias 27.7 1.0 -7.1 -10.1 
Note: The schooling estimates are based on Oy / Os = [3 + 2/3 2 s + p s,x 
13s,a and f3„b stand for the marginal effects of schooling derived from Model 6, 
Table 5.9 and Model 3, Table 5.14, respectively. 
5.3.5 Summary and Conclusions 
In this section we have presented the results of the OLS analyses of earnings 
differentials. We found that investment in human capital through experience and 
education improves the earnings of an individual. Our findings also provide evidence on 
the proposition that an individual with higher level of education can invest more 
through on-the-job training (experience). The results of the analysis provide evidence 
that the marginal effect of schooling on earnings increases with level of education. In 
fact our empirical data enables us to relax the restrictive assumption that the effect of 
schooling on earnings is independent of levels of education. This evidence can be 
interpreted in the way that greater capability of human capital accumulation at higher 
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levels of education would lead to incremental effect of education on earnings. It also 
provides evidence to support the hypothesis that at higher levels of education 
individuals also acquire knowledge, which is more specific and more relevant to do a 
job. Such human capital accumulation is rewarded in the labour market with higher 
earnings, pecuniary benefits. 
In connection with the issue of biased estimates of schooling on earnings, 
attempts were made, through adding dummies in earnings functions, to eliminate 
earnings variation due to job seniority and some characteristics of firms. The OLS 
findings like most empirical studies, reviewed in chapter 2, show that these factors are 
important in the determination of earnings and that ignoring such earnings determinants 
leads to bias in the estimation of the effects of education on earnings. The bias, 
however, varies with level of education and experience. 
As explained above, job seniority is in part due to more education and experience. 
Our data enabled us to examine the probability of having a high level job as a result of 
higher education and more experience. Such findings help us to demonstrate that up to 
80 percent of earnings differentials attributed to management could be ascribed to the 
option value of education and experience. 
Although through conducting the OLS analysis of earnings differentials we were 
able to evaluate the effects of human capital factors, after eliminating the effects of 
some non-human capital variables on earnings, there are still some other variables 
affecting earnings, which due to the limitation of a single-level method of analysis we 
could not incorporate in an earnings function. More importantly, as elaborated in 
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chapter 3, we think that most economic data like that we use in this study are dominated 
by a hierarchical structure. In practice, such a structure may relax one or two of the 
basic assumptions of a single-level method of analysis (i.e. OLS). This relaxation or 
rejection of the assumptions may mislead us in hypothesis testing. These issues will be 
examined and elaborated in the next chapter, through employing a multilevel analysis of 
earnings. 
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Chapter 6 Earnings Functions; A Multilevel Analysis 
6.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter the results of a human capital analysis of earnings were 
presented. The analysis is based on employing the OLS methodology. The effects of 
human capital variables and only some aspects of firm characteristics on earnings were 
examined. However, we did not incorporate all firm variables in the analysis due to the 
limitation of the single-level method of analysis. The findings of the analysis, like many 
other empirical studies reviewed in chapter 2, has indicated that human capital as well 
as firm variables are important determinants of earnings. Thus, to have unbiased 
estimates of human capital variables one has to include other determinants of earnings 
in an earnings function. In this chapter attempts are made to extend the basic earnings 
function, introduced in chapter 5, through employing multilevel techniques. As 
discussed in chapter 3, the classical OLS analysis is based on specific and basic 
assumptions and so far little attention, if any, has been devoted to examining the validity 
of one or two of the basic assumptions, which may dramatically affect the results of an 
analysis. In this chapter, the validity of such assumptions is empirically examined. 
We also study the advantages of employing a multilevel technique in the context 
of human capital analysis of earnings. Attempts are made to evaluate the marginal 
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contribution of schooling and experience on earnings, after incorporating the cluster 
effects. The chapter ends with the section of concluding remarks. 
6.2 Examination of OLS Assumptions 
One of the assumption on which the OLS method is based is that the covariance 
between two observations is zero, Cov(us,u)=0. It means that error terms of the units of 
analysis (i.e., employees) are not correlated and employees are not clustered and 
grouped into, for example, firms. If they are, the effect of clustering on their earnings is 
assumed to be similar for all workers. (Figure 6.1 depicts an estimated earnings-
experience profile using the single-level method, OLS.) In reality, however, not only 
employees are clustered within firms but also the structures and organisations as well as 
the nature of their activities are different from each other. This hierarchical structure, in 
terms of multilevel methodology, affects the earnings of employees differently and, 
therefore, the effects of education and experience on earnings vary from one cluster to 
another.' In such a case, the covariance of error terms of, for example, two employees in 
a cluster/firm is not zero, Cov(u,,u,)#0. That is, earnings of employees in a firm are 
correlated to each other, partially because they are working in the same company and 
under a single management. In other words, there are some factors such as firm size, 
geographical location, industry, etc. that may affect earnings of employees working in 
the same firm regardless of their qualifications. Therefore, the effect of these factors 
makes a correlation between their earnings. Nevertheless, the covariance between 
The effects of hierarchical structure on earnings are elaborated in detail in chapter 3. 
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earnings of two employees working in two different firms can still be assumed zero.2 In 
this section, we examine our data to find out whether the data are dominated by a 
hierarchical structure. As elaborated in chapter 3, the intra-unit correlation statistic is 
used for this purpose. 
To test the existence of a hierarchical structure, earnings functions were run with 
no explanatory variables using both OLS and multilevel methodology. In addition to 
examining the existence of a hierarchical structure, this also enables us to find out the 
attribution of the units of each level to earnings differentials. Table 6.1 shows the results 
and indicates that the mean and the variance of the unconditional Model 1 are 7.41 and 
0.1402, respectively. It indicates that log hourly earnings of an employee on average is 
7.41. In this model no firm effect on earnings is assumed. We can decompose the 
variance of the model into two elements: one of first level and the other of the second. 
This decomposition can show whether firms have any effect on earnings. Model 2 was 
estimated and indicates that 53 and 47 percent of earnings differentials can be attributed 
to the employee and firm level, respectively. It demonstrates that, besides the employee 
characteristics, firm characteristics can also explain a large portion of earnings 
differentials among the employees. The random part at level 2 is very significant (based 
on likelihood ratio changing from 13763 to 3061 with one new parameter), which shows 
that this parameter (intercept) should be considered as a random coefficient. Firms, 
therefore, do play a significant role in earnings variation. It also provides evidence that 
covariance between two employees working in the same firm is non zero. The findings 
2 It is worthwhile noting that since units of higher level of analysis in this are firms, we assume a zero 
covariance between two observations in two different firms. However, if we had three levels of analysis 
consisting of individuals as units of first level, firms as the second, and industries as the third, we would 
put the same assumption for the industry units as the units of higher level. In such a case it would be 
plausible to assume a non-zero covariance between units of an industry, say firms. 
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indicate that data used are dominated by a hierarchical structure, and to obtain reliable 
estimates the application of multilevel techniques is needed. 
Table 6.1: Decomposition of Earnings Variations into Levels 1 and 2 
Model 1 Model 2 
Parameter t stat. Parameter t stat. 
Fixed Part: 
Cons* 7.41 2483 7.39 175 
Random Part: 
Level 2. 0.0621 
** 




Intra-Firm Correlation***  0 0.469 
-2* log(lh) 4  13763 3061.2 
Note: * 'cons' stands for constant term or intercept of a model. 
** 'cons/cons' or 6,„„ is variance associated with intercept. 
*** The intra-firm correlation (= 	 ( „ 	 ) ) measures the proportion 
of the total variance which is between-firms. (Goldstein, 1995: 19) 
4 Likelihood ratio is used for testing of hypotheses especially for the random 
part of a model. 
In other words, when data used are dominated by a hierarchical organisation it is 
argued that the results based on an OLS analysis are not completely reliable and t-
statistic may mislead us in testing of hypotheses. Going one step towards reality, 
therefore, we have to include the hierarchical structure in our considerations through 
using a multilevel analysis. For that purpose, two issues need to be examined: whether 
the coefficients of the human capital variables should be considered as random 
parameters varying across firms, and whether the hierarchical structure will affect the 
results of the analysis. The following section attempts to examine these issues by 
employing a two-level method of analysis, which is based on varying coefficient 
models. 
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6.3 Varying Coefficients 
To investigate the issue of varying coefficient structure, we employ the basic 
earnings function (6.1), which is an extended form of Model 2 of Table 6.1: 
Yq — Poi + Ps SkiP,,S /21 + pyx,,+ 
	
x 2 + psx  s x + 	 ei 	 (6.1) 
where S, X, and M are years of schooling, years of experience and management, 
respectively. Earnings function (6.1) is used to study whether or not the intercept term 
and the coefficients of schooling, experience, experience squared, and management vary 
across the firms.3 By carrying out this experiment we, in fact, are able to investigate 
whether firms reward human capital investments differently. 
Table 6.2 shows the results of the experiments. In column 2 the results of an 
earnings function in which intercept is considered as the only varying coefficient are 
presented. The findings show that the likelihood ratio4 decreases dramatically, as 
compared with that of column 1, and indicates that the intercept should be considered as 
a varying coefficient. That is, employees with no educational qualification and at the 
beginning of their working life earn differently across firms.5 Figure 6.2, drawn based 
on the earnings function 2 of Table 6.2, depicts such a relationship. As can be seen, each 
firm had a different starting wage/salary, holding human capital variables the same. 
3 The methodological issues have been elaborated in chapter 3. 
4 For the purpose of hypothesis testing in this study we use t statistic to evaluate the significance of a 
single parameter at the fixed part of a multilevel model and likelihood ratio for the random part, as 
Goldstein suggests. (Goldstein, 1995: 33-35) 
5 At this stage we do not intend to explain why different firms pay differently to their workers. Later in 
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Figure 6.1: Estimated Earnings-Experience Profile for all Employees (OLS) 
Note: The earnings-experience profile is drawn based on the estimated 
earnings function 1 of Table 6.2. 
Figure 6.2: A separate Estimated Earnings-Experience Profile for each 
Firm (varying intercepts) 
Note: The earnings-experience profiles are drawn based the estimated 
earnings function 2 of Table 6.2. 
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Considering a varying structure for the coefficient of years of schooling we 
achieve the same conclusion (based on the likelihood ratio that changes from -5708.7 to 
-6064.5, Model 3). That is, the contribution of an extra year of schooling to earnings 
varies among the units of the second level. It shows that investment in human capital 
through schooling is rewarded differently across firms. 
Table 6.2: Estimated Effects of Employees' Characteristics on Earnings using Multilevel 
Methodology 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Fixed Part 
EDUN .0067 -.0213 -.0175 -.0171 -.0172 -.0162 
(2.8) (-12.5) (-6.8) (-6.6) (-6.6) (-6.3) 
EDUN2 .0011 .0023 .0020 .0020 .0020 .0020 
(8.9) (25.5) (21.8) (21.7) (21.8) (21.7) 
EXP .0311 .0210 .0200 .0198 .0197 .0203 
(23.5) (22.1) (20.8) (15.3) (14.6) (12.3) 
EXP2 -.0006 -.0005 -.0005 -.0004 -.0004 -.0004 
(-15.2) (-16.7) (-17.0) (-15.5) (-11.3) (-8.9) 
SX .0003 .0007 .0009 .0009 .0009 .0008 
(3.3) (12.4) (15.1) (13.7) (13.7) (13.0) 
MANG .446 .3092 .3101 .3078 .3068 .2898 
(50) (48.7) (49.5) (48.8) (43.3) (12.9) 
CONS 6.97 7.13 7.11 7.11 7.11 7.10 
(517) (200) (201) (196) (192) (193) 
Random Part* 
Level 2: 
cons/cons .0407 .0392 .0402 .0410 .0409 
edun/cons -.0005 -.0006 -.0007 -.0005 
edun/edun .0001 .0001 .0001 .0001 
exp/cons -.0002 -.0002 -.0002 
exp/edun .00002 -2.5e-6 -6.1e-6 
exp/exp .00002 .00002 .00004 
exp2/edun 9.1e-7 7.4e-07 
exp2/exp -1.5e-7 -8e-07 
exp2/exp2 1.6e-8 2.9e-08 
mang/mang .0134 
Level 1: 
cons/cons .0853 .0403 .0392 .0388 .0388 .0379 
-2. log(lh)** 5928.3 -5708.7 -6064.5 -6146.8 -6160.9 -6439.3 
Note: * Parameters in random part show variance of a variable or covariance between two 
variables varying at a given level. For example, 'cons/cons' represents the variance of 
intercept term varying at level two, edun/cons' is covariance between the coefficient for years 
of schooling and intercept, and so on. The parameters, which were found insignificant at the 
random part such as exp2/cons', `mang/cons', etc. have been excluded. 
Definition of variables and notations used in this analysis are presented in Appendix 1. 
** Likelihood ratio is used for testing of hypotheses especially for the random part of a model. 
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One may also argue that employees with the same educational qualification and 
years of experience receive different wage rate (hourly earnings) among the units of 
level two. That is an extra year of experience would have a different contribution to 
employees' earnings in different firms. This suggests that the slope of earnings-
experience profiles varies from one firm to another. To study whether or not there exists 
such a variation we consider the coefficient for years of experience and experience 
squared as random coefficients (i.e., Models 4 and 5, Table 6.2). The results show that 
there is enough evidence to reject the null hypothesis assuming that the contribution of 
years of experience on earnings is the same across firms. 
Finally, the variation of contribution of managerial position (MANG) on earnings 
is another issue, which is worth investigating. To deal with this issue, we consider the 
coefficient for managerial job-title as a random coefficient. This would help to examine 
the question whether there is enough evidence to support the hypothesis of inter-firm 
wage-rate differentials for managers, holding other qualifications constant. The results 
of earnings function or Model 6, Table 6.2 show that there is indeed evidence to accept 
the hypothesis that managers receive different wage rate in the selected firms. That is, 
due to considering the coefficient of management as a varying one, likelihood ratio 
decreases dramatically (from —6160.9 to -6439.3). Therefore, this indicates that the 
coefficient for managerial position like the coefficients of other human capital variables 
varies across the firms. 
The results of runs of the basic earnings function presented in Table 6.2, thus, 
provide evidence that the selected coefficients vary across the level 2 units. Figure 6.3 
shows the random or varying relationship between experience and earnings. As can be 
seen, the relationship is not the same among the firms; employees in different firms did 
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receive different wages and salaries at the start of their working lives and investment 
through experience was rewarded differently across the firms. 
So far, however, we have viewed such variations as due to chance and 
randomness. In the following section we attempt to extend the basic earnings function 
by including some firm level variables. The estimates of the extended earnings function, 
using both the OLS and multilevel techniques, enable us to examine the effect of 
random or varying coefficient structure on testing of hypotheses. 
Figure 6.3: Estimated Earnings-Experience Profiles (varying intercepts and 
slopes across firms) 
Note: The earnings-experience profiles are drawn based on the estimated 
earnings function 6 of Table 6.2. 
6.4 Reliability of Hypothesis Testing 
As mentioned earlier, under a varying coefficient situation and hierarchical 
structure, applying classical regression analysis (OLS), which is based on a single-level 
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method and an assumption that residuals across observations (i.e. employees) are 
uncorrelated, will produce unreliable results for testing of hypotheses. In such 
circumstances, although it is argued that the estimates of the regression parameters are 
still unbiased, the estimates of the variances are biased. That is we would be 
underestimating the true variance of the OLS estimators, so this affects the testing of 
hypotheses.6 
To study the effect of underestimating variance on t-statistics, we run earnings 
functions under a varying coefficient structure. As presented in Table 6.2, a t-statistic, 
as expected, reduces while its coefficient is considered as varying coefficient. For 
example, in Model 2 the intercept is considered as a varying coefficient. Its t-statistic, in 
turn, reduces from 495 to 200. In Model 6 the coefficient for management is also 
examined as a varying or random coefficient and its t statistic reduces from 43.3 to 12.9, 
consequently. 
However, the coefficients for human capital variables included in Model 1, Table 
6.2, assumed as random coefficients are still very significant. In that respect, it should 
be mentioned that earnings functions, presented in Table 6.2, do not include all 
explanatory variables. Including all relevant variables in an earnings function would 
provide a better base to study the effect of varying structure on testing of hypotheses. 
We, therefore, extend the earnings function (6.1) by including firm characteristics 
and some interaction variables for the interaction between individual and firm 
characteristics on earnings. Table 6.3 shows the results of the estimated earnings 
functions. The first column of the table presents an earnings function estimated by using 
6 Theoretical illustration in that respect is provided in chapter 3. 
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OLS. All coefficients of Model 1, except the interaction between years of experience 
and size ("XSIZE") and between years of experience and geographical location 
("XLOCN"), are highly significant. When the intercept is considered to vary randomly 
across all firms its t statistic dramatically reduces (see Model 2 using multilevel 
technique in comparison with Model 1). Besides, under this situation some other 
explanatory variables, such as size, geographical location, and economic sector, are not 
statistically significant any longer. The sign of some variables also changes due to 
applying the varying structure. For instance, the interaction between years of schooling 
and size of firm in the estimated earnings function or Model 1, applying OLS, positively 
affects earnings while in earnings function 2, incorporating the cluster effects 
influencing intercept, the situation is reversed. The same situation is held for the 
interaction between years of experience and economic sector. 
The results of unreliability of hypothesis testing are getting worse when we 
incorporate the cluster effects in the coefficients of the main human capital variables 
employed. In Model 3, Table 6.3, the coefficients for schooling and experience are also 
considered as random parameters varying across firms. As a result, their t statistics 
shrink dramatically and, besides the coefficients which are not significant in Model 2, 
the coefficients of the interaction between years of experience and economic sector 
("XSCTR"), years of schooling and size ("SSIZE") and years of experience and 
geographical location ("SLOCN") become insignificant. 
In sum, the above consideration provides evidence to support the hypothesis that 
there exists a hierarchical structure in data used and this structure affects both intercept 
and slopes. To achieve reliable and efficient estimates under this hierarchical structure, 
therefore, the application of multilevel analysis is necessary. Moreover, multilevel 
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analysis methodology enables us to decompose the error term into two or more 
elements. This decomposition in turn provides valuable information, for example, 
regarding the proportion of firm characteristics on earnings differentials as well as that 
of individuals. It also helps a researcher to study the real determinants of earnings 
accompanied with new aspects of human capital analysis of earnings such as the 
externalities attributed to the stock of human capital in each firm. The following section 
deals with a detailed analysis and the advantages of employing a multilevel analysis of 
earnings function in the context of human capital theory. 
Table 6.3: Estimated Effects of Employee and Firm Characteristics on Earnings using both 
OLS and Multilevel Methodologies 
Variables 
Model 	 1 Model 	 2 Model 	 3 
P t star. f3 r stat. l3 t stat. 
EDUN -.0087 -3.6 -.0147 -7.6 -.0113 -2.6 
EDUN2 .0015 12.5 .0022 23.5 .0020 21.7 
EXP .0283 21.8 .0210 19.1 .0184 8.4 
EXP2 -.0006 -17.7 -.0005 -16.0 -.0004 -15.5 
SX .0005 6.3 .0007 12.1 .0009 13.7 
MANG .4051 49.8 .3070 48.4 .3076 48.5 
SIZE .00016 1.8 .0001 1.1 .0001 1.4 
LOCN .1736 12.2 .1048 1.3 .1023 1.2 
SCTR .1730 9.6 .0010 0.1 .0075 0.1 
SSIZE 2.6e-06 3.4 -2.7e-06 -4.3 -4.7e-06 -1.6 
XSIZE -1.5e-7 -0.4 -1.0e-07 -0.3 5.6e-07 0.4 
SLOCN -.0059 -4.5 -.0065 -5.9 -.0069 -1.6 
XLOCN -.00018 -0.3 -.0007 -1.2 .0011 0.5 
SSCTR .0155 10.7 .01197 10.6 .0110 2.3 
XSCTR -.0033 -4.2 .0021 3.5 .0015 0.7 
CONS 6.9 401 7.01 92.4 6.99 87.4 
Random Part: 
Level 1: 
cons/cons .0685 .0399 .0388 
Level 2: 






-2* log(lh) 2469.9 -5848.9 -6160.8 
Note: The shaded coefficients are not significant at 10 percent level. 
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6.5 Multilevel Analysis of Earnings 
So far, we have examined the question whether data used in this study are 
dominated by a hierarchical structure. We have provided evidence that there exists a 
hierarchical organisation and this structure affects the testing of hypotheses and in turn 
the results of the analysis. The results of the experiment suggest that the cluster effects 
also influence the coefficients of the main explanatory variables, which lead to a 
situation where such coefficients should be recognised as random ones varying across 
firms. In this section, attempts are made to study whether the coefficients of years of 
schooling and years of experience are affected by hierarchical structure at level 1. We 
also examine the advantages of the application of multilevel methodology through 
conducting a multilevel analysis of earnings in the context of human capital theory. 
As presented above, the results of the simple multilevel model 2 of Table 6.1 
show that earnings differentials are ascribable into two parts: employee and firm parts. 
At first, we attempted to evaluate the significance of employee variables. As discussed 
above, including these variables substantially reduces the variance of error terms of both 
first and second level. The variance of first level reduces by 42 percent and of level 2 by 
35 percent (comparing the variance of error terms of Model 2, Table 6.2, with those of 
Model 2, Table 6.1). This indicates that the employee variables explain a significant 
proportion of earnings variation. The coefficient of each variable has a large t statistic 
demonstrating a high level of significance. All variables, therefore, are consistent with 
human capital theory and also with most of other empirical studies. 
Then, we tried to study whether the hierarchical structure affects the coefficients 
of main human capital variables. In other words, there was also an interest to investigate 
whether investments in human capital are rewarded differently among different firms. 
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Models 3 to 6 of Table 6.2 show that, for example, an additional year of schooling is 
rewarded differently in different firms, and a similar situation is held for the cases of 
experience and management. The coefficients of the main human capital variables 
(years of schooling, years of experience, years of experience squared, and management) 
vary across the firms. This varying structure, as stated in chapter 3, is consistent with 
the main argument that a hierarchical structure dominates most individuals' earnings 
opportunities. 
Considering the coefficients of years of schooling and years of experience as 
random coefficients at level I is another important issue, which merits further 
investigation. The results can provide two important implications; one a statistical point 
and the other an issue of human capital theory. 
As stated at the beginning of this chapter, the conventional OLS analysis assumes 
that the error terms of an estimated function have a constant variance across all 
observations. Examination of the question whether the coefficients of independent 
variables vary across level 1 units can provide evidence for or against this assumption. 
Earnings functions were run for that purpose and Table 6.4 shows the results. In Model 
2, the coefficient of years of schooling is assumed as a varying parameter and in Model 
3 the coefficient of both years of schooling and experience are assumed to vary at level 
1. The results indicate that the coefficients should be considered as random or varying 
parameters. Statistically, this varying structure, in fact, relaxes the assumption of 
constant variance. In other words, the variance of error term at level 1 varies with years 
of schooling and years of experience, as Equation (6.2) below depicts. 
=(eOij 	 (6.2) 
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where eo0 is error term and the effect of omitted variables at level 1 and esii and exij  
represent the extent to which the effect of schooling and experience of individual i, 
respectively, depart from the average contribution of schooling and experience to 
earnings in firm j. Unlike the OLS techniques, in the multilevel methods, therefore, it is 
assumed that est and exy are non-zero. The rejection of constant variance raises the 
problem of heteroscedasticity that in turn affect the issue of hypothesis testing 
elaborated earlier. 
Table 6.4: Estimated Effects of Employee Variables on Earnings when Coefficients 
of Years of Schooling and Years of Experience varying across level 1 Units 
Model 1 Model 	 2 Model 	 3 
Coeff Tst. Coeff. Tst. Coeff. Tst. 
Fixed Part: 
CONS 7.103 193.3 7.078 205.0 7.075 208.2 
EDUN -0.0162 -6.4 -0.0042 -1.7 -0.0037 -1.5 
EDUN2 0.0020 21.6 0.0011 11.2 0.0011 11.2 
EXP 0.0204 12.0 0.02154 23.7 0.0219 17.9 
EXP2 -0.0004 -8.9 -0.0005 -13.9 -0.0005 -11.9 
SX 0.00083 13.1 0.0007 10.6 0.0007 10.2 
MANG 0.2897 12.9 0.2599 11.9 0.2615 11.6 
Random Part: 
Level 2: 
cons/cons 0.0410 0.0376 0.0361 
edun/cons -0.0006 -3.5E-04 -0.0004 
edun/edun 1.0E-04 0.0001 1.1E-04 
exp/cons -0.00023 -2.2E-04 -0.0001 
exp/exp 4.0E-05 2.2E-06 1.1E-05 
exp2/edun 5.8E-07 7.5E-07 7.8E-07 
exp2/exp -8.2E-07 1.1E-07 -1.1E-07 
exp2/exp2 3.0E-08 1.5E-08 1.5E-08 
mang/mang 0.01339 0.01133 0.01216 
Level 1: 
cons/cons 0.03792 0.0195 0.023 
edun/cons -0.0011 -0.0011 




-2. log(lh) -6439.4 -9404 -9778.1 
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The variation of the effect of schooling and experience on earnings, in the context 
of human capital theory, can be considered in the way that each individual has received 
different pecuniary benefit from his investments through schooling and experience, 
given years of schooling and years of experience constant. These differences can be 
attributed partly to the quality of schooling and experience. The estimates of the random 
part associated with level 1 of Models 2 and 3 enable us to evaluate the standard 
deviation of the variation of schooling and experience coefficients. For example, based 
on the estimates of Model 3, Table 6.4, the standard deviation of years of schooling and 
years of experience are 0.0245 and 0.0087, respectively. These figures suggest that an 
additional year of schooling for an employee with high quality of schooling may 
increase hourly earnings about 0.0245 more than the average estimate of years of 
schooling in a firm. In other words, the schooling effect for 95% of employees 
clustered within firm / will lie between: 
psu = [to" ± 2(0.0245) 	 (6.3) 
where Psoj  is average effect of years of schooling on earnings in firm j. Moreover, 
dispersion from the average estimate is higher for the estimated coefficient of schooling 
than that of experience. 
6.6 Firm Characteristics and Earnings differentials 
It has been demonstrated above that the earnings functions estimated are 
dominated by a varying structure. This structure affects both intercept and the slopes of 
an earnings function. It was assumed, so far, that the variation of the coefficients for the 
human capital variables of an employee clustered in a firm is derived from chance and 
randomness. In this section, we examine the relaxation of this assumption. That is, 
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attempts are made to study whether firm characteristics, employed in this study, account 
for earnings variation attributed to firm level. For that purpose, firstly, an attempt is 
made to explain the variation in intercept through including firm level variables. In that 
respect, two categories of variables are distinguished: conventional firm variables such 
as size, geographical location, and industry and contextual firm variables such as 
average stock of human capital and average hours of work in each firm. Secondly, we 
investigate whether variation in the coefficient of years of schooling can be explained 
by the firm level variables. Finally, we examine the question whether the firm variables 
account for the dispersion of the estimated coefficient for years of experience from its 
average. 
Table 6.5 shows the results of runs of earnings functions for the purpose of 
evaluating the effects of firm variables on earnings. Model 2 presents the results of the 
examination of effects of first category of firm variables on earnings. All coefficients of 
size, geographical location, and economic sector or industry have positive sign 
indicating that the variables affect employees' earnings positively. It could be said that 
employees in lager firms could recoup the benefits of their human capital investment 
more as compared with the situation of small firms. It might also be argued that firms 
located in big cities would pay more than those located in small cities to an employee, 
given the same human capital. However, t statistics of the coefficients are not big 
enough to support such hypotheses. In other words, statistically neither size of firms, 
geographical location nor economic sector accounts for the variation of intercept at firm 
level. 
For the category of contextual variables, on the other hand, the situation is 
different. That is, including these variables reduce the variance of firm level by more 
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than 10 percent. This suggests that they can be regarded as important determinants of 
earnings; an employee working in a firm with one extra unit of human capital stock 
receives about 0.02 points more than his counterpart who works in a firm with lower 
stock of human capital. In other words, the intercept or initial earnings for such a person 
working in firm j is as follows: 
poo + 0.02 
	 (6.4) 
where I3oo  is the average intercept. 
Different firms may have different hours of work. This may affect employee's 
earnings. For that purpose another contextual variable (average hours of work in each 
firm) was calculated. Model 3 shows the estimated effect of average hours of work in 
each firm on earnings. The coefficient for average hours suggests that employees who 
have to work in a firm with longer hours earn less, hourly. For instance, an employee 
working in a firm whose hours worked are less than other firms, say by 100 hours, may 
earn about 0.02 points more than the average, holding other variables constant. t 
statistics and change of the likelihood ratio of Model 3 in which the contextual variables 
are included support these hypotheses. 
As presented above, the estimates provide evidence of the fact that the coefficients 
of the main human capital variables employed vary across firms. The main reasons for 
such variations might be size of firm, geographical location, industry, average hours of 
work and/or average stock of human capital. At this stage, it is appropriate to examine 
the question of whether the variables account for the variations of the coefficients for 
years of schooling and years of experience or such variations are due to randomness and 
chance, or perhaps there are some other firm level variables that could not be measured. 
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Table 6.5: Estimated Effects of Firm Characteristics on Intercept variation of 
Earnings Functions 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 3' 
p 	 1-slat. [3K 	 1-slat. /3K  t-stat. /3K t-stat. 
Fixed Part: 
EDUN -.0037 	 (-1.5) -.0037 	 (-1.5) -.0038 (-1.5) -.0037 (-1.5) 
EDUN2 .0011 	 (11.2) .0011 	 (11.2) .0011 (11.2) .0011 (11.1) 
EXP .0219 	 (17.9) .0219 	 (17.3) .0217 (19.5) .0218 (19.7) 
EXP2 -.0005 	 (-11.8) -.0005 	 (-11.4) -.0005 (-13.0) -.0005 (-13.5) 
SX .0007 	 (10.2) .0007 	 (10.2) .0007 (10.2) .0007 (10.1) 
MANG .2615 	 (11.6) .2614 	 (11.6) .2614 (11.6) .2613 (11.6) 
SIZE .00005 	 (1.0) .00004 (1.0) .00003 (0.8) 
LOCN .0775 	 (1.1) -.0030 (-0.1) -.0079 (-0.1) 
SCTR .0413 	 (0.5) -.0502 (-0.7) -.0419 (-0.7) 
AV S X* .0192 (2.4) .0190 (2.4) 
AV HRS -.0002 (-5.1) -.0002 (-5.2) 
CONS 7.07 	 (208) 6.99 	 (98.2) 7.32 (37) 7.37 (41.8) 
Random Part 1 2 3 
Level 2: 
cons/cons .03611 .0338 .0291 .0301 
edun/cons -.0004 -.0003 -.0008 -.0008 
edun/edun .00011 .00011 .00011 .00011 
exp/cons -.00015 -.00016 -.0003 -.0003 
exp/exp .00001 .00001 .00001 .00001 
exp2/edun 7.8e-7 7.4e-7 8.3e-7 7.9e-7 
exp2/exp -1.1e-7 -1.7e-7 -2.0e-8 3.1e-8 
exp2/exp2 1.5e-8 1.7e-8 1.1e-8 1.0e-8 
mang/mang .0122 .0121 .0121 .0122 
Level 1: 
cons/cons .023 .023 .0232 .0232 
edun/cons -.0012 -.0012 -.0012 -.0012 
edun/edun .00055 .00055 .00055 .00055 
exp/cons -.0009 -.0009 -.0009 -.0009 
exp/edun .00003 .00003 .00003 .00003 
exp/exp .00008 .00008 .00008 .00008 
-2* log(lh) -9778.1 -9780.4 -9799.7 -9799.6 
Note: * It should be noted that in the estimated earnings functions presented in this table and 
subsequent tables of chapter 6 it is assumed that average years of schooling in each firm 
increase earnings of employees as much as average years of experience. To calculate average 
stock of human capital in each firm, we used 27,(EDUN + EXPIJ ))/n;  ; where ri;  is the number of 
employees in firm j. This assumption may not necessarily be a satisfactory assumption for 
different sets of data and, therefore, the assumption should be supported by empirical evidence. 
One reasonable way is to use weighted average stock of human capital. For this purpose, the 
weighted average stock of human capital can be calculated, for example, through using 
E((I3ays / Pay.,) *EDUNii+EXPii))/ni; where 	 and Pc. are the contribution of average years 
of schooling and years of experience to earnings, respectively. By doing this, we found that the 
results are similar (Model 3 in comparison with Model 3'). Since the issue of externality effect 
of human capital density is of interest to economists, it would be interesting to see if there are 
more appropriate ways of estimating average stock of human capital in each firm, which merits 
further investigation. The results of experiments using a variety of methods of weighting the 
average stock of human capital are presented in Appendix 1, Table A2. 
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The results of runs are presented in Table 6.6. Model 1 incorporates the 
interactions between years of schooling and the contextual firm variables ("sav s_x" 
and "sav_hrs") on earnings. The estimates of the model show that only average hours of 
work can partly explain the variation of the coefficient of years of schooling across the 
firms. In the same manner, attempts were made to explain the variation in the 
coefficient of years of experience by including the interactions between years of 
experience and the contextual variables (Model 2). None of the variables could provide 
an explanation in this regard and their t statistics are all insignificant. However, average 
hours of work in each firm seems to have a negative effect on the variation. The average 
stock of human capital in a firm may positively influence the variation of the effect of 
experience on earnings. This may be viewed in the way that an employee working in a 
firm with larger stock of human capital has a better opportunity to accumulate his 
human capital through on-the-job learning. The greater volumes of human capital 
accumulation through learning imply the steeper earnings profiles over years of 
experience in firm/. 
Through running earnings function or Model 3, which includes the interactions 
between years of schooling and the conventional firm variables, we test the hypothesis 
that the conventional firm variables account for the variation of the coefficient for years 
of schooling. As the results of Model 3 show, none of the variables has a statistically 
significant effect. 
We also ran earnings ftmction 4 of Table 6.6 to evaluate the effect of these 
conventional variables on the variation of experience coefficient. Like the case of 
schooling coefficient, they too are not statistically significant. 
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Overall, Model 4 presents the estimated effect of determinants of earnings using 
an extended form of Mincerian earnings function through applying a multilevel 
methodology. The human capital variables at the employee level of analysis have a 
significant contribution to earnings differentials. The results are consistent with human 
capital theory and indicate that individuals receive pecuniary benefits from their human 
capital (investments). Each human capital variable has a different contribution to 
earnings. In the following section the marginal effect of each variable on earnings is 
presented, separately. 
6.7 Marginal Effect of Human Capital Variables on Earnings 
The results of the multilevel analysis, like that presented in chapter 5, show that 
years of schooling contributes to increasing earnings at an increasing rate.7 The 
marginal effect of schooling also increases with years of experience. For example, an 
additional year of schooling increases hourly earnings, for an employee with 12 years of 
schooling and with 20 years of experience, by 4.7 percent, based on the estimates of 
Model 4 of Table 6.6. The equivalent figure for an employee with 16 years of schooling 
(a higher education degree) and with 30 years of experience is 6.3 percent. 
The random part of the multilevel models gives the extent to which the random 
parameters depart from their overall average. In the case of the coefficient for 
schooling, the estimate suggests that contribution of schooling to earnings in 
approximately 95% of firms will lie between 
It seems the increasing contribution of schooling with levels of education to earnings has become a 
widespread phenomenon since early 1980s, as Carnoy states (1997: 489-90). 
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Pso ± 2( 0.0088) 
assuming that the firms' coefficient of schooling are normally distributed. 
The random part associated with schooling effect provides another important 
piece of information. The negative estimate for covariance between intercept and 
schooling coefficient indicates the tendency that firms with higher intercepts have 
smaller slopes for schooling variable. This provides empirical support for the idea that 
individuals may accept lower levels of earnings for a better prospect of learning 
opportunity to enhance earnings later. The estimates of random part of the model enable 
us to estimate the correlation between intercepts and slopes. For example, the estimated 
correlation between schooling coefficient and intercept is — 0.40, which is consistent 
with the above-mentioned argument. 
Years of experience also increases earnings but do so at a decreasing rate. The 
experience effect, however, increases with years of schooling: 
o(in y) / 	 = f3 -2Nxx;x+ J3„s 	 (6.5) 
Equation (6.5) provides the marginal effect of experience on earnings in firm j. The 
equivalent figure for all employees will be given by: 
	
(lny)/ cam = 13. — 2 /3,, x + f3sf s 	 (6.6) 
Using the estimates of Model 4, it can be said that an extra year of experience for 
an employee with 12 years of schooling who is at the beginning of his working life 
about 3 percent, on average, contributes to earnings. The corresponding figure for an 
individual with 16 years of schooling and with 10 years of experience is 2.3 percent. 
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years of experience 
depicts the relationship between experience and earnings after controlling for other 
variables and cluster effects. 
Figure 6.4: An Estimated Earnings-Experience Profile for all Employees 
Note: The earnings-experience profile is drawn based on the estimated 
earnings function 4 of Table 6.6. 
As elaborated earlier, the effect of experience on earnings varies across firms. 
Assuming that the firms' coefficients of experience are normally distributed, the 
estimates suggest that the effects of experience and experience squared on earnings in 
approximately 95% of firms will lie between: 
J3xj =PA ± 2(0.0041) 
Prcj =fixxo± 2(0.00012) 
Similar to the schooling coefficient, the covariance associated with intercept and 
experience variable at random part of level 2 indicates that firms with steeper earnings-
experience profiles have lower intercepts and vice versa. This may also be viewed in the 
199 
8.2 T 
















way that firms with lower starting wages and salaries are likely to provide better 
learning opportunities and in turn higher growth rates of earnings with experience. 
Figure 6.5 shows such a varying relationship. 
Figure 6.5: A Separate Estimated Earnings-Experience Profile for each Firm 
(varying intercepts and slopes across firms) 
Note: The earnings-experience profiles are drawn based on the estimated 
earnings function 4 of Table 6.6. 
By plotting earnings-experience and earnings-age profiles, Fig 5.1 and Fig. 5.2 
chapter 5, it has been shown that the gap between the profiles increases with experience 
(or age). The interaction between years of schooling and years of experience was 
entered in the extended earnings function to account for such a phenomenon. The 
estimate of this variable (derived from Model 4 of Table 6.6) shows that the interaction 
variable has a positive effect on earnings indicating that the contribution of schooling 
(experience) to earnings increases with years of experience (schooling). These findings 
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are, in fact, consistent with the notion that more educated people can invest more 
through on-the-job learning. 
As the case of OLS analysis, the multilevel analysis provides evidence that 
individuals who have managerial jobs earn more than those who do not have managerial 
jobs. However, as argued before, the job seniority is partly because of more education 
and experience and these additional earnings from the job seniority (up to 80 percent) 
can be attributed to the option value of education and experience. Moreover, managerial 
jobs may also provide a better opportunity for learning on the job, and potential 
managers might need to acquire specific skills. Such investments with extra 
responsibilities, which managers usually have, may also provide an explanation for 
earnings differentials attributed to management. 
The multilevel estimate of management to (log) earnings differentials is 0.26. It 
indicates that being a manager increases hourly earnings by 26 percent on average. 
However, the contribution of management variable varies across firms. The standard 
deviation of the coefficient of the management derived from the random part of Model 
4, Table 6.6, is 0.1085. This suggests that the effect of management on earnings in 
approximately 95% of firms will lie between 0.26 ± 2(0.108), assuming that the firms' 
coefficients of management are normally distributed. 
As presented above, firm variables are classified into the two categories of 
conventional and contextual variables. Findings of the extended earnings function, 
Model 4, suggest that contextual variables alone account for, in part, earnings 
differentials attributed to firm level. The effects of these variables are distinguished into 
8 Based on the logistic estimation presented in chapter 5. 
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two parts: the effects on intercept and on slopes. The inclusion of average stock of 
human capital in a firm, as one of main contextual variables, in an earnings function 
provides interesting results. 
The average stock of human capital in each firm, which is directly affected by 
worker characteristics, mainly influences the intercepts and, in a much lesser extent, the 
coefficient of years of experience. The results of earnings function 4 presented in Table 
6.6 show that one extra unit of the variable in a firm contributes some 2 percent to 
earnings of employees working in the fiiin, holding other variables constant. That is, an 
employee with a given human capital would earn more in a firm that has a higher 
average accumulation of human capital than in a firm with otherwise situation. This 
effect in fact echoes the effect of human capital density on earnings and is attributable, 
in part, to externalities due to human capital density. Such externality effects would 
provide a signal to attract better and highly qualified workers into better and more 
productive firms. 
In sum, the results of the multilevel analysis highlight the key point that human 
capital variables are main determinants of earnings. Institutional factors that were 
considered as the conventional firm level variables were found to be insignificant when 
the cluster effects were incorporated into the analysis. However, through conducting an 
OLS analysis, most of the firm variables were found to be important and significant 
determinants of earnings. The empirical analyses, therefore, clearly show that 
employing the classic OLS technique, when data are dominated by a hierarchical 
structure, provides unreliable estimates for the testing of hypotheses. The findings also 
tend to support the claim of human capital theory in comparison with, for example, 
institutional hypotheses. 
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Table 6.6: Extended Earnings Functions; Estimated Effects of Employee and Firm 
Characteristics on Earnings 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
13K T St. 13 K  T St. 13 K  T .St. 13 K  T St. 13 K  T st. 
CONS 7.053 30.8 6.969 25.7 7.026 28.0 7.041 27.7 6.816 26.2 
EDUN 0.0264 2.2 0.0288 2.2 0.0237 2.4 0.0225 2.2 0.0190 2.0 
EDUN2 0.0011 11.1 0.0011 11.1 0.0011 11.1 0.0011 11.1 0.0011 11.4 
EXP 0.0216 18.6 0.0245 3.5 0.0210 3.2 0.0211 3.1 0.0211 3.3 
EXP2 -0.0005 -14.0 -0.0005 -14.5 -0.0005 -11.6 -0.0005 -11.6 -0.0003 -7.4 
SX 0.00074 10.2 0.0007 10.1 0.0007 10.2 0.0007 10.1 0.0007 9.2 
MANG 0.2607 11.6 0.2604 11.7 0.2596 11.7 0.2599 11.7 0.2576 11.6 
SIZE 4.4E-05 1.1 4.5E-05 1.2 8.1E-05 1.9 7.3E-05 1.4 7.8E-05 1.5 
LOCN 0.00608 0.1 0.00404 0.1 0.0260 0.4 0.0045 0.1 0.0029 0.0 
SCTR D -0.0592 -0.9 0.05975 0.9 -0.0801 -1.1 -0.0672 -0.8 -0.0826 -0.9 
AV S X 0.0246 2.8 0.02257 2.2 0.0186 2.1 0.0190 2.1 0.0198 2.1 
AV HRS -0.0002 -3.3 -0.0001 -2.0 -0.0001 -2.1 -0.0001 -2.1 -0.0001 -2.3 
SAV S X -0.0007 -1.4 -0.0006 -1.1 
SAV HRS -6.5E-06 -2.6 -8.0E-06 -3.0 -8.6E-06 -2.7 -8.4E-06 -2.6 -7.4E-06 -2.5 
XAV S X 1.3E-04 0.5 0.0003 1.4 0.0003 1.0 -4.3E-05 -0.1 
XAV HRS -1.9E-06 -1.3 -1.9E-06 -1.4 -1.9E-06 -1.3 -1.3E-06 -1.0 
S SIZE -2.9E-06 -1.3 -2.7E-06 -1.0 -3.6E-06 -1.4 
SLOCN -0.0046 -1.3 -0.0036 -0.9 -0.0034 -0.9 
SSCTR 0.0050 1.2 0.0044 1.0 0.0058 1.3 
XSIZE 3.2E-07 0.3 -7.8E-07 -0.7 
X LOCN 0.0011 0.6 0.00131 0.7 
XSCTR -0.0007 -0.3 0.00028 0.1 
AGE 0.0141 9.7 
AGE2 -0.0002 -10.3 
Level 2: 
cons/cons 0.0288 0.0278 0.02692 0.02707 0.0281 
edun/cons -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.00058 -0.00057 -0.0006 
edun/edun 8.7E-05 8.4E-05 7.8E-05 7.8E-05 7.6E-05 
exp/cons -0.00036 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003 
exp/exp 1.1E-05 1.0E-05 1.9E-05 1.7E-05 6.9E-06 
exp2/edun 8.2E-07 7.6E-07 6.2E-07 6.2E-07 6.6E-07 
exp2/exp -3.2E-07 -2.7E-07 
exp2/exp2 8.3E-09 6.8E-09 1.5E-08 1.4E-08 1.1E-08 
mang/mang 0.01204 0.01192 0.01177 0.01178 0.0118 
Level 1: 
cons/cons 0.0232 0.0232 0.0231 0.0231 0.0224 
edun/cons -0.0012 -0.0012 -0.0012 -0.0012 -0.0011 
edun/edun 0.0006 0.0006 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 
exp/cons -0.0009 -0.0009 -0.0009 -0.0009 -0.0008 
exp/edun 3.0E-05 3.0E-05 3.0E-05 3.0E-05 2.8E-05 
exp/exp 7.7E-05 7.7E-05 7.7E-05 7.7E-05 7.5E-05 
-2. log(lh) -9804.9 -9806.9 -9810.8 -9811.2 -9920.7 
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6.8 Actual and Potential Experience and Earnings 
After the pioneering work of Mincer in 1974, most empirical human capital 
analyses of earnings have employed estimated or potential years of experience as a 
proxy for investment in human capital through on-the-job training. In this study, 
however, we use actual years of experience. It is believed that the estimated years of 
experience does not provide an unbiased estimate of the contribution of on-the-job 
learning/training to earnings.9 To investigate this hypothesis, earnings functions were 
run and the results are presented in Table 6.7. In Models 1 and 2, actual years of 
experience are added to account for earnings variation from on-the-job learning and in 
Models 3 and 4 estimated years of experience. Model 1 and 3 are identical for the 
purpose of comparison. The marginal effect of the estimated years of experience is 
much more than that of actual experience. Therefore, using potential experience leads to 
overestimating the effect of experience on earnings. This overestimation, based on the 
findings of this study, increases with years of experience and decreases with years of 
schooling. 
To have a more detailed analysis, both actual and potential years of experience are 
added in Model 4. The coefficients of estimated years of experience are reduced 
dramatically. Moreover, the coefficients of actual years of experience are larger than 
those of estimated years of experience.10 These findings suggest that the growth of 
hourly earnings with potential experience in large part due to growth of earnings with 
9 A study by Arabsheibani (1996:10) highlights the issue for the case of Egypt. 
I° Using data from the Michigan Panel Study on Income Dynamics, Hanushek and Quigly (1978:73) 
report the same findings. 
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actual experience. The rest can be attributed to other kinds of post-school investment 
and maturity with age that are not captured by actual experience. 
Table 6.7: Estimated Effects of Actual and Estimated Years of Experience on Earnings 
1 2 3 4 
p, T st. p, T st. PK T st. 13K T st. 
Fixed Part: 
CONS 7.042 31.8 6.819 31.0 6.567 28.1 7.082 33.0 
EDUN 0.0155 1.7 0.0134 1.5 0.0239 2.4 0.0015 0.2 
ED'UN2 0.0011 11.1 0.0012 11.5 0.0016 10.8 0.0020 13.5 
EXPE* 0.0269 18.8 0.0062 3.7 
EXPE2 -0.0003 -20.3 -0.0001 -6.2 
SX** 0.0007 10.3 0.0007 9.4 0.0003 3.3 0.0006 6.5 
MANG 0.2601 11.6 0.2578 11.5 0.2711 11.9 0.2466 10.8 
AV S X 0.0231 3.0 0.0228 3.0 0.0294 3.7 0.0201 2.7 
AV HRS -0.0001 -2.8 -0.0002 -3.0 -0.0001 -2.4 -0.0002 -3.3 
SAV HRS -7.2E-06 -2.2 -6.7E-06 -2.1 -8.0E-06 -2.4 -6.8E-06 -2.1 
AGE 0.0143 9.9 
AGE2 -0.0002 -10.5 
EXP 0.0217 18.4 0.0164 12.7 0.0203 21.6 
EXP2 -0.0005 -17.3 -0.0003 -8.8 -0.0003 -9.6 
Random Part: 
Level 2: 
cons/cons 0.0278 0.0278 0.0412 0.0464 
edun/cons -0.0007 -0.0006 -0.0011 -0.0013 
edun/edun 8.7E-05 8.5E-05 0.0001 0.0001 
exp/cons -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0004 
exp/edun 1.1E-05 1.4E-05 1.2E-05 1.6E-05 
exp/exp 1.3E-05 1.3E-05 7.2E-06 7.3E-06 
mang/mang 0.0122 0.0120 0.0125 0.0126 
Level 1: 
cons/cons 0.0231 0.0223 0.0634 0.0546 
edun/cons -0.0011 -0.0011 -0.0040 -0.0037 
edun/edun 0.0006 0.0005 0.0007 0.0007 
exp/cons -0.0009 -0.0008 -0.0014 -0.0012 
exp/edun 2.9E-05 2.7E-05 0.0001 9.7E-05 
exp/exp 7.6E-05 7.5E-05 4.0E-05 3.6E-05 
-2. log(1h) -9784 -9897.8 -8878.3 -9934.7 
Note: * "EXPE" stands for potential years of experience derived from: "AGE - S - 6". 
** "SX" in Model 1 and 2 is the product of "edun"*"exp" and in Model 3 and 4 of 
"edun"*"expe". 
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As argued in chapter 3, the assumption that individuals start their working lives 
immediately after graduation, especially for countries experiencing high rate of 
unemployment, is not a plausible assumption. However, during such periods, 
individuals may have other opportunities to invest in themselves. For instance, they may 
attend special courses during unemployment period. Besides, maturity with age may 
also create variation in earnings. All these factors, accompanied with actual experience, 
make the earnings-age profiles steeper than earnings-experience profiles, as 
demonstrated in chapter 5. This implies that actual experience does not account for all 
earnings differentials among individuals, given the years of schooling constant. The 
profiles, however, do not enable us to evaluate the extent to which experience, in 
comparison with other post-school investments, contributes to earnings. With respect to 
this aspect, Model 2 of Table 6.7, including age and age squared, was run. The 
coefficients of age are statistically significant, indicating that age also is an important 
determinant of earnings. However, the coefficients of experience (i.e. the marginal 
effect of experience) are larger than those of age. (Model 5 of Table 6.6 presents the 
same findings.) This suggests that larger volumes of human capital after graduation are 
accumulated through experience. 
6.9 Summary and Conclusion 
To investigate the relationship between education, experience and earnings in the 
manufacturing sector of Iran's economy, we have conducted an empirical analysis based 
on 15755 observations (employees) at level 1 and 35 observations (films) at level 2. It 
has been found that the amount of education and experience are significantly associated 
with earnings of the employees. The association between higher education and 
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experience and higher earnings tend to support the hypothesis that spending on human 
beings is an investment, which is rewarded with pecuniary benefits in the labour market. 
It was found that years of schooling increase earnings and do so at an increasing 
rate. Such additional earnings from schooling can be ascribed to extra human capital 
accumulation at higher levels of education and the fact that investment acquired through 
higher levels of education is more specific and more relevant to a job. 
Moreover, the results of multilevel analysis of earnings differentials showed that 
data used are dominated by a hierarchical structure. As demonstrated in section 6.4, in a 
hierarchical structure, the OLS estimates are not efficient and employing an earnings 
function for overall observations under an OLS methodology, which ignores the effects 
of the structure on the estimates, misleads us in testing of hypotheses. In Table 6.3, 
Model 1, it was shown that when we employ an OLS method most coefficients for firm 
variables employed in this study (i.e., size of firm, geographical location, and economic 
sector variables) and interaction between these variables and years of schooling and 
years of experience significantly affect the earnings of employees. However, once the 
coefficients for years of schooling and years of experience are considered as random 
coefficients varying across firms, as in Model 3, all the variables, except the interaction 
between years of schooling and size, geographical location and economic sector, 
changed to become insignificant. That is, in Model 3 employing the multilevel 
methodology, neither size of firm, geographical location, and economic sector nor their 
interactions with years of experience can significantly explain earnings differentials 
across the firms. 
Based on the results, it was found that this hierarchical structure also affects the 
estimated effects of education, experience and management. That is, the coefficients of 
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human capital variables vary across the units of level 2 (i.e. firms). Attempts were 
made to explain earnings variation across firms through including firm level variables; 
that is, the conventional firm variables (i.e., size, geographical location and industry) 
and contextual firm variables (i.e. average stock of human capital and average hours of 
work). Unlike the results of the OLS method, none of the conventional variables 
accounts for earnings variation across firms, which support the argument that the 
application of OLS techniques in a hierarchical structure lead to incorrect inferences. 
The contextual variables can explain, in part, the variation. For example, we found 
that employees working in a firm with higher proportion of human capital earn more. 
Such findings can be interpreted as externality effects of human capital density. 
Finally, the human capital variables employed remain significant determinants of 
earnings. This empirical evidence suggests that after eliminating the cluster effects 
through applying the multilevel technique, the importance of non-human capital 
variables in earnings determination is weakened, which support the view that human 
capital theory is a powerful analytical tool in explaining earnings differentials. 
The issue of varying effects of education and experience on earnings can be 
illuminated in two dimensions; the first one can be regarded in such a way that 
education and experience are more productive in some firms than in others. That is, due 
to some elements such as human capital density (i.e. higher proportion of human capital 
in a firm), education and experience may make a greater contribution to increasing 
earnings than otherwise. Regarding the other dimension, it can be said that in a situation 
where investments in human capital are more productive, in terms of augmenting 
earnings, an individual has a stronger opportunity and motivation to invest in himself, 
especially through experience and (on-the-job) training. 
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Finally, an attempt was made to examine the assumption that individuals start 
their working lives immediately after graduation. Our data about actual years of 
experience enabled us to evaluate the validity of such an assumption. It was found that 
individuals with different educational levels experienced different (un)employment 
patterns; the more educated experienced a shorter unemployment period after 
graduation than the less educated. Consequently, as the findings showed, including the 
estimated, instead of actual, years of experience in an earnings function would overstate 
the effect of experience on earnings. 
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Chapter 7 Education, Earnings and Productivity 
7.1 Introduction 
In chapters 5 and 6, we presented the results of the analyses applying both OLS 
and multilevel techniques. It was demonstrated that the main human capital variables 
(education, experience, and management) account in part for the earnings variation 
among employees. The analyses enabled us to establish the relation between the human 
capital variables and earnings and to estimate the extent to which such variables 
contribute to earnings. However, such findings do not explain why human capital 
variables explain earnings differentials. In this chapter attempts are made to illuminate 
and to investigate this aspect of human capital theory. First, we discuss some aspects of 
the debate between human capital theory and screening hypotheses, in general, and the 
signalling hypothesis in particular. Secondly, the sample of respondents, who were the 
senior managers of selected companies and responsible for making and implementing 
wages/salaries, employment policies, and training programmes in their own company, is 
discussed. Finally, qualitative data collected through interviews are presented and 
analysed under three separate sections for education, experience, and training. As 
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demonstrated in the previous chapters, the variables employed in earnings functions 
account for a large part of the earnings variation among employees. However, another 
part of earnings differentials remains unexplained, and some observations were found to 
be outliers. In the next section, using interviews' responses, we shall present 
explanations for such observations and outliers as well as for the previously unexplained 
part of earnings differentials. The chapter ends with concluding remarks on the issue of 
productivity-enhancing role of education. 
7.2 Education and Productivity 
In chapter 2, relevant issues concerning the theoretical underpinnings of 
investment in human capital were reviewed. It was demonstrated that human capital 
theory could provide a theoretical explanation that justifies the investment behaviour of 
an individual spending on himself. As Cohn and Geske (1990: 34) point out, the basic 
premise of the human capital approach is that variations in labour income are due, in 
part, to differences in labour quality in terms of the amount of human capital acquired 
by the workers. This premise, however, is based on the assumption that investments in 
human capital improve the productivity of workers, and hence increase earnings through 
imparting useful knowledge and skills. This assumption has been attacked by critics' 
who have argued that the higher earnings of more educated workers reflects their 
superior ability, higher social background, etc. rather than specific knowledge and skills 
Among others are Arrow (1973), Filtering Theory; Spence (1973), Signalling Theory; and Stiglitz 
(1973), Screening Hypothesis. 
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acquired during the educational process. These critics, therefore, are sceptical and 
doubtful about the productivity-augmenting role of education. In their view education 
serves mainly as a screening device to select the abler workers. 
Spence's signalling view, for example, states that an employer cannot directly 
observe the productive capabilities of an individual at the time he hires him. Nor will 
this information necessarily become available to the employer immediately after hiring. 
What the employer observes, Spence argues, is a plethora of personal data in the form 
of observable characteristics and attributes (i.e., signals) of the individual, and it is these 
that must ultimately determine the employer's assessment of the productive capabilities 
of an applicant. For each set of signals that the employer confronts, he will have an 
expected marginal product for an individual who has these observable attributes. This 
determines the wage offered to applicants with those characteristics. Potential 
employees therefore confront an offered wage schedule whose arguments are signals. 
These signals are alterable and therefore potentially subject to manipulation by the job 
applicant. Of course, there may be costs in making these adjustments. Education, for 
example, is costly and incurs a signalling cost. The individual will invest in education if 
there is sufficient return as defined by the offered wage schedule. It is postulated in this 
view that individuals select signals so as to maximise the difference between offered 
wages and signalling costs. (Spence, 1973) 
The signalling theory, as mentioned above, views education as a signal that yields 
useful information to identify individuals with higher expected productivity. That is, the 
employer, who cannot observe the productive capabilities of a potential employee at the 
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time of hiring, uses observable characteristics such as education to select more able and 
productive applicants through offering appropriate wages to the applicants with those 
characteristics. This process of selection seems to be very cheap for the employer 
(Wiles, 1974) because the employer does not pay the costs of education. Human capital 
theory, on the other hand, postulates that education actually improves the productive 
capacity of employees, which is the main reason why employers pay more to the more 
educated. 
For the purpose of our empirical analysis, we illuminate the relationship between 
investment in human capital and earnings by investigating; first, the existence of a 
positive relationship between education and earnings, and second the reason why 
education influences earnings. From the viewpoint of an individual employee it does not 
matter whether education improves productivity or serves mainly as a screening device 
to select more able workers. In either case the earnings differentials actually ascribed to 
education would provide an indication that education and training are good investments. 
The other issue, that is how education affects earnings, is in fact the key debate 
between human capital and screening theorists. This issue concerns the demand for (the 
services of) human capital. From that aspect, relevant questions emerge; How and why 
do investments in human capital explain earnings differentials? Why do employers offer 
higher pay to more highly educated workers? Is it because education makes workers 
more productive, or because education merely serves as a screening device that 
identifies the more able and highly motivated young people? 
213 
These questions, from the viewpoint of an employer'`, can be elaborated in two 
dimensions: the employer's incentives first for paying more to the more educated 
workers, and second for paying the cost of training their employees. As presented in 
chapter 2, a variety of approaches have been employed to investigate the first 
dimension. As has been discussed, such approaches, in which earnings functions were 
employed, cannot evaluate the validity of human capital theory versus screening 
hypotheses (and vice versa) in connection with the question why education increases 
earnings. Especially, if we accept the view that the more educated are paid more 
because they actually are more productive, there is not a clear cut distinction between 
human capital theory and screening hypotheses; that is, higher productivity may be due 
to higher ability, as screening hypotheses predict, or due to education itself, as human 
capital theory presumes. In both cases a positive correlation between human capital 
variables and earnings is expected, as demonstrated in the previous chapters. To study 
the debate and to provide empirical evidence, therefore, other aspects of the relationship 
between investment in human capital and productivity need to be illuminated. Such 
aspects are presented in the subsequent sections. 
7.3 Qualitative Data and Respondents 
As discussed in chapter 3, the main purpose of the analysis in this chapter is to 
investigate the debate between human capital theory and screening hypotheses by 
2 This part of the study is confined to employers' viewpoints. The issue of social benefits of education and 
schooling is another vital aspect, which is beyond the scope of this analysis. 
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analysing data derived from interviews with employers. In the interviews we asked the 
respondents to describe how they treat education and other kinds of investment in 
human capital and how they see the relationship between investment in human capital 
and earnings/productivity in the actual world. To clarify the issue, we extended the 
debate from the specific case of education to other kinds of human capital; that is, 
training and experience for which the screening hypotheses fail to provide any 
explanation. Moreover, as the results of the quantitative analyses showed, part of the 
earnings variation among the employees remains unexplained. After running a separate 
earnings function for each firm using OLS technique, we found some extreme values 
and outliers. An attempt was also made to collect explanations for such values. In the 
following sections we attempt to elaborate these issues, using data derived from 
interviews. 
To collect the qualitative data for this study, we interviewed 12 persons who were 
mainly members of management board, and administrative and financial managers 
directly involved in making and implementing employment and wage policies in their 
own companies. Outline details of respondents are presented in Table 7.1. We tried to 
collect data as much as possible through interview and were able to interview the 
representatives of 10 firms.3 These firms, which cover some 29 percent of units of level 
2 of the quantitative analysis, employ more than 7300 workers (46 percent of all 
observations at the employee level). 
3 Detail about the selection of interviewees is presented in chapter 3. 
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I-1 (a) member of management board, and administrative and financial 
manager; and (b) manager of recruitment department in refrigerator 
and heater manufacturing company 
1-2 member of management board and deputy in car part manufacturing 
company 
1-3 director of paper and cardboard manufacturing firm 
1-4 (a) administrative manager, (b) training unit director in medical 
product manufacturing company 
1-5 deputy of chief executive in car part manufacturing company 
1-6 member of management board, and administrative and financial 
manager in distribution company 
1-7 director of textile manufacturing company 
1-8 Administrative and financial manager in textile manufacturing 
company 
1-9 member of management board and administrative and financial 
manager in food and chocolate manufacturing company 
I-10 director of textile manufacturing company
* 
Notes: * We could not complete this interview because of time limitation at the first 
meeting. Another appointment was made for a more detailed discussion of the 
issues that we were interested in but we could not meet the person to complete 
the interview. 
Appointments were made to interview the representatives of three other firms. 
We were not able to meet and conduct interviews due to fact that respondents 
had no time available to be interviewed. 
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The interviews lasted between 45 minutes and 2 hours. In some cases, one person 
from a firm was interviewed and in others, where further explanation and discussion 
were necessary, two people. In some cases we had to see the same person more than 
once, mainly due to time limitations at the first meeting. We also made appointments 
with the representatives of three other firms and waited at the places where these 
interviews were expected to take place; however, as stated earlier, we were not able to 
conduct these interviews. 
In the interviews, the respondents were asked about the situation and importance 
of the educational qualifications and experience of their (prospective) employees in 
regard to recruitment, productivity, and earnings. (A copy of the semi-structured 
questionnaire is provided in Appendix 3.) We asked questions about their training 
programmes as well. The key purpose of this part of study is to provide evidence 
regarding the debate between human capital theory and screening hypotheses. In other 
words, the results of this part of analysis shed light on the question whether investments 
in human capital contribute to improving the productivity of the employees.' In the 
following sections, the behaviour of employers concerning different kinds of investment 
in human capital is elaborated in three sections dealing with education, experience and 
training. In each section, data derived form the interviews is presented and interpreted. 
4 Concerning the relationship between investments in human capital and productivity, two dimensions can 
be recognised: whether there is a positive relation between the investments and productivity and how 
these investments improve productivity. It is the first dimension that is of interest in this study. However, 
an attempt is also made to present and to analysis data collected on the other dimension. 
217 
7.4 Education 
In this section, we shall present the respondents' views about the situation and 
significance of educational qualifications awarded before recruitment. This should help 
to elaborate and explain how employers observe and treat educational qualifications, 
and whether they see education as a screening device or as a productivity-augmenting 
element. This analysis is followed by a discussion of the investment behaviour of the 
employers concerning the education of their employees who have already been 
screened. 
Assuming perfect competition in both labour and product markets, Becker, in his 
theoretical examination (1962, reprinted in: 1993), tries to make a connection between 
wages and the marginal product of a profit-maximising firm. He argues: 
If there were no on-the-job training, wage rate would be given to the firm 
and would be independent of its actions. A profit-maximising firm would be 
in equilibrium when marginal products equalled wages, that is, when 
marginal receipts equalled marginal expenditure. (Becker 1962, reprinted in: 
1993:31) 
It should be inferred, therefore, that the willingness of the employer to pay more 
to more educated workers is directly related to the fact that more educated workers 
should also be more productive, so there would be a positive relation between wages 
and marginal productivity. That is: 
Wt=f(VMP,) 	 (7.1) 
218 
where W, and MP, are earnings and the value of the marginal products of an employee 
at time t, respectively. In these circumstances, as Becker remarks, firms would not 
worry too much about the relation between labour conditions in the present and future, 
partly because workers would only be hired for one period and partly because wages 
and marginal products in future periods would be independent of a firm's current 
behaviour. 
In that respect a connection between earnings and educational qualifications of 
employees can be made, in that educational qualification is usually attained before 
recruitment at a firm. Therefore, the current wage of an employee should be dependent 
on his current productivity (i.e., Equation (7.1)). Consequently, an employee with 
higher education earning more wages (in comparison with an employee with lower 
education), as observed in previous chapters, should also be more productive.5 The 
question is whether this higher productivity is attributable to the pre-existing ability of 
employees signalled by higher education, as argued in signalling, filtering and screening 
hypotheses, or whether it is education that improves the productive capacity of 
employees. In the latter case the higher productivity is partly attributed to education, 
human capital theory. 
Screening hypotheses consider education as a sorting device signalling pre-
existing ability. Signalling theory, in particular, considers education as a signal, which is 
5 It is worthwhile mentioning that in the actual world a part of earnings variation may be ascribable to 
other factors, as demonstrated in chapters 5 and 6. In this section we assume that such factors are the 
same for all employees. 
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alterable and potentially subject to manipulation by the job applicants. However, under 
the signalling view a controversial issue arises about the relationship between education 
and productivity. That is, it is not very clear whether the alterability of signals such as 
education means that education improves the productive capacity or that it merely 
signals pre-existing ability. Spence's signalling theory apparently assumes that 
education does not improve productive capacity. (Spence, 1973: 364) However, it has 
recently been highlighted that signalling and screening models should be viewed as 
extension of the human capital model. (Weiss, 1995: 133) In Weiss' view "sorting 
models are mistakenly grouped with credentialism, in which wage differences are 
independent of productivity differences, or with models in which education has no 
effect on productivity. ... In addition, education surely improves productivity at certain 
technical managerial jobs." (Ibid.: 150-151)6 
To explore this aspect of the investigation, we asked interviewees to discuss the 
situation of their own company about the relation between education, earnings and 
productivity. For that purpose, first the positive relationship between education and 
earnings derived from quantitative analysis was highlighted, and the interviewees were 
asked why they pay more to more highly educated employees. Two key points were 
addressed by the respondents: the sorting role and the productivity-augmenting effect of 
education. That is, almost all interviewees confirmed not only that educational 
attainment is regarded as a sorting device but also that they believe that education 
6 A discussion concerning contrasting views of screening models is also given in Johnes (1998). 
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improves productivity, and therefore they expect that more highly educated candidates 
to be more productive. 
According to the interviewees, all their companies consider educational 
qualification initially as a sorting device to select more productive candidates. To be 
recruited, as they stated, candidates should provide a copy of their educational 
qualifications with the application forms. After considering the application forms of 
candidates, companies invite the most appropriate candidates for interview. In fact, it 
seems that neither educational qualifications nor the information provided through the 
application form provides enough information to select the more appropriate and more 
productive candidates. For this reason, they interview a number of candidates greater 
than that which will be selected as prospective employees. After conducting interviews, 
the companies select the candidates they consider most appropriate. Those who are 
selected must sign a temporary employment contract, and then they can start working. 
During this temporary employment period (i.e. the probationary period), the 
performance of the employees is assessed by supervisors and managers who monitor the 
performance of their subordinates. If a candidate fulfils the expectations of his or her 
employer s/he will be recruited; otherwise his or her recruitment will be terminated at 
this stage. 
Education is an important factor for the selection of new employees. 
Initially, candidates should send their educational qualifications with the 
application form. Based on such information, more appropriate candidates 
are invited for interview. The assessment of interviewers determines 
whether or not a candidate can be selected. After selection, a candidate 
should pass a six-month temporary employment period. In the case of 
satisfactory assessment showing that the candidate is capable and productive 
for such a job, he will be recruited as a permanent employee. (I-1) 
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Personnel are selected based on their qualifications and interview. However, 
for final selection they should prove their capability in practice, otherwise 
their employment will be terminated or they have to accept a lower (level 
job and) wage/salary. (I-8) 
However, this does not necessarily mean that any candidate who has a degree is 
invited for interview. A selection from graduate applicants is made before interview, 
and only some people are invited for interview. Besides, employers request specific 
qualification for a given (especially for a high level) job: 
A person may have a degree but no appropriate skills, which are important 
to perform a job. Such a person would face a difficult situation in practice. 
For example, we had a candidate with a foreign language degree. He did not 
have any experience and wanted to work in the export/import unit. Due to 
lack of skills, he was not able to request a pro forma appropriately. (I-2) 
For a given job, we invite appropriate candidates who have relevant 
educational qualifications for interview. However, we do not invite any 
graduate who has a degree. ... There is the issue of managerial capability; 
the candidate should be able to "manage" as well. (I-9) 
Therefore, the recruitment procedure indicates that education is a screening device 
but not a perfect one. 
Besides the sorting role of education, the interviewees believe that education 
contributes to the improvement of the productive capacity of graduates. Education 
provides knowledge and skills as well as better attitudes, personality traits, etc. that 
make the educated more productive: 
Education and higher education, especially for management, are good things 
that make them more productive to perform their job better and with less 
malfunctioning.... More highly educated employees and managers would 
attempt to collaborate with other colleagues, especially with other more 
educated personnel, in a better way ... (I-2) 
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For recruitment educational qualification and experience are very important. 
... There is a relation between payment and marginal product, as the theory 
of the firm in microeconomics predicts. Therefore, it is expected that the 
more educated and more experienced to be more productive, and in fact this 
is what we observe in practice. ... (I-5) 
Especially for white-collar jobs, (educational) qualification is very 
important. It helps individuals to adapt and familiarise with the current 
situation of the firm in a shorter time. It enables people to have better 
collaboration with other colleagues and also better performance. (I-6) 
There is also the issue of human capital density, which merits further elaboration. 
Generally speaking, it is believed that more highly educated people choose to work in 
firms and working places that already have higher human capital density.7 This, 
however, would be only one side of the coin. On the other hand, it can be argued that 
more highly educated employees, especially managers, could provide a better human 
capital density at their work place. One of the respondents highlighted the issue and 
stated that more qualified individuals and people with higher educational qualifications, 
particularly in the case of managers, would attempt to attract better and more qualified 
prospective colleagues. In contrast, less qualified persons would attempt to create a 
lower human capital density in their working place. (I-2) It is very likely that education 
increases productivity more in a situation of high human capital density than in a 
contrary situation. Therefore, all employees would benefit from such a situation. This 
finding is consistent with the multilevel quantitative findings, presented in chapter 6, 
This issue is often referred to self-selection problem. A recent and interesting review is given in 
Heckman and Honore (1990). 
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that employees working in firms with higher average stock of human capital earn more 
than their counterparts working in a firm with less average stock of human capital. 
There is another point that needs to be illuminated regarding the issue of the 
relationship between education, earnings and productivity. It has been highlighted that 
education signals the productive capacity of candidates. Therefore, according to this 
view, more educated people are more able and, in turn, more productive. According to 
this theoretical explanation, employers would be interested in recruiting more educated 
candidates regardless of the nature of the job/work. They would face a queue of 
candidates with a variety of educational qualifications, from primary to higher levels of 
education, for any given job. However, the actual situation is not so simple. That is, 
employers usually request a specific educational qualification for a specific job, as in 
the examples quoted above. For example, for a production line they may recruit 
individuals with a diploma degree. When recruiting a person for a managerial job, they 
are interested in both relevant experience and higher educational qualifications as pre-
required conditions. (I-8) There would not be candidates who have not got the relevant 
qualifications. Thus, the employers in their selection for a particular job would face 
candidates with homogenous educational qualifications from whom prospective 
employees would be selected. At the same time they may select individuals with 
different educational qualifications, but for different jobs. 
Although the above mentioned arguments may provide some evidence justifying 
the relationship between education, earnings, and productivity, it is still not clear 
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enough to provide evidence on the fact that education improves productive capacity of 
individuals. It is, however, implied that if the main function of education were to screen 
more able candidates, the employers should not have had any tendency to contribute, in 
one way or another, to the improvement of educational qualifications of their employees 
who have already been screened. The contribution of employers to the payment of the 
tuition fees of their employees could shed light on this issue and clarify the 
productivity-augmenting role of education. That is, it makes sense, if they believe in the 
productivity-augmenting role of education, that employers are also willing to contribute 
to the tuition fees of their employees who are part/full time students:8 
If an employee passes the general examination to enter a university, we 
would help him to pay the tuition fee, etc. (I-4) 
In some cases where employees succeeded in entering university we may 
contribute to their tuition fees. If so, they should sign a contract/agreement 
to work at our company after their graduation. (I-9) 
In sum, the evidence presented from the respondent views shows that education is 
not only regarded as a screening device, even as an imperfect one, to select candidates 
with the capability to do a job, but is considered as an element that contributes to 
improving productive capacity. As demonstrated, both human capital theory and 
screening hypotheses imply that the more educated are paid more because they are more 
8 Some employees may pass the general examination to enter a university. (More discussion on the 
education system in Iran is provided in chapter 4.) Depending on their agreement with the employers they 
can continue their education as a part or a full time student. In the latter case, they should terminate their 
work temporarily. After graduation they would come back to their previous work place. 
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productive.9 Therefore, observations on education, earnings, and productivity do not 
provide evidence that enables one to distinguish the human capital view from screening 
hypotheses. However, data from employers' views, showing that employers observe the 
productivity-augmenting role of education in the work place, and also data on the 
investment behaviour of employers when spending on the education of the employees 
who have already been screened, tend to support the human capital view, that education 
actually improves the productivity of individuals. 
We also presented evidence that attaining an educational qualification does not 
guarantee a job. Employers would select their prospective employees for particular jobs 
from a number of candidates with homogenous educational qualification. Therefore, 
besides educational qualifications, they need to have some other selection criteria such 
as experience, as we elaborate in the following section. 
7.5 Experience 
As demonstrated in chapters 2, 5 and 6, experience is an investment that creates 
earnings variation among employees. In this section, we present respondents' views on 
why employers pay more to more experienced workers. 
9 The same point is also stated by Mace (1987: 25) "On the one hand there is the human capital notion 
that more educated people earn, on average, more than the less educated people ... and that these higher 
earnings result from their additional education because it has raised their relative productivity. On the 
other hand there is the screening hypothesis which accepts the first part of the human capital proposition, 
that the more educated earn more, but asserts that this is because the more educated possess greater innate 
productive skills and this is why they are more productive and are paid more." 
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In the view of interviewees, experience is also an important criterion for 
recruitment. Employers see experience as a productive element of human capital. (e.g., 
I-1 and 1-3) The importance of experience in improving productivity, as the respondents 
stated, may vary across different jobs and educational subjects and backgrounds. For 
example, in social sciences, where most students are not taught the very practical 
aspects of doing a job, relevant experience is more crucial than in engineering and 
medicine. Moreover, experience and education are seen as two complementary elements 
of productive capacity. In a respondent's words: 
Academic knowledge and experience make a person more qualified to do a 
job. An educated person with good experience insists on a better way of 
doing a job, and he is more disciplined as well as more enthusiastic ... (I-2) 
Nevertheless, this does not necessarily mean that the more experienced are always 
preferred to the less experienced. For some cases and jobs, recruiting younger 
employees is preferred, and for others the more experienced. One reason for the former 
case is the fact that employers attempt to provide a situation that enables employees to 
accumulate their human capital according to the situation and needs of the firm. 
Recouping the benefits of investment in human capital is another important factor that 
may encourage employers to recruit younger employees who may stay in the firm for a 
longer period. Whether to recruit younger employees or more experienced personnel, 
therefore, depends on the dominant situation: 
In some cases we prefer to recruit younger workers (with less external 
experience). This provides opportunities for the workers to have a longer 
tenure in our company and better on-the-job learning and training. (I-6) 
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Sometimes younger workers are recruited because employers face the problem of 
a lack of candidates with relevant experience. The respondent (I-4) stated that "due to 
the fact that there is no similar producer in the region, we found it difficult to find 
candidates with appropriate and relevant experience." For this reason, as well as to 
provide a longer career prospect for the employees, they had to recruit younger workers. 
For recruitment, both education and experience are important. However, the 
effects of education and experience on productivity are not the same. In some jobs, 
education was reported as the more productive element of human capital, and in others 
experience: 
Concerning whether education or experience is more effective to improve 
productivity, it depends on the job and task that the employees are doing. In 
lower level jobs where the task and responsibility of the employees are very 
specific, experience and on-the-job learning are more important. In cases 
where responsibilities are greater and the tasks to be done are more 
complicated, such as the job of technicians, supervisors, and managers, 
higher educational qualifications can be and are more productive. (I-6) 
Human capital accumulation through experience and learning on the job is 
more productive since it is more close to various aspects of doing a job and 
a task. (I-7) 
These statements about the employers' views of experience imply that employers 
may treat experience which is acquired inside their own company, in comparison with 
external experience, differently. We asked interviewees to discuss the actual situation of 
their own firm in that respect. As expected, the employers had different attitudes to 
experience acquired outside (external experience) and inside (internal experience) the 
firm; though both kinds of experience seem important for productivity and earnings: 
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... As compared with external experience (which may even be acquired in a 
company with a similar activity), inside or internal experience has a more 
significant effect on performance and productivity. Because internal 
experience is more relevant to the current task and is accumulated based on 
the structure and the situation of the current firm. It is through internal 
experience that workers can learn the details of doing the job. Such details 
are not taught in schools and universities and may not be acquirable in other 
firms. ... (1-8 and 1-9) 
These findings are consistent with our quantitative analysis presented in chapter 5. 
From the results of the earnings functions, in which years of experience are decomposed 
into internal and external experience, we found that an extra year of internal experience 
contributes to earnings twice as much as a year of external experience.1° 
The extent to which human capital can be accumulated through experience varies 
across different jobs:11 
... Learning through experience varies, depends on the nature of the jobs. 
Some jobs have a very limited learning opportunity. For example, a driver 
does not have an infinite opportunity to learn through doing. ... (I-3) 
Finally, it seems that employers try to provide an appropriate learning atmosphere, 
so that more experienced workers can exchange their experience with the less 
experienced: 
0 
 A more detailed discussion is given in chapter 5. 
In a study on skill formation systems in Japan and Southeast Asia, Koike (1990) derives the same 
conclusion. Through close observance and intensive interviews with veteran workers, he explores two 
major categories of work on the shop floor that became part of his conceptual framework: usual 
operations (routine, repetitive, and monotonous jobs) and unusual operations (those dealing with changes 
and problems occurred during repetitive and routine operations). Because of the repetitive character of 
usual operations, as he argues, most people are inclined to conclude that little skill is really necessary. 
However, the ability to deal with problems (consisting of detecting problems, diagnosing the sources of 
the problems, and rectifying or amending the process in order to eliminate the problems) and changes 
efficiently is an essential part of necessary skills and knowledge. Intellectual skills become more 
necessary as the technological requirements of the work become more advanced. According to his direct 
observation of the shop floor, on-the-job training (learning while working and following the teachers' 
pattern) is the principal way in which these skills are formed. (Ibid., 7-10) 
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To achieve a high degree of efficiency, we try to create a working 
environment consisting of an appropriate combination of experienced 
workers and more educated but less experienced ones. Such an environment 
would help the less experienced to learn from the more experienced. (I-9) 
To sum up, in this section the significance of experience based on the 
respondents' views was examined. We found that experience is one of the important 
factors for recruitment, and human capital accumulation through experience varies 
across different jobs. There is a difference between the effects of internal and external 
experience on productivity. The same pattern is revealed when we use earnings 
functions in which experience is decomposed into internal and external experience. That 
is, the contribution of inside or internal experience to earnings is about two times 
greater than that of external experience, after controlling for other variables. 
7.6 Training 
In the previous sections, education and experience were examined from the 
viewpoint of employers. Training is also another key element of human capital, which is 
of interest. Screening hypotheses do not provide any explanation for such an 
investment. However, it can be argued that if education did not improve productivity, 
training would not make a contribution to productivity and therefore it would not be 
justifiable that employers spend on training programmes. In this section, first, an 
attempt is made to present some theoretical aspects of training from the viewpoint of 
employers, using Becker's training theory. Then, data on the training-investment 
behaviour of employers collected through interviews is presented. The findings will 
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help to provide evidence about the validity of human capital theory versus screening 
hypotheses in the actual world. 
As elaborated in chapter 2, Becker in his well-known training theory introduces, 
what I would call, an explanation of firm investment behaviour in which he switches 
human capital theory to the matter of profit-maximising equilibrium of a firm through 
taking into account on-the-job training. In Becker's view, the inclusion of on-the-job 
training in the investment-decision process of a firm alters the conditions of the 
equilibrium, which depend only on the current period, and creates a connection between 
present and future receipts and expenditures. He then remarks: 
Training might lower current receipts and raise current expenditure, yet 
firms could profitably provide this training if future receipts were 
sufficiently raised or future expenditures sufficiently lowered. Expenditures 
during each period need not equal wages, receipts need not equal the 
maximum possible marginal productivity, and expenditures and receipts 
during all periods would be interrelated (Becker, 1962, reprinted in: 1993: 
32). 
This consideration provides a base for Becker's famous distinction between 
specific and general training (reviewed in chapter 2). In this theoretical explanation, 
Becker argues that the firm will invest in human capital only if the discounted benefits 
accruing to the firm from the human capital investment are sufficiently large to cover 
the costs of the investment. 
If training, for example, were given only during the initial period, expenditures 
during the initial period would equal wages plus the outlay on training, expenditure 
during other periods would equal wages alone, and receipts during all periods would 
equal marginal products. Equation (7.1) becomes: 
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where k measures the outlay on training. (Ibid.: 32) 
In terms of empirical investigation, the key question, then, is whether the firms 
have had any training programme. Based on data from the interviews, almost all 
companies have had training programmes, and it seems that employers see training as a 
productive investment. Such training may be provided on the job, especially by 
supervisors and by more experienced workers, and/or through establishing a training 
course in the firm or in an educational/training institution. 
To justify training programmes, interviewees stated that employees, especially 
newcomers, need such training to improve their capabilities. Initially, the performance 
of all employees is assessed by their supervisors and managers. This kind of assessment 
helps employers to find out whether their employees are capable of doing their jobs 
properly. In case of any weakness, the supervisors report the situation so that (specific) 
training is provided for the employees. 
In a manufacturing firm like us training is seen as an important device/plan 
that enables us to be dynamic enough to compete with other rivals and to 
meet our targets in the market. Training for personnel may be provided as 
general or specific. In our company (on-the-job) training comprises both 
theoretical and application aspects. ... (I-I) 
In cases of off-the-job training, employees would participate in the programmes 
and they would receive their wage and salary while attending the programmes: 
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When the units of our company report that some employees need special 
training we provide such opportunities. Training may be on-the-job or 
through participating in a short training course off the job. In the latter case, 
the employees would attend the course as well as receive their wage or 
salary. ... (I-4) 
The findings presented above are consistent with the first part of Becker's training 
theory. That is, the employers view training as an investment in human capital. 
However, our evidence does not support the second part of the theory (i.e. the generality 
view of training). All training seems to be specific not in the sense of the generality of 
training but, as Ziderman (1978: 23) states, in the sense of the potential mobility of 
trainees to other firms. 
Training is seen as a complement to education and experience. The main aim of 
such training programmes seems to be the improvement of the productive capacity of 
employees who are eligible to be trained. It would seem that employers, managers, 
and/or supervisors have a clear idea regarding the specific capability needed for doing a 
particular task and job. During their assessment, if they recognise that some employees 
need further training they will provide such opportunities for them: 
To recruit a person, of course education and experience are very important. 
Nevertheless, candidates should be armed with specific knowledge and 
skills to perform their tasks properly. In case of lack of appropriate 
knowledge and skills, reported by the selecting committee during the 
recruitment procedure or by supervisors, candidates should take part in such 
training programmes successfully. Training programmes have various 
dimensions and objectives. The main purpose is to improve the productive 
capacity of employees. (I-5) 
Some firms were able to organise more comprehensive training programmes: 
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We have recently established a high standard training centre. There are three 
full-time tutors selected from six well-qualified and trained candidates for 
the purpose of training other employees. It is their duty to train both new 
and old employees. All salesmen, for example, should attend the training 
course. (I-6) 
Besides training personnel, one of the respondents highlighted that "it is also the 
tutors' duty to assess the effects of such training on the productivity of the company, to 
find out whether the targets of training programmes have been achieved."' (I-6) 
Training programmes cover all employees, whether higher level workers or those 
with lower level jobs and with different educational qualifications. Nevertheless, more 
educated employees invest in themselves more through on-the-job training in 
comparison with less educated workers.13 In a respondent's words: 
There are also (on-the-job) training opportunities for lower level workers. 
However, it is the more skilled and more highly educated employees who 
mostly need to attend training courses, and they do so. (I-6) 
It is worth noting that quantitative data also supports the above-mentioned point. 
Using data from a large company that provided all the requested data for the purpose 
our quantitative analyses, we estimated by applying a logistic method the effect of 
education and experience on the probability of receiving training. It was found that both 
education and experience have a positive effect on the probability of being trained. As 
12 Attempts were made to interview the head of the training centre regarding how they assess the effects 
of training programmes on productivity and performance of the trainees. But we could not succeed in 
conducting such an interview. 
13 Mincer (1974: 131), for example, points out that in dollar volumes the relation between schooling and 
post-school investments is found to be positive. This finding is consistent with a notion of 
complementarity between the two investment forms. 
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Table 7.2 shows, the probability of being trained increases with years of schooling, 
holding years of experience constant. For example, the probability that an employee 
with 5 years of schooling receives a training course is less than one percent, while the 
equivalent figure for a person with 16 years of schooling is 44.3 percent, holding years 
of experience constant at 10. The same pattern appears for experience. That is, when 
years of experience increase from 10 to 20, the chance of being trained increases from 
44.3 to 70.5 percent, with the same years of schooling (i.e., 16). 
Table 7.2: The effects of education and experience on the probability of being trained 
using Logistic Method 
Years of Years of schooling 
Experience 5 12 16 
10 Prob.* .0053 .1143 .4432 
Z** -5.233 -2.48 -.228 
20 Prob. .016 .279 .705 
Z -4.133 -.948 .871 
Notes: * Prob. stands for the probability of being trained and is calculated based on 
{1/(1+e-z)}. 
** Z is the estimated function. 
Data from questionnaires for the purpose of quantitative analysis also help us to 
elaborate these firms' training programmes in more detail. In the above mentioned 
company about 5 percent of employees received training, during the year March 1995-
March 1996. All participants were permanent employees who had a secure job in the 
company. This in fact supports the view that there is low potential mobility of such 
employees, and therefore the employer would be sure that the investment would not be 
lost through quitting. Almost all courses were relevant to the current jobs of the 
235 
participants. This confirms the issue of the relevancy of (on/off-the-job) training to 
perform a job, in comparison with formal education. As discussed in chapter 5, these 
findings support the view that management is an element of human capital, because to 
be a manager one may need to receive a specific training course. It was also stated that 
managerial jobs might provide a better opportunity to accumulate human capital. Data 
on employees who received training show that about 57 percent of participants were 
managers or applying for a managerial job when they attended such programmes. In 
terms of subject, the courses covered a variety of subjects, and management and 
computer or computing courses were among the most frequent. 
It might be argued that training is provided just for the sake of promotion. Data 
collected through interviews such as that which is quoted below reveal that training 
programmes, like education, make employees more productive and more capable of 
doing higher level jobs: 
There is on-the-job training for newcomers provided by experienced 
workers and specific training courses for others. For example, we selected 
some workers from the local employees to be trained in special training 
courses for higher level jobs. After training they could demonstrate that they 
are more capable of the higher level jobs in comparison with their 
counterparts who are non-local employees. Their success is due to the 
training programmes and the fact that they have a similar social and cultural 
background to their subordinates who are mainly local employees. ... (I-7) 
Both specific and general training is provided, and that such training may be 
supplied in the firm or in another place or an educational/training centre. In any case, 
the employers expect training to improve productivity: 
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In our training centre, we provide general training such as English language 
courses, computer courses, etc. mainly for new employees. Specific training 
is mainly supplied for employees who are selected by supervisors and 
managers as eligible workers to be trained. If the centre cannot supply the 
training courses which are needed, employees are introduced to some other 
educational and training institutions to attend such special programmes as 
full time trainees. ... Training and especially specific training programmes 
affect the productivity of employees. (I-9) 
Becker's training theory predicts that the cost of general training should be paid 
by employees who recoup the benefits of training. On other hand, the cost of specific 
training is paid by employers, since specific training improves the productivity of 
employees only at the firm that provides such training. Therefore, the firm can recoup 
the benefits of specific training. Our empirical data, however, reveals that the costs of 
both general and specific training are paid by employers. (e.g. 1-9) As mentioned earlier, 
through establishing special mechanisms such as an internal labour market and 
contracts, employers reduce the chance that an employee in whom investment has been 
made may quit the firm. This weakens the relevancy of the classification of training by 
Becker. Both employees and the employers are able recoup the benefits of training in 
the time that training is provided as well as in future: 
Costs of training are paid by the company. Of course, we expect to recoup 
the whole benefits of training programmes in the future. ... To provide 
better incentives for the trained workers we share the benefits of training 
with them through their promotion and increasing their earnings. (I-9) 
In some cases it was stated that when participants in training programmes could 
obtain a good score (i.e. score between 17 and 20 out of 20) they would be rewarded 
with up to 5 percent of their wage/salary. (I-1) In the respondent's view such 
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opportunities of promotion and signals would encourage trainees to participate in the 
programmes.1 4  
It might be plausible to assume that, to some extent, education and training are 
substitutes for each other. However, in practice they are complementary. "Education 
and on-the-job training are complementary investments." (I-4) 
Finally, although employers view training as a productive investment, the extent 
to which such an investment may increase productivity varies with the kinds of training 
in terms of their relevancy to performing a job. "Training, especially specific training, is 
more useful to improve productivity because it can meet better the company's needs." 
(I-4) 
In this section, the investment behaviour of employers about training was 
presented, using data derived from interviews. It was found that the employers do invest 
in human capital through training to improve the productive capacity of their 
employees. Although such investment (training) may be specific or general, in Becker's 
terminology, it is the employers who pay for the costs of training. Both employers and 
employees recoup the benefits of training. The respondents stated that more educated 
workers tend to invest more through (on-the-job) training. The results of a logistic 
model using data from quantitative questionnaires support such an argument. It seems 
that training is seen as a complement to other kinds of investment in human capital 
14 The estimated earnings functions for a large firm (employing 2200 workers) show that receiving 
training increases hourly earnings by 3.5 percent, after controlling for other factors (i.e. S, S2, X, X2, SX, 
and M) affecting earnings. This finding indicates that training is a good investment for employees as well. 
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(education and experience) in the sense that it provides the trainees with appropriate 
skills, which enable them to perform a specific job more efficiently. 
7.7 Extreme Values and Outliers 
In chapters 5 and 6 we studied earnings variation among employees in the context 
of human capital theory. Our data collected through questionnaires enabled us to 
evaluate the effects of the main human capital variables and some firm characteristics 
on earnings. Although including such variables enabled us to explain a large part of 
earnings differentials, there is still a part of earnings variation that remains unexplained. 
Of course, one explanation for such an unexplained part would be ascribable to 
randomness and chance. However, randomness or chance is not the whole answer. 
There might be some other factors that cause the variation but were not included in the 
analyses. The omission of such factors from an analysis may also lead to a situation 
where an observation(s) is far removed from the rest of the observations. Such an 
observation is called an outlier or extreme value. (Maddala, 1992: 89) In this section, an 
attempt is made to explain such possible factors causing earnings variation, which were 
not included in the earnings functions. For that purpose, the omitted factors are divided 
into two parts; the first relates to firm level variables, and the second to employees'. 
Another classification can be made for the variables of each level of analysis; that is, the 
variables that were included in the questionnaires (but not in the analyses) and the 
variables that were not. 
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For both levels of analysis, the variables included in the questionnaires are 
training, shift work, night work, difficulty of task, job (heterogeneity), and subject of 
study at employee level, and accommodation benefits and working in a difficult 
atmosphere at firm leve1.15 Data on these variables were not provided by all firms, so 
that we could not incorporate the variables in the earnings functions, to account for 
earnings variation due to such factors. However, running a separate earnings function 
for a firm providing such data shows that these variables are important earnings 
determinants.16 In some cases data were given, but the extent of variation and diversity 
of variables especially among units of level 2 (firms), are so complicated and wide that 
the application of the simple dummy variable technique, which was considered to deal 
with such factors, was not adequate. 
During interviews, we asked the respondents to give an explanation for the 
unexplained part and the outliers. Almost all interviewees highlighted the importance of 
human capital variables and the above mentioned factors. They also stated that there are 
some other elements, such as accommodation loans, occasional rewards, non-pecuniary 
benefits, pay for performance, kind of jobs, and payment in kind that may account for 
outliers or the unexplained part. That is, some but not all firms provide accommodation 
loans or cheap accommodation for some employees. Some firms give their employees 
15 More discussion is given in chapter 3. 
16 For instance, using an Mincerian earnings function, it was found that (i) a shift worker earned 6.1 
percent more than a non-shift worker, (ii) a night-work employee was paid 4 percent more than a day-
work employee, and (iii) an employee who received training during 1995 earned 4 percent more than his 
counterpart not receiving training. It is worth noting that the inclusion of such factors does not weaken the 
estimated effects of schooling and experience on earnings. We shall discuss this in further detail later on. 
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the products of their own company free or at a discounted price. To create an 
atmosphere encouraging hard work, employers offer special rewards to some 
enthusiastic workers. Such rewards may be pecuniary or non-pecuniary, such as an 
announcement in a newspaper and/or a letter of commendation. Specific workers, such 
as security officers, have to stay for longer hours at work. This leads to decreasing their 
hourly earnings, which were calculated by "annual earnings divided by annual hours 
worked". Some personnel, especially those working at the top management level, have 
to stay longer than the usual hours of work but their actual hours of work may be more 
than their recorded hours of work. This in turn leads to overstating the hourly earnings 
for such employees. It is reported that the wages/salaries of some employees directly 
relate to their performance, especially in the case of salesmen. Sometimes the efforts of 
such employees, or some external factors, may create extra-ordinary payment 
variations. 
All such factors inevitably contribute to earnings variation, and their omission 
from an earnings function may lead to making outliers, mainly at the employee level, 
and their effects are left to the error term.17 However, it should be acknowledged that 
measuring some of the factors is difficult, and incorporating all quantifiable variables 
for a large number of firms and employees is indeed a difficult and almost an 
impossible task. The omission of such factors may affect the estimates of human capital 
variables. In other words, the estimated earnings functions would face the problem of 
17 As Maddala (1992: 64) points out, the error term is a catchall for the effects of all omitted variables, 
some of which may not even be quantifiable, and some of which may not even be identifiable. 
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misspecification, which in turn may lead to bias in the estimates. The extent of bias 
depends on the correlation between the human capital variables, which are included, and 
the omitted ones. 
We can classify the omitted variables into two groups. One may be attributed to 
the employee level, such as occasional rewards, shift work, night work, etc. and the 
other to the firm level, such as cheap or loan accommodation, location of firm in a 
difficult atmosphere, and/or payment in kind. This latter group, in fact, creates cluster 
effects; for example, employees may accept a lower wage/salary if they receive cheap 
accommodation or payment in kind, and vice versa. In other words, an employee may 
receive lower wage/salary in a firm where free or cheap accommodation is provided for 
the employees. The multilevel technique, however, deals with such cluster effects. 
The situation of the first group of variables is slightly different. That is, some 
variables are positively correlated with human capital variables and others negatively. 
The evaluation of the sum of bias due to omitted variables needs to be investigated 
empirically. However, it seems that most of the variables are negatively correlated with 
human capital variables. For example, using a sub-sample of observations, we found 
that employees who were shift workers or chose to work at night were less educated and 
experienced employees. In other words, the probability of being a shift worker 
decreases with higher levels of education and more experience. Therefore, it is likely 
242 
that the omission of such variables understates the effects of human capital variables on 
earnings.' 8 
7.8 Summary and Conclusion 
In sum, we have presented information and evidence derived from interviews, 
reflecting the viewpoint of the representatives of employers, that education is initially 
regarded as a sorting device. Employees are paid more because, as the respondents 
stated, they are more productive. However, this does not provide evidence for the notion 
that education improves productivity, since both human capital theory and screening 
hypotheses predict that the more educated are more productive than the less educated. 
Therefore, the next question that was addressed in interviews is whether education 
improves productivity. Such a question would provide direct evaluation by employers 
about the productivity-augmenting role of education. In that respect, employers, 
drawing from their observations and experience in the work place, acknowledged that 
education improves the productive capacity of employees. The contribution of 
employers to paying their employees' tuition fees studying at higher educational 
institutions could also be regarded as evidence that supports the argument. 
18 As mentioned earlier, footnote 16, using a sub-sample of observations, we estimated the effects of 
training, shift work, and night work on earnings and found that the variables affect earnings positively. 
After including the variables in an earnings function, the estimated effects of education and experience 
increase slightly. 
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For different jobs employers demand different educational qualifications, and it is 
not the case that more education is always preferred, as implied by screening 
hypotheses. On the contrary, attaining a degree does not guarantee a job. For a specific 
job, employers usually select their prospective employees from a group of candidates 
with the same educational qualifications. Besides, education is not the only means of 
investment in human capital. Learning through experience and training on or off the job 
are also other methods of investment, and these methods are regarded as complements 
to education and as productive factors. 
In the case of experience, two kinds of experience, internal and external, were 
recognised. Although both kinds of experience are viewed as productivity-enhancing 
factors, internal experience was reported as more relevant to current jobs and more 
productive. As the earnings function analyses showed, internal experience is, therefore, 
rewarded more than external experience. 
Data presented in this chapter suggest that employers have a strong view on the 
importance and usefulness of training for productivity, which is consistent with 
Becker's training theory. However, screening hypotheses fail to provide an explanation 
for such an investment in human capital. 
Employers provide training and pay for such investments, for both general and 
specific training. This empirical evidence may apparently contradict the second part of 
Becker's theory of training, which predicts that trainees should pay the cost of general 
training. In fact, it is the employer who recoups the benefits of training and other kinds 
of investment in human capital through establishing an internal labour market and 
244 
contracts that prevent employees from quitting their current firm. This suggests that the 
issue of potential mobility rather than the generality of training is the main concern of 
employers when they finance and provide training. However, almost all respondents 
highlighted the point that to motivate employees and to benefit from the effects of 
training on productivity they do share the benefits of training with the employees who 
received training. The results of an earnings function using a sub-sample of employees 
also support such an argument. 
As the respondents stated, the employers expect to recoup the benefits of training 
in the current period as well as in the future. This empirical evidence, which is 
consistent with the theoretical explanation by Becker, has an empirical implication in 
the sense that to evaluate the benefits of training one has to incorporate the effects of 
training during all periods, otherwise the benefits of training would be understated. 
Overall, although this qualitative analysis cannot be regarded as a thorough test of 
human capital theory versus screening hypotheses about the productivity-augmenting 
role of investment in human capital, in general, and in education, in particular, the 
results tend to support the human capital view. It may not be possible to generalise this 
key point to the whole labour market; however, it can be held for the case of profit-
maximising firms, specifically in the manufacturing sector, which select their 
employees from a large number of candidates. 
Moreover, it seems that employers expect that investments in human capital 
contribute, at least, to the cognitive knowledge, (psychomotor) skills and effective 
behavioural traits of an individual, such a classification of educational objectives was 
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provided by Bloom in 1956. (Cited in Blaug, 1990:12-13) The extent to which 
education, experience, or training affects such characteristics are different, and 
education seems to affect mainly cognitive knowledge and effective behavioural traits, 
while experience and training mainly affect skills. Perhaps, due to such specifications, 
employers regard education, experience, and training as complementary. Little 
attention, however, has been paid to such a consideration about the elements of human 
capital. Our methods in this chapter can also provide a conceptual framework for further 
in-depth and qualitative investigations. 
Some possible explanations were presented in the last section of this chapter in 
connection with the unexplained part of earnings variation and with extreme values. It 
was demonstrated that there are still other factors that affect earnings. As discussed, 
some of the variables may create a cluster effect. Others may be correlated with human 
capital variables, either negatively or positively. Measuring and incorporating all of 
these factors in an analysis is an almost impossible task. This implies that the estimates 
of human capital variables derived from an earnings function would face the problem of 
misspecification and potential bias. The precise and final bias due to omitted variables 
needs to be investigated empirically. However, it seems that most of the variables are 
negatively correlated with human capital variables. Therefore, it is likely that the 
omission of such variables understates the effects of human capital variables on 
earnings, as demonstrated for the cases of training, shift work, and night work. 
Moreover, the multilevel technique can help a researcher to deal with such complexity, 
in particular in connection with the variables that affect the cluster effect. However 
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collecting data that enables a researcher to conduct, for example, a five level method of 
analysis remains the main issue. 
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Chapter 8 Summary and Conclusions 
Economists have long been interested in the questions why do individuals invest in 
themselves? and Do investments in human capital explain earnings variation among 
individuals? We adopted the human capital hypothesis, arguing that an individual 
undergoes and pays for educational activities for the sake of future economic benefits, 
particularly earnings. One of the aims of this study, therefore, is to investigate the extent 
to which investments in human capital contribute to increasing earnings in the 
manufacturing sector in Iran. For that purpose, both the OLS and multilevel techniques 
were employed. In particular, it was of interest to examine the advantages of the new 
technique of multilevel modelling for the human capital analysis of earnings 
differentials. Attempts were also made to examine the question why investments in 
human capital increase earnings. 
This chapter presents the main findings and conclusions of the thesis. The first 
two sections evaluate the findings in relation to the aims of the thesis and to economic 
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theory. The third section considers the policy implications derived from the empirical 
findings. And in the final section areas for further research are identified. 
8.1 Human Capital and Earnings 
8.1.1 Summary of Remarks 
As the literature reviewed in chapter 2 showed, the notion of human capital stems 
from the ideas of Adam Smith, who identified the improvement of workers' skills (e.g., 
through education) as a source of personal incomes which partly explains earnings 
differentials. However, in the 1930s empirical investigations were conducted in this 
area. For example, the work of Walsh (1935) investigated whether expenditures 
incurred by persons for professional careers were a capital investment made in a profit-
seeking and an equalising market, and in response to the same motives that lead to 
investments in conventional capital. In the early 1960s this notion entered the 
mainstream of economic literature, when Schultz (1961) in his inaugural lecture to the 
American Economic Association analysed educational expenditure as a form of 
investment, and by Becker's book with the title of Human Capital (1964). In this 
Becker developed a theory of human capital formation and analysed returns to 
investments in human capital. 
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The basic idea of the human capital approach is that variations in the earnings of 
employees are due, in part, to differences in employee quality in terms of the amount of 
human capital acquired through education, on-the-job learning, and training. 
Since that time very many attempts have been devoted to test the key notions of 
human capital theory. In particular, using earnings functions, efforts have been made to 
establish a relationship between education, training and earnings and, in turn, to 
evaluate the returns to education and training.' Generally speaking, the results of all 
studies support the existence of an association between more education and higher 
earnings. Such finding has been regarded as evidence indicating that education and (on-
the-job) training are good investments, which are rewarded by pecuniary benefits in the 
labour market. 
However, in the manufacturing sector of Iran no study has been conducted that 
investigates earnings differentials in the context of human capital theory. Therefore, the 
first research question which this thesis investigates is "whether and to what extent 
education and training contribute to increasing earnings in the specific case of 
manufacturing sector in Iran". 
As presented in chapter 2, the conventional evaluation of returns to education and 
the contribution of education and training (experience) to increasing earnings, derived 
from the Mincerian earnings function, has been questioned because it ignores, among 
Some of the most well known are the studies by Mincer (1958, 1974), Psacharopoulos (1973, 1981, 
1985), Psacharopoulos and Williams (1973), Psacharopoulos and Layard (1979), Becker (1962, 1993), 
Schultz (1961, 1962), Carnoy (1995), Griffin et al. (1996), Kingdon (1997) and Cooper and Cohn (1997). 
250 
other factors, the quality of education (Griliches, 1977; Betts, 1995), ability (Griliches, 
1977; Fagerlind, 1987), employer size (Siebert and Addison, 1991, cited in Polachek 
and Siebert, 1993; Idson, 1995; Velenchik, 1997), team work (Idson, 1995), and 
geographical aggregation (Bisdsall and Behrman, 1984; Griffin and Edwards, 1993; and 
Velenchik, 1997). It has been argued that ignoring these factors leads to bias in 
estimating the returns to education and training. In this study, an attempt was also made 
to examine whether such criticisms held for the case of the manufacturing sector in Iran. 
Moreover, reviewing the literature, we found that little attention has been devoted 
to assessing the efficiency of the conventional OLS estimates that rely on data 
dominated by a hierarchical structure. This is in fact the main concern of the new 
technique of multilevel analysis, whose supporters argue that in a hierarchical structure 
the OLS estimators are not efficient (Goldstein, 1995). As argued in chapter 3, data 
collected to investigate earnings differentials in the context of human capital theory are 
dominated by a hierarchical or clustered structure in the sense that the units grouped at 
different levels, and the relationship between dependent and independent variables 
varies from one group to another. In relation to such issues, the literature reviewed in 
chapter 2 showed that the effect of human capital variables on earnings is different 
across different geographical areas (e.g., Chiswick, 1974; Velenchik, 1997), economic 
sectors (e.g., Mincer and Higuchi, 1988; and Velenchik, 1997), etc. Dummy variable 
technique has been used to deal with such differences and variations. No systematic 
analysis, however, has been conducted through applying varying coefficient models to 
investigate such a varying structure. Little effort, if any, has been made to examine 
whether the variation of the coefficients of the human capital variable is explainable, for 
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example, by the characteristics of firms. These aspects of the evaluation of human 
capital variables on earnings led us to address the second main research question: 
"whether a multilevel statistical analysis is a more appropriate approach than the 
conventional OLS one for evaluating the effects of education and training (experience) 
on earnings". 
We attempted, as elaborated in chapter 3, to incorporate such heterogeneities 
across the groups/clusters (i.e., firms) into the empirical analyses of earnings through 
employing the multilevel technique. In particular, we chose employees as the basic units 
of analysis, which are clustered in firms. In this consideration, it was assumed that 
employees influence and are influenced by firms. This enabled us to categorise the 
determinants of earnings into two groups: the characteristics of employees and those of 
firms. Education, experience, and management were included in earnings functions as 
the characteristics of employees, and size of firm, geographical location, industry as 
those of firms. This latter group of variables was described as the conventional firm 
variables. The cluster analysis also allowed us to include contextual variables such as 
the average stock of human capital and average hours worked in each firm. In particular, 
the average stock of human capital enabled us partly to deal with the issue of the 
monetary externality of human capital density, which has long been of interest to 
economists. So far little empirical evidence, if any, has been provided about such 
monetary externalities. (Blaug, 1990; Schultz, 1993; and McMahon, 1997) 
The contribution of years of schooling to earnings across different levels of 
education is conventionally assumed to be constant (Mincer, 1974: 11). However, it is 
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more plausible to assume that the coefficient of schooling depends on levels of 
education in the sense that one extra year of schooling at different levels of education 
improves the earnings capacity of an individual differently, from the viewpoint of the 
supply side. From the demand side, the extent to which technological developments 
may affect the demand for educational qualifications is not necessarily constant across 
time. Besides, in a cross-section method of analysis the units of analysis (i.e., 
employees) are not necessarily homogenous (apart from the conventional human capital 
variables). For example, employees may have had different opportunities (i.e., 
heterogeneity in innate ability, finance and social background) to invest in themselves. 
They may also have experienced different qualities of education during their schooling 
as well as post-schooling investment. All these heterogeneities affect human capital 
accumulation and in turn earnings capacity, which are hardly captured by the 
conventional years of schooling variable. 
Finally, it is well established that more educated workers tend to invest more 
through training and experience, in comparison with the less educated. In that respect 
empirical studies show a lot of controversy. Moreover, most of the empirical studies 
have used the estimated instead of actual years of experience to account for earnings 
differentials attributable to on-the-job training. Little work has been done to evaluate the 
relevancy of such a measurement in the context of a country like Iran. 
Data on the characteristics of 15755 employees clustered in 35 firms from the 
manufacturing sector in Iran was collected, and both the single-level technique and the 
multilevel methodology were employed to examine the research questions and the 
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issues of interest. The main findings and implications are presented in the following 
section. 
8.1.2 Empirical Findings and Implications 
With regard to the first research question, it was found that the amount of 
education and experience is significantly and systematically associated with earnings of 
the employees. That is, more educated (experienced) employees receive more earnings 
than less educated (experienced) ones. The association between higher education and 
experience and higher earnings (i) provides evidence that individuals have rational and 
optimising, rather than random, behaviour in investing in themselves, as economic 
theory predicts, and (ii) tends to corroborate the notion that human capital acquired 
through education and experience improving the earnings capacity of individuals is 
subject to economic benefits. These benefits and in turn the profitability of education 
would justify borrowing money for investment in human capital. 
Using a single-level method of analysis (OLS), we demonstrated that both human 
capital and firm variables contribute significantly to increasing earnings. The findings of 
human capital variables indicate that human capital theory is an important tool for 
studying earnings differentials in the manufacturing sector, and are consistent with other 
empirical analyses of earnings in the context of human capital theory. It can be 
concluded, therefore, that the manufacturing labour market in Iran functions much like 
labour markets elsewhere. To the extent that the Iranian manufacturing labour market 
differs from others, it is a difference in degree, not a difference in kind. 
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The findings of firm variables support the criticisms of the basic Mincerian 
earnings function, which argue that the function ignores the firm variables and other 
earnings determinants and, therefore, provides biased estimates of education and 
experience on earnings. 
The multilevel approach, besides evaluating the contributions of schooling and 
experience to earnings, enabled us (i) to test if data used are dominated by a hierarchical 
structure, (ii) to decompose and to evaluate earnings variation attributable to individual 
and firm levels, and (iii) to provide evidence for the pecuniary externality effect of 
human capital on earnings. 
Based on the multilevel estimates, about 47% of earnings variation is attributed to 
the firm level, and the employee level accounts for 53% of the variation. This finding 
highlights the issue of the hierarchical structure of data used, and the point that firm 
characteristics are also important determinants of earnings. The firm variables echo the 
importance of the demand for (the services of) human capital, which influences the 
earnings. 
Besides the existence of a high intra-unit correlation, as presented in chapter 6, the 
results of multilevel analysis confirm that the effects of education and experience on 
earnings vary across the selected companies. All this empirical evidence indicates that 
data used are dominated by a hierarchical structure. Therefore, the OLS estimates are 
not efficient and employing an earnings function for overall observations under an OLS 
methodology misleads us in the testing of hypotheses. In Table 6.3, Model 1 (chapter 6) 
it was shown that when we employ an OLS methodology most coefficients for firm 
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variables employed in this study (i.e., size of firm, geographical location, and economic 
sector variables) and interaction between these variables and years of schooling and 
years of experience significantly affect the earnings of employees. Conventionally, one 
may interpret the results to conclude that employees whose firm, for example, is located 
in large cities like Tehran earn 17.4% more than their counterparts working in firms 
located in small cities. However, once the coefficients for years of schooling and years 
of experience are considered as random coefficients varying across firms, as in Model 3, 
all the variables, except the interaction between years of schooling and size, 
geographical location and economic sector, change to become insignificant. That is, 
under Model 3 employing the multilevel methodology, neither size of firm, 
geographical location, and economic sector nor their interactions with years of 
experience can significantly explain earnings differentials across the firms. Therefore, 
OLS estimates not only failed to evaluate earnings differentials attributed to the firm's 
characteristics and in turn to explore the real explanatory variables at firm level, but also 
misled us in the testing of hypotheses. 
A positive and non-linear relationship is found between years of schooling and 
earnings. That is, the contribution of years of schooling to earnings varies with the 
levels of education. For example, an extra year of schooling at tertiary level contributes 
more to earnings than an extra year at secondary level (5.5% in comparison with 4.7%, 
derived from Model 4, Table 6.6). The same results have recently been reported by 
Dougherty and Jimenez (1991), Kingdon (1997), Arias and McMahon (1997) and Light 
(1998). These findings provide evidence that: 
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1. Higher levels of education are more vocationalised than lower levels, in the sense 
that students are taught the subjects which are relatively more relevant to performing 
a job. (Machlup, 1984, and Williams, 1985, make the same point.) 
2. A student studying at a higher level of education can invest more in him/herself 
compared to a student studying at secondary or primary level. It is expected that this 
extra capability of accumulation of human capital, in turn, improves earnings 
capacity.2 
3. There is also a demand-side implication in the sense that demand for human capital 
has probably been growing more, relative to the supply of more educated workers. 
This would lead to increasing earnings in the labour market in favour of more highly 
educated employees. 
Our findings regarding the effect of years of experience on earnings confirm 
previous empirical work. That is, the earnings function is concave in experience, as is 
suggested by human capital theory. According to this theory, as Mincer (1979: 5) states, 
the life-cycle growth of earnings reflects the rate of accumulation of personal 
investments, indicating that much investment in the individual is concentrated at 
younger ages. The investments may increase initially, but continue at a diminishing rate 
through the rest of the working life. This behaviour is due to the fact that (i) the cost of 
investment, especially earnings forgone, increases through the life cycle, and (ii) young 
This point was initially addressed by Bowman (1961) and so far, to my knowledge, little attention, if 
any, has been paid to such an important issue in empirical (human capital) analysis of earnings. 
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people have greater opportunity to collect the return to their investment over more 
years. 
The well-known Mincerian earnings function and most other empirical studies 
employing the earnings function assume that individuals start their working lives 
immediately after graduation. Our data about actual years of experience enabled us to 
evaluate the validity of such an assumption. We found that individuals with different 
educational levels experienced different (un)employment patterns; the more educated 
experienced a shorter unemployment period after graduation than the less educated. 
Such a pattern seems to be plausible for all countries experiencing a high rate of 
unemployment, especially for developing countries.3 As a consequence, including the 
estimated, instead of actual, years of experience in an earnings function would overstate 
the effect of experience on earnings, as demonstrated in chapter 6. 
A positive relation is also found between the effects of years of schooling and 
years of experience on earnings. The contribution of an extra year of schooling for an 
employee with a higher education degree (i.e. S=16) and 10 years of experience is 4.8 
percent. The equivalent figure for a person with the same level of education and 30 
years of experience is 6.3 percent. Likewise, the marginal effect of experience on 
earnings increases with years of schooling; an extra year of experience for an employee 
with 8 years of schooling and 10 years of experience increases earnings by 2.5 percent. 
3 In the case of Egypt Arabsheibani (1996) notes the same point. 
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The equivalent figure for the person with 16 years of schooling is 3.3 percent.4 These 
findings provide evidence concerning the point that more educated workers may accept 
relatively lower levels of wage/salary at the beginning of their working life in return for 
better learning prospects, and that the more educated invest more in themselves through 
experience and on-the-job training. Employing a logistic model using data from a sub-
sample, we also found that the more educated employees were more likely to invest in 
training than the less educated. The findings also highlight the fact that education, 
training and experience are complementary rather than substitutable. Our qualitative 
analysis also supports the point. 
As mentioned earlier, due to the heterogeneity of human capital among the 
employees, holding years of schooling, years of experience, and management constant, 
there are still some earnings variation attributable to partly un-observable elements of 
human capital such as the quality of schooling and experience. It should be 
acknowledged that collecting data about the quality of education and experience is a 
difficult task and we could not collect data for such elements of human capital in order 
to evaluate their effect on earnings; however, the multilevel technique helped us to 
evaluate the overall effect of such unobservable variables on earnings differentials. For 
that purpose, we considered the coefficients for years of schooling and years of 
experience as random coefficients varying among the employees. Our statistical tests 
support such assumptions. This finding provides two implications for econometric and 
4 The findings presented here are average contribution of schooling and experience to earnings. The 
effects vary across the firms that will be discussed later. 
259 
economic theory. One is, it indicates that the earnings functions employed face the 
problems of heteroscedasticity5 and misspecification partly due to omission of the 
unobservable variables, which are associated with years of schooling and years of 
experience. 
The other is the fact that unobservable elements of human capital have a 
significant effect on earnings and productivity, which is of interest to employers too. In 
other words, it indicates that employers choose their prospective employees from a 
homogenous group of candidates (in terms of educational level) but in their selection 
they focus on the specific elements of human capital, such as the quality of education 
and experience. 
As mentioned earlier, the multilevel analysis of earnings showed that the 
relationship between earnings and human capital variables varies across the firms. The 
implications of the varying effects of education and experience on earnings can be 
illuminated in two dimensions; the first is to conclude that education and experience are 
more productive in some firms than in others. This variation in productivity may be due 
to chance/randomness and/or the fact that there are some factors (i.e., firm level 
variables), which are significantly associated with productivity. We have attempted to 
incorporate the firm level variables in an earnings function to find out whether these 
variables account for such higher productivity. Among the firm variables, as classified 
into the conventional and contextual variables in chapter 6, only the contextual 
5 The same findings reported by Dougherty and Jimenez (1993) and Akbari and Ogwang (1996). 
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variables, that is average stock of human capital and average hours of work in each 
firm, could significantly explain, in part, the varying structure of earnings across the 
selected companies.6 The findings of the multilevel analysis, therefore, highlight the 
importance of human capital variables and weaken the role of non-human capital 
variables in the determination of earnings. This supports the view that human capital 
theory is a powerful tool in explaining earnings differentials. 
As mentioned above, the contextual variables, in particular the average stock of 
human capital in a firm, explain in part the variation of earnings across the firms. For 
example, we found that an employee working in a firm with an extra unit of average 
stock of human capital earns some 2% more than his counterpart in a firm with a lower 
average human capital. This interesting finding sheds light on the issue of the monetary 
externality effect of investments in human capital. It can be inferred that more highly 
educated and experienced workers would be attracted to firms with a higher average 
stock of human capital, and not necessarily to larger firms, because they would also 
benefit from the externality of human capital density of their working place. Regarding 
the other dimension, it can be inferred that in a situation where investments in human 
capital are more productive an individual would have a stronger motivation to invest in 
himself, especially through experience and on/off-the-job training. 
6 It is worthwhile noting that increasing the number of observations at level 2 (i.e., firms) would provide a 
better base to evaluate the extent to which the conventional firm variables would explain earnings 
variation attributed to the firm level. 
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Overall, our findings, derived from the quantitative analysis, confirm the existence 
of a hierarchical organisation in data derived from the case study which investigated a 
relatively homogenous set of firms. As a result, the OLS estimates were found 
unreliable for the hypothesis testing. Thus, in a case where firms are selected from a 
relatively heterogeneous set of firms clustered within different economic sectors, the 
matter of hierarchical structure may be more apparent. (Due to resource limitations we 
were not able to collect such a data set.) Indeed, when one includes other dimensions 
such as the variations of return to education across different time spans and different 
jobs, the hierarchical effects would be more important to consider in an analysis for the 
purpose of policy implications. 
As discussed in chapter 7, some other earnings determinants, which we thought of 
as important in the analysis of earnings in the manufacturing sector, were included in 
the questionnaires; but only some firms provided data on these factors. As a result, we 
were not able to include all of the important variables influencing earnings for all 
observations. However, running earnings functions using a sub-sample of data showed 
that they significantly affect earnings and correlate with other human capital variables. 
The omission of such variables may lead to bias in the estimates of education and 
experience variables. For example, the omission of some of the variables, such as 
training, may overstate the coefficients of education and experience variables and the 
omission of others, such as shift work and night work, may understate the coefficients. 
The sum of positive and negative effects of the omitted variables on the coefficients 
needs to be investigated empirically. Where appropriate data is not available, it is 
difficult to make an assumption about the downward or upward effect of the omitted 
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variables on the coefficients of human capital variables included in the analysis. 
Practically it may be impossible to include all of the important variables in an earnings 
function; however we should be cautious about the precision of the estimates. 
8.2 Human Capital Theory and Screening Hypotheses 
Regardless of the fact that there exists a strong association between higher 
education and higher earnings from an individual standpoint, the reason why (higher) 
education leads to higher earnings has long been debated between human capital 
theorists and the supporters of the screening hypothesis. The human capital view holds 
that education provides the cognitive, behavioural and manual capacities that increase 
productivity on the job and therefore earnings. In contrast, in the screening and 
signalling theories of Arrow (1973), Spence (1974), and Stiglitz (1975) education is an 
indicator of pre-existing ability. That is, more able individuals invest in education to 
signal their higher abilities, and employers, therefore, use educational qualifications to 
select more able individuals in the absence of any better information, but education 
itself does not contribute to productivity. Several attempts have been made to study 
empirically the claims of human capital theory and its rival hypotheses through 
employing various research methods sudh as investigating the relation between 
education and productivity in agriculture (e.g., Welch, 1970; Lockheed, 1987) and 
industry (e.g., Fuller, 1970; Min, 1987 cited in Carnoy, 1994); comparing earnings of 
the self-employed as non-screened group with those of the employed as screened group 
(e.g., Wolpin, 1977; Riley, 1979; Katz and Ziderman, 1980; Grubb, 1993; Arabsheibani 
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and Rees, 1998); and examining supervisors' ratings of their subordinates as a 
productivity criterion (Medoff and Abraham, 1981). 
As argued in chapter 2 and 7, these studies at best provided evidence that the more 
educated are paid more because they are more productive. They do not, however, 
address whether this higher productivity is because of the higher ability of the more 
educated, as screening hypotheses predict, or the productivity-augmenting role of 
education. As discussed in chapter 7, little attention has been devoted to the core of the 
debate, that is why employers are willing to pay more to more highly educated workers 
and whether they actually observe and, therefore, consider education as a productivity-
enhancing element. In our qualitative analysis, we extended the debate from the specific 
case of education to the case of "education, experience, and training". 
In that connection we interviewed the representatives of ten firms who have been 
involved in making and implementing wage and employment policies in their own 
companies. Data derived from these interviews were used to shed light on the third 
research question: whether the contribution of education and training is due to the 
productivity-augmenting role of education or education serves only as a filter to identify 
abler workers. 
In chapter 7 we presented information and evidence derived from the views of 
interviewees. Overall, we found that education is initially regarded as a sorting device, 
even though an imperfect one. That is, for a particular job, employers would request 
certain educational qualifications, given that other factors are the same. However, the 
responses of employers showed that the real situation is not a simple case that for a 
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particular job, employers face a queue of candidates with different educational 
qualifications. In fact, as interviewees pointed out, a certain educational qualification is 
necessary to perform a particular job. The educational qualifications of the candidates 
for such jobs are relatively homogenous and, therefore, the results cast doubt on the 
claim of the screening hypothesis that education merely serves as a screening device. 
Moreover, if the role of education were only sorting and screening, employers would 
always prefer to invite the more educated for any job. In reality, however, they request 
different educational qualifications for different jobs. It is also implied that there would 
not be any other selection device such as an interview or the temporary employment 
(i.e., probationary) period in which employers assess the performance of employees for 
final selection. 
More importantly, in the view of employers education improves the productive 
capacity of employees. The contribution of employers to paying the tuition fees of their 
employees studying at higher educational institutions could be regarded as evidence to 
support the argument. That is, if education did not contribute to improve productive 
capacity, employers would not be willing to contribute to the payment of the tuition fees 
of their employees who have already passed the selection process. 
Although the key point of the productivity-augmenting effect of education may 
not be generalisable to the whole labour market and the small number of interviewees 
may make us cautious about the generalisability of the results, it may be held for the 
case of profit-maximising firms, specifically in the manufacturing sector, that the 
employers select their employees from a large number of candidates. However, this 
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does not mean that attaining a degree guarantees a job. For a specific job, employers 
usually select their prospective employees from a group of candidates with the same 
educational qualification. Besides, education is not the only means of investment in 
human capital. Learning through experience and training are also other sources of 
investments, which are mainly regarded as complements to education. 
Experience is also a productivity-enhancing element, in the view of employers. 
The effect of experience on productivity is different across different places of work and 
different jobs. Human capital acquired through internal experience is reported to be 
more effective than external experience in increasing productivity. We have also found 
that the accumulation of human capital through learning and training on the job varies 
across jobs. Moreover, learning opportunities in any particular job seem to be limited. 
Therefore, it is inferred that the internal labour market is an important process for 
improving the accumulation of human capital through on-the-job learning and training 
and, in turn, productivity. From the viewpoint of an employee, it is expected that this 
variation contributes to earnings differentials, as human capital predicts. To take into 
account such variations and to evaluate the economic benefits of these investments, 
years of experience, conventionally used in empirical studies, is a very crude proxy 
measurement. We attempted to collect data on job characteristics to deal with the 
heterogeneities; however, we were not able to collect appropriate data about the jobs for 
all observations used in the analyses. Considering the coefficients for years of schooling 
and of experience as random ones varying across level 1 units, as we did in the 
quantitative and multilevel analysis, should be regarded as a beginning in that respect. It 
could help us to find out that such heterogeneities exist. However, a more detailed 
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evaluation of the economic benefits attributed to heterogeneity in human capital 
accumulation across the jobs needs more detailed data about job characteristics and the 
application of a multilevel of analysis with an extra level of analysis (e.g., a three level 
model). 
Our qualitative analysis also showed that employers provide training and pay for 
the cost of such investments, in both general and specific training, because such 
investments are seen as productive. This empirical evidence may apparently contradict 
Becker's theory of training, which predicts that trainees who recoup the benefits of 
general training should pay the cost of general training. In fact, it is the employer who 
recoups the benefits of training and other kinds of investment in human capital, through 
establishing contracts and an internal labour market that prevent employees from 
quitting their current firm. Therefore, as Ziderman (1978) states, it is the potential 
mobility rather than the generality of training, which is the main concern of employers 
when they finance and provide training. The benefits of spending on human resources 
through training would justify such firm investment behaviour. 
However, almost all respondents highlighted the point that to motivate employees 
and to benefit from the effects of training on productivity they do share the benefits of 
training with their employees through promotion and increasing the earnings of 
employees who receive training. (The results of an earnings function using a sub-sample 
of observations support this view.) Such benefits would also provide evidence that skills 
acquired through training are good investments for employees as well. 
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8.3 Policy Implications 
The main policy implications on the issues of investment in human capital in Iran 
can be summarised as follows: 
(i) Our findings derived from both qualitative and quantitative analyses tend to 
confirm the productivity-augmenting role of investments in human capital, 
in general, and education, in particular. It can justify, therefore, investment 
in human capital by both individuals and society. Unlike most other 
empirical studies, however, we did not intend to interpret the coefficient of 
schooling as the rate of return to education for two reasons: (a) the issue of 
other benefits and direct costs of education, which vary between levels of 
education and are ignored in the estimates, and (b) the misspecification of 
the basic Mincerian earnings function for the case of the manufacturing 
sector of Iran. These imply a caveat about the estimates of the rates of return 
to education derived from the function for the purpose of policy 
implications and allocation resources, for example, between investment in 
human capital or physical capital.' 
(ii) Besides education, experience and training were found to be two other 
important and productive elements of human capital, which are 
Akbari and Ogwang (1996) highlight the same issue for the case of Canada. That is, the results of their 
study, as they state, question the validity of past policy recommendations based on Mincer type of 
earnings functions in Canada. 
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complements to education. It seems, at least for the units of the sector, most 
training is provided and financed by the employers, which limits the 
mobility potential of employees. Government can contribute to providing 
and financing training especially towards the needs of manufacturing units, 
which have a higher priority. This policy would also help workers to receive 
training outside their working place that enables them to have more choice 
to select their future employers. The issue of complementary of education 
and training also implies that there is room for encouraging technical and 
vocational education especially at higher education level. 
(iii) It was found that an extra year of schooling at higher level of education 
increases earnings more in comparison with secondary or primary 
education. To improve the individual earnings capacity, in particular for the 
poor, investment in human capital is an important mechanism. It would help 
the redistribution of income in the society. 
(iv) The varying coefficient structure at the employee level echoes the existence 
of inequality in both abilities (demand) and opportunities (supply) as well as 
the quality of education. Evidence as such shows that there is room for 
government to implement policies for the sake of equity, especially 
regarding the allocation of educational budget, and quality improvement. 
(v) As the results of the multilevel analysis showed, human capital investments 
are rewarded differently across the firms. This may be regarded as evidence 
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on the fact that the economic agents operate under an imperfect competition 
market which dominates the economy. As economic theory predicts, there is 
a degree of under-utilisation of resources in the imperfect, in comparison 
with perfect, competition market. Therefore, encouraging competition 
among the agents would provide a situation for more efficient use of 
resources. 
(vi) The variation of effect of education and experience on earnings across firms 
also implies that investment in human capital is more productive in some 
economic agents than in others. There is room, therefore, to explore the 
causes of such higher productivity and to encourage other agents to 
implement the more appropriate methods of allocation of resources. 
(vii) The application of the new technique of multilevel modelling enabled us, in 
part, to incorporate the heterogeneity, which is involved in the accumulation 
of human capital and earnings differentials, in the analyses. The results, in 
comparison with those of the OLS methodology, provide a rather different 
explanation of determinants of earnings, and strengthen the explanatory 
power of human capital theory. In other words, it seems the results are 
sensitive to the methods of analysis used, which implies that a degree of 
caution should be made concerning the precision and reliability of estimates, 
in particular those derived from the OLS techniques. 
270 
8.4 Directions for Further Research 
(i) As the findings from the multilevel analysis showed, there is a great degree 
of heterogeneity in the real world. To study the economic benefits of 
investment in human capital, especially using data from a nation-wide 
survey or census, the application of a multilevel method of analysis 
including other dimensions of heterogeneity, such as jobs, economic sectors, 
cities, etc., is recommend for further research in the future. Because this 
technique provides efficient estimates and more detailed explanations, in 
comparison with a single-level one. 
(ii) As we found the application of both quantitative and qualitative methods 
very useful to study the key notions of human capital theory, and that these 
methods are complements, future research can befit from this 
complementarity too. That is, qualitative analysis can enrich the quantitative 
results by exploring the scopes of heterogeneity as well as providing more 
detailed explanations of the findings. In other words, when one seeks to 
investigate "what" types of question, for example To what extent does 
education increase earnings?, the quantitative methods may be more 
relevant to provide convincing answers. However, when the purpose of a 
study is to investigate "why/how" types of question, for example How does 
education increase earnings?, the qualitative methods would be more 
relevant. In the case of human capital analysis of earnings differentials, both 
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kinds of question are involved. In particular, the question "how does 
education improve productivity?" merits further investigation in the future. 
(iii) As mentioned earlier, the accumulation of human capital through learning 
and training on the job varies across jobs, which in turn may create earnings 
differentials across the jobs. This variation, in fact, reflects a degree of a 
hierarchical structure. To evaluate economic benefits attributed to 
(heterogeneity in) human capital accumulation across the jobs more detailed 
data on the characteristics of job and employing a multilevel of analysis 
with an extra level of analysis (e.g., a three-level model in which employees 
are units of level 1, jobs units of level 2 and firms units of level 3) would be 
essential for future investigation. 
(iv) Conventionally, in the Mincerian earnings function the coefficient for years 
of schooling is regarded as the rate of return to education, which is assumed 
to be constant across levels of education. The results of our analyses and 
those of many other investigations show that such an assumption is not 
plausible. That is, the findings suggest that the rate varies with levels of 
education and experience, which indicates that it is unlikely that the 
coefficient for years of schooling provides an unbiased estimation of return 
to education. From the viewpoint of policy implications it is essential to 
evaluate real rates of return to education, which merits further 
methodological and econometric investigation. 
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(v) The evaluation of the economic benefits of training may be of interest 
especially to the employers. As Becker's training theory predicts and our 
qualitative analysis shows, employers expect to recoup the benefits of 
training in the year when training is provided as well as in the future. 
Therefore, to evaluate the benefits of training programmes, in terms of 
methodological issues, one has to incorporate both the current and future 
effects of the investments. Through a longitudinal design it would be 
possible to have more appropriate estimates in that regard that merits 
investigating in the future. 
(vi) It seems that internal labour market is an important mechanism whereby 
employers, for instance, provide motivation for employees to stay at their 
current work place. It is likely that internal labour market is also a 
mechanism that provides a better situation for employees to invest in 
themselves through on-the-job learning and training. This could be another 
interesting area for further empirical studies, especially through using and 
conducting qualitative research methods. 
(vii) The analyses in this study were confined to the investigation of determinants 
of earnings of full-time male employees working in the units of the 
manufacturing sector. It would be of interest to policy makers to extend the 
study by including a sample of other manufacturing units (i.e., small size 
and very large size units), economic sectors, and the self-employed, 
accompanied with a sample of female employees. 
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(viii) The multilevel analysis showed that the contextual firm variables partly 
explain earnings variation across the fines, but a part of earnings variation 
attributable to firm level still remains unexplained. Therefore, there is room 
for future studies to investigate the effect of other factors such as 
productivity growth, technological development, etc. to provide an 
explanation for the variation of earnings across firms. 
8.5 Concluding Comment 
This thesis has shown that, in the manufacturing sector of Iranian industry, the 
amount of education and experience is significantly and systematically associated with 
the earnings of employees. This helps to corroborate the notion that human capital 
acquired through education and experience provides individual economic benefits 
through improving the earning capacity of individuals. These findings are consistent 
with many other analyses of earnings based on human capital theory. It can be 
concluded, therefore, that the modern manufacturing sector labour market in Iran 
functions much like labour markets elsewhere. To the extent that there are differences 
these are differences of degree and detail, not differences in kind. 
This study has also shown that the relatively new statistical technique of 
multilevel modelling provides a powerful tool for examining earnings differentials and 
some of the effects of labour market structures on earnings. In general the use of a 
multilevel model provides evidence for the pecuniary externality effects of human 
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capital. By treating individual firms as second level units of analysis, it has been shown 
that part of the differences in earnings can be attributed to the firms in which individuals 
are working. In particular clusters of highly educated people seem to have a positive 
effect on the amount of human capital created through experience. It would be 
interesting to see whether this finding has wider application. The multilevel technique 
also strengthens the explanatory power of human capital variables. 
Information collected from interviews provided some evidence to support the 
human capital theory interpretation of education rather than pure screening. Although 
many employers use educational qualification as an indicator of likely ability to do a job 
and to learn on the job, it is clear that they consider this ability to have been acquired 
during the process of education rather than as an innate ability. 
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Appendix 1: Variable Definitions 
Table Al: Variable Definitions 




Years of schooling. 
EDUN2 
	
Years of schooling squared. 
EXP 
	
Years of experience. 
EXP2 
	
Years of experience squared. 
SX 
	






Hours of work during a year. 
SIZE 
	
Size of firm (number of employees). 
LOCN 
	
Geographical Location; 1 if the firm located in a big city, 0 otherwise. 
SCTR 
	
Sector or Industry; 1 if the firm produces services, 0 otherwise. 
AV S X 
	
The average of human capital accumulation in each firm (calculated 
through (I(EDUNi + EXP; ))/nj ; where nj is the number of employees in 
firm j). For a discussion concerning alternative ways of calculating the 




The average hours of work in each firm. 
SSIZE 
	
Years of schooling multiplied by size of firm. 
XSIZE 
	
Years of experience multiplied by size of firm. 
SLOCN 
	
Years of schooling multiplied by geographical location. 
XLOCN 
	
Years of experience multiplied by geographical location. 
SSCTR 
	
Years of schooling multiplied by sector or Industry. 
XSCTR 
	
Years of experience multiplied by sector or Industry. 
SAV HRS Years of schooling multiplied by the average hours of work. 
XAV HRS Years of experience multiplied by the average hours of work. 
CONS 
	
Intercept or Constant tem. 
Table A2: Estimated Effects of Different Methods of Weighting Stock of Human 
Capital on Employees' Earnings 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 	 3 Model 4 Model 5 
/3 t-st. /3 t-st. /3 t-st. /3 t-st. /3 t-st. 
CONS 7.176 29.6 7.168 33.9 7.208 37.3 7.171 34.3 7.213 37.4 
EDUN 0.0132 1.7 0.0135 1.7 0.0135 1.7 0.0134 1.7 0.0135 1.7 
EDUN2 0.0011 11.1 0.0011 11.1 0.0011 11.1 0.0011 11.1 0.0011 11.1 
EXP 0.0219 18.9 0.0219 18.9 0.0218 18.8 0.0219 18.9 0.0218 19.0 
EXP2 -0.0005 -13.2 -0.0005 -13.2 -0.0005 -13.1 -0.0005 -13.2 -0.0005 -13.1 
SX 0.00073 10.1 0.00073 10.1 0.0007 10.1 0.00073 10.1 0.0007 10.1 
MANG 0.2607 11.6 0.2607 11.6 0.2609 11.7 0.2609 11.7 0.2609 11.7 
SIZE 5.0E-05 1.3 4.4E-05 1.1 3.9E-05 1.0 4.3E-05 1.1 3.9E-05 1.0 
AV_HRS -0.0002 -3.1 -0.0002 -3.1 -0.0002 -3.4 -0.0002 -3.3 -0.0002 -3.4 
SAV_HRS -6.5E-06 -2.6 -6.4E-06 -2.3 -6.4E-06 -2.3 -6.4E-06 -2.3 -6.4E-06 -2.3 
GAV_SX(1)' (4) 0.6940 2.0 
GAV_SX1(2)' (4) 0.4678 2.4 
W1AV SX(3 I) 0.01827 2.5 
AV_S_X(3 2) 0.01783 2.5 
W2AVSX(3 3) 0.0316 2.5 
Level 2: 
cons/cons 0.0329 0.0299 0.0288 0.0298 0.0289 
edunicons -0.0008 -0.0007 -0.0007 -0.0007 -0.0007 
edun/e dun 8.7E-05 8.4E-05 8.4E-05 8.4E-05 8.4E-05 
exp/cons -0.00037 -0.00034 -0.00033 -0.00034 -0.00033 
exp/exp 1.1E-05 1.1E-05 9.2E-06 9.4E-06 9.1E-06 
exp2/edun 7.1E-07 6.9E-07 6.9E-07 6.9E-07 7.0E-07 
exp2/exp2 9.6E-09 9.6E-09 9.8E-09 9.6E-09 9.8E-09 
mang/mang 0.01204 0.01204 0.01202 0.01201 0.01202 
Level 1: 
cons/cons 0.0232 0.0232 0.0232 0.0232 0.0232 
e dun/c on s -0.0012 -0.0012 -0.0012 -0.0012 -0.0012 
edun/e dun 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006 
exp/cons -0.0009 -0.0009 -0.0009 -0.0009 -0.0009 
exp/edun 3.0E-05 3.0E-05 3.0E-05 3.0E-05 3.0E-05 
exp/exp 7.7E-05 7.7E-05 7.7E-05 7.7E-05 7.7E-05 
-2*1og(/h) -9801.4 -9803 -9803.4 -9803 -9803.4 
(1) j), 	 + ps S, + px x, 




0 	 + 	 Aix XI/ + f X/12 + 13  1: SI/ XI) 
+ 'Z + P„,,,,,.(AvHrs) + p„„,(AvS) + p„„,(AvX) 




(3.2) E(EDUN; + EXP, ))/nj ; where it is assumed that p„„ = I3avx 
(3.3) E( av,/  (Puy, + p„„,)) *EDUNi+ (/3avx  / (p„,, + f3„„))*EXP;))/ni 
It should be noted that in the estimated earnings functions presented in tables of 
chapter 6 it is assumed that average years of schooling in each firm increase earnings of 
employees as much as average years of experience. To calculate average stock of 
human capital in each firm, measured by year, we used E(EDUN, + EXP, ))/ni ; where nj  
is the number of employees in firm j. This assumption may not necessarily be a 
satisfactory assumption for different sets of data and the assumption should be 
supported by empirical evidence. One reasonable way is to use the weighted average 
stock of human capital. For this purpose, the weighted average stock of human capital 
can be calculated, for example, through using E((/„,,, Yavx )*EDUN,+EXP,))/nj, where 
f3„„ and 13„,„ are the contribution of average years of schooling and years of experience 
on earnings, respectively. By doing this, we found the same results for the coefficient of 
average stock of human capital, and the coefficients for other variables remain 
unchanged (Model 3 in comparison with Model 4). 
One may adopt another way of weighting; for instance the coefficients for years of 
schooling and years of experience from the basic Mincerian earnings function (i.e. 
earnings function (1) or (2)) can be used for the purpose of weighting. That is: 
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(4) I( 13,*EDUNi+ pv *Expyri; 
There are some problems with using this approach: 
i. Depending on the specification of Mincerian earnings function (e.g. earnings 
function 1 or 2), the estimated coefficients (i.e. [3, and p,) are different and this 
will affect the measurement of the variable and in turn the estimated effect of the 
variable on earnings, as shown in Models 1 and 2. 
ii. The product variable calculated through multiplying the coefficients by years of 
schooling and years of experience does not have a meaningful scale; it is neither 
year, month, ..., nor dollars/pounds. As a result, it would be difficult to interpret 
the results and to make a comparison. 
iii. The estimates of /3, and Px derived from earnings function (2) are exactly the 
same for the case of this study. It is expected that the estimated effect of the 
weighted average stock of human capital on earnings would be the same as the 
estimated effect of non-weighted average stock of human capital (i.e. the 
coefficient of "GAV-SX1" of Model 2 in comparison with the coefficient of 
"AV S X" of Model 4). As seen from Models 2 and 4, the coefficients are far 
from each other because of scaling issue. 
iv. The target variable is a firm level variable and it would be more reasonable to 
employ weights from the firm level, as suggested in equation (3.1), rather than 
from employee level. 
Therefore, it is more reasonable that the earnings function (3) is estimated for the 
purpose of weighting, because the function should have been employed for separate 
evaluation of the effects of average years of schooling and average years of experience 
on earnings. Nevertheless, since the issue of externality effect of human capital density 
is of interest to economists and policy makers, it would be interesting to see if there are 
more appropriate ways of estimating the average stock of human capital embodied in 
employees in each firm, which merits further investigation. 
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Appendix 2: Questionnaires for Collecting Data of the 
Characteristics of Employees and Firms 
Dear Sir, 
I would be grateful if you would complete the enclosed questionnaires; Questionnaire 1 
consists of the characteristics of full-time male employees, and Questionnaire 2 consists 
of the characteristics of the firm. The questionnaires concern research I am undertaking 
for my Ph.D. thesis, which examines the relationship between investment in human 
capital, earnings and productivity. 
All responses and data provided will be used only in this study and be treated 
confidentially. No references will be made which enable respondents and the units to be 
identified. 
I appreciate your help in advance and the results of the study will be made available to 
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Appendix 3: Questions for Open Interviews 
In the semi-structured interviews, to start with, we asked the respondents about 
the position and significance of candidate's qualifications in recruitment. Then, we 
intentionally asked specific questions about the issues of education, experience, and 
training. Our main purpose was to find evidence about the validity (or otherwise) of the 
productivity-augmenting role of investments in human capital, in general, and 
education, in particular, as assumed in human capital theory. 
Conducting the quantitative analyses of earnings, we found some outliers and that 
a part of earnings variation remains unexplained. We were also interested in finding out 
any possible explanation for such patterns from the viewpoint of respondents. 
Therefore, we asked question about these issues as well. The main questions and issues 
that were addressed in the interviews for the above mentioned aims are as follows:' 
1. Education 
(i) We observe that more highly educated workers/employees are paid more 
compared to less educated ones, as the figures regarding earnings of your employees 
show. Could you explain in further detail why the more educated are paid more? Are 
more educated workers more productive (i.e., are they able to produce more and do they 
It should be noted that the extent to which we were able to elaborate the questions and issues varied 
from interview to interview, because we had no control of time given for the purpose of interviews. 
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contribute more to the profitability of your firm)? If so, is it the case for all 
candidates/employees, or in some cases may the more educated not be more productive? 
Does education improve the productivity of individuals? 
Practically, is it possible to provide any evidence regarding the productivity-augmenting 
role of education in various jobs involved in the production process? 
(ii) Is there any differences among different educational groups (e.g., engineering 
compared with social sciences) concerning the above mentioned issues? How about the 
effect of different educational institutions in terms of the quality of schooling? 
2. Experience 
It is usual to consider experience as another source of accumulation of human 
capital, as is possibly the case in your company. Could you explain to me the position of 
experience in connection with the matter of employees' recruitment and their earnings? 
Considering experience as working years both inside and outside of your company, do 
such kinds of classification concern you? Is there any significant difference in their 
contribution to increasing productivity? If so, is there any relationship between the 
productivity-augmenting role of experience and employees' earnings? 
3. Training 
(i) Do you have any training programme and policy? If so, could you explain to 
me the reasons for having such programmes? Do you consider the programmes as a 
source of updating and improving employees' knowledge and know-how? Do the 
programmes augment the productivity of trainees? [Any evidence?] 
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(ii) Do the training programmes affect the trainees' earnings? [If so, is this 
because of the productivity-augmenting role of training or merely due to the fact that 
the trainees have participated the programmes? Or ...] 
4. Unexplained Part of Earnings Variation and Outliers 
(i) After including all variables in an earnings function, on which we were able to 
collect data, there still remains a part of earnings variation, which is unexplained. Are 
there any other variables and influencing factors that may account for these earnings 
differentials? 
(ii) We also found that some observations are far removed from the rest of the 
observations, and show extreme values. In other words, some employees earned too 
little and some others earned too much in comparison with their counterparts with the 
same human capital. What are the possible causes of such phenomena? 
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